


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West Europe Report

No. 1548



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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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CONTENTS

PAGE

THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

- U.S., French, West German, Soviet Relationships in SALT,
NATO
(Pierre Hassner; POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, Dec 79)..... 1

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

- Briefs
Mertes on U.S. Neutron Weapons 25

FRANCE

- Problems of Creating European Nuclear Force Analyzed
(Jean Klein; POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, Dec 79)..... 26

NETHERLANDS

- Vredeling Warns of Consequences of Antinuclear Weapons Stand
(Henk Vredeling; NRC HANDELSBLAD, 18 Jan 80)..... 35

COUNTRY SECTION

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

- Sweden To Get First Norwegian North Sea Gas in 1981 or
Later
(Per Sjogren; DAGENS NYHETER, 30 Jan 80)..... 42
- General Kuntner Discusses European Strategic Position
(Wilhelm Kuntner; OESTERREICHISCHE MILITAERISCHE
ZEITSCHRIFT, Jan-Feb 80)..... 44

CONTENTS (Continued)

Page

Selected Publications in Political Sciences (REVUE FRANCAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE, various dates).....	56
--	----

Selected Titles of Unpublished Works in the Political Sciences (REVUE FRANCAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE, 3 Jun 79).....	72
--	----

Briefs PCP-PCI Discuss Issues.....	79
---------------------------------------	----

BELGIUM

Flemish Socialists To Discuss Future Political Course (KNACK, 9 Jan 80).....	80
---	----

Government To Debate Purchase of Army Tanks (Frank de Moor; KNACK, 9 Jan 80).....	84
--	----

CYPRUS

TFSC Fiscal 1980 Budget Under Discussion (OLAY, 7 Jan 80).....	88
---	----

Editorial Warns of Pending Unrest in TFSC (Editorial; Resad Kazim; HALKIN SESI, 21 Jan 80).....	92
--	----

'I MAKHI' Urges Mobilization To Counter Caglayangil's 'Challenge' (Editorial; I MAKHI, 16 Feb 80).....	94
--	----

Editorial Notes Smuggling Goes Unchecked in TFSC (Editorial, A. Ginnelli; OLAY, 21 Jan 80).....	95
--	----

Briefs Diplomats at Denktas' Reception.....	97
--	----

DENMARK

Folketing Debates Three Alternatives to 1981-85 Defense Plan (FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 25 Jan 80).....	98
---	----

CONTENTS (Continued)

Page

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Press Discusses Vance Visit, Western Policy (Deutschlandfunk Network, 22 Feb 80).....	100
Paper Views Carter's Measures on Afghanistan (SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, 21 Feb 80).....	102
Weinstein on NATO 'Crisis Cabinet' Suggestion (Adelbert Weinstein; FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 20 Feb 80).....	103
Commentator Chides Bonn for Not Stating Positions (Editorial, Dolf Sternberger; FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 21 Feb 80).....	107
FRG Paper Sees 'Turbulences' in Western Alliance (Editorial, Ulrich Mackensen; FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, 18 Feb 80).....	109
SPD Manager Bahr Justifies Criticism of West (Egon Bahr Interview; ARD Television Network, 20 Feb 80).....	111
Official Views Role of German Navy in NATO (Andreas von Bulow; MARINE-RUNDSCHAU, Jan 80).....	113
Weinstein Criticizes Western Defense Policy (Editorial, Adelbert Weinstein; FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 15 Feb 80).....	116
Weinstein Views FRG Destroyers' Trip to Indian Ocean (FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 19 Feb 80).....	118

FINLAND

SKDL Chairman: Socialism Must Preserve Democracy, Rights (SUOMEN KUVALEHTI, 19 Oct 79).....	119
New Book's Authors Debate State's Role in Easing Jobless- ness (SUOMEN KUVALEHTI, 19 Oct 79).....	121

CONTENTS (Continued)

Page

FRANCE

Briefs

Corsica Worries PCF	124
Marchais Prefers Gromyko	124

GREECE

Prime Minister's Chances for the Presidency Discussed (Kostas Papaioannou; TA NEA, 19 Jan 80).....	125
Foreign Policy Positions Analyzed (Vasos Vasileiou; I VRADYNI, 21 Jan 80).....	129
National Defense Minister Attacks Major Opposition Party (I VRADYNI, 21 Jan 80).....	136
Briefs	
Financing Policy	139
Bauxite Exports	139
Tourist Traffic	139

ITALY

Soviet Ambassador Interviewed on Trade Relations With Italy (Nikita Ryzhov Interview; IL SETTIMANALE, 28 Dec 79)...	141
PRI's Compagna Interview on Problems of the South (Francesco Compagna Interview; IL SETTIMANALE, 10 Jan 80).....	147
Harsh Criticism of DC by Catholic Journal (L'UNITA, 1 Feb 80).....	152
Unions Predict Dramatic Increase in Unemployment (Amedeo Lanucara; IL SETTIMANALE, 24 Jan 80).....	154
Post-Tito Period as Seen by Military Experts (Stefano Brusadelli; IL SETTIMANALE, 24 Jan 80).....	164
Oil Drilling Posing Financial Problems (Paolo Zecchini; IL SETTIMANALE, 24 Jan 80).....	170
Western Press Has No Right To Judge Iran (Editorial, Saverio Vertone; L'UNITA, 1 Feb 80).....	175

NORWAY

Jo Benkow Seen as Strong Candidate To Succeed Retiring Norvik (Eivind G. Karlisen; AFTENPOSTEN, 15 Dec 79).....	178
Economist Discusses Agenda for 1980's (Preben Munthe; AFTENPOSTEN, 28 Dec 79).....	180
Fishing Industry Sees Prospects for 1980's as Uncertain (Knut Vattdal; AFTENPOSTEN, 20 Dec 79).....	184
Volvo-Renault Deal Seen as Important for Norwegian Industry (AFTENPOSTEN, 17 Dec 79).....	187

PORTUGAL

Portuguese Finance Minister on Effects of Escudo Revaluation (DIARIO DE NOTICIAS, 12 Feb 80).....	189
Socialists Continue To Sort Themselves Out (Pedro d'Anunciacao; EXPRESSO, 26 Jan 80).....	191
Future Role of Reformers, Unions Discussed (Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa; EXPRESSO, 2 Feb 80).....	197
EEC Director on Accession Negotiations, Membership in 1983 (Roland de Kergolay Interview; DIARIO DE NOTICIAS, 28 Jan 80).....	201

SWEDEN

Communist Youth Leader Describes Group's Goals (DAGENS NYHETER, 28 Jan 80).....	207
Government To Back Saab in Deal With Fairchild To Build Plane (DAGENS NYHETER, 29 Jan 80).....	209
Volvo To Build Saab-Fairchild Plane Engine With U.S. Firm (Henrik Borgstrom; DAGENS NYHETER, 31 Jan 80).....	211

U.S., FRENCH, WEST GERMAN, SOVIET RELATIONSHIPS IN SALT, NATO

Paris POLITIQUE ETRANGERE in French No 2, Dec 79 pp 275-300

[Article by Pierre Hassner, chief researcher at the Center for International Relations of the [French] National Foundation for Political Science: "United States, USSR, Germany, Europe: Serious Problems, Frivolous Responses"]

[Abstract] The debate which began in France this summer over strategic questions, the role of Germany, America's guarantee, and the Soviet threat corresponds to real worries and questions. But this debate all too often resulted in disappointing exchanges based on errors of fact or interpretation. In strategic matters, the real debate expressed in terms of decoupling or disconnection is not over whether the Americans are defending Europe, but /how/, and /who/ [in italics] will decide on the strategy of deterrence or the means to be adopted. Likewise for the SALT negotiations, the problem is to know how Europe's interests will be taken into account. The evolution of the international context will affect Germany with special intensity. But even those in the FRG who want their country to play a bridging role between East and West do so from the point of view of the primacy of West German national interests anchored to the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community. As to the USSR, it sees no contradiction in pursuing both negotiations and military superiority. Its ideal would be a faint-hearted Europe dependent for its security on Soviet goodwill.

[Text] Frivolous Responses

Will the new strategists take the place of the new philosophers, and the new right give way to the new deterrence? Will the next best-sellers be called, "Germans and French," or "Putting Anti-Germanism Behind Us"? Victorious or scandalous, the Soviet Union was already at a premium on the market; henceforth will the SS-20 compete with CSS 17, and a title such as "Mischief in Moscow" evoke in any reader on the SALT accords?

These questions could almost seriously be asked, seeing on the one hand how questions of defense and international affairs have passed from the domain

of specialists to the covers of weekly papers and the front page of the dailies, and on the other hand how the contributions which animate the debates partake more of the nature of advertising slogans or spy novels than of diplomatic or strategic analysis.

However, it would be wrong to treat this agitation with disdain or vexation. It is quite possible that by the time these lines, written in September 1979, appear, public attention will be occupied by other fads or other cares. But there is good reason to wager that the problems brought into the public domain, in confused or exaggerated form, during the last weeks of summer, will not disappear so quickly, or at least that they will continue to preoccupy leaders and citizens. They correspond to the realization by European and particularly French opinion of a vulnerability to the external world which the sixties had attenuated or hidden and which new circumstances make impossible to gainsay.

Between the time of the coup in Prague and the Cuban Crisis, Europe lived in the shadow of the East-West conflict and (particularly for France, where the fear of war or Soviet invasion was always less than elsewhere) of the conflicts of decolonization. During the sixties and the early seventies, the dangers and confrontations linked to foreign threats or adventures in the East and South seemed far away. Protected from the one by the triple shield of Soviet-American parity, its own nuclear force, and detente, freed of the other by its prosperity and prudence, France could to a certain extent ignore the extra-European world and experience the tensions of internal changes whose profundity was shown by May 1968 and its consequences.

The thunderbolt of 1973 rudely uncovered the fragility of the economic and even military security of the Western developed countries. Detente had encouraged the manifestations of identity of different social groups; it was not the cause. Their aspirations, and the conflicts entailed by them, are not disappearing, but they no longer command priority: more ancient fears resurface; the reflexes of the fifties (fear of the Soviet Union and the third world war) and those of the thirties (fear of the great crisis and the foundering of the economy) battle with them and each other for preeminence.

The relations between the crisis of prosperity and the crisis of detente are complex: on the one hand the dependence of the Western economies on oil and the potential Soviet threat to that supply line tend to link them; on the other hand, the competition between more and more pressing military and social requirements for ever more rare resources tends to oppose them. More than those of the cold war and detente, the era of the "hot peace" is one of uncertainty and perplexity born of the fragility of complexity.

The triple East-West shield is put triply in question: technical progress seems to make nuclear war less impossible, and the inequalities between

nuclear powers less negligible: the balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union swings in favor of the latter; politics in the United States is dominated by an identity crisis, wherein humiliation could lead as easily to revenge as to surrender; and politics in the USSR is dominated by a succession crisis, wherein the combination of military power and economic weakness could lead to adventurism as easily as to cooperation.

Europe perceives that its security rested on two asymmetries: on the one hand, a local Soviet superiority, compensated by strategic American superiority, and on the other hand the rigid but regional character of the Soviet empire, compensated by the looser but more global character of the American empire. This double asymmetry is changing: American strategic superiority gives way, at best, to parity, while the local Soviet superiority grows even greater; outside of Europe, the military presence of the USSR tends to be globalized, and that of the United States to be regionalized.

French opinion senses confusedly that in a world changing politically as much as technologically, the power of national deterrence cannot be considered in its cost, doctrine, or effectiveness as an immutable given. It is just as worried over the conclusions Germany might draw from a putting into question of the framework on which up to now its security has rested. If shared doubts surface about the validity of the Atlantic framework and the viability of national solutions, how can one not wonder if it is not preferable to work toward an autonomous Europe, rather than to drift separately into a Finlandized Europe?

The trouble with the era of the "hot peace" is not only that all issues--those of the cold war and those of detente, those of the economy and those of defense, those of national or regional identity and those of western or global interdependence--are confronting us at once, but also that there is no consensus, either within the democratic countries or amongst them, on either their order of importance and urgency or the responses to make to them.

The assumptions that defined the previous period are indeed shaken, but they are still alive enough to permit those with the desire to bet on their permanence. The strategic balance of the great powers and the capitalist economy, the presence of troops and American nuclear arms in Europe and the invulnerability of the French atomic submarines, the advantages of detente for the USSR and the special reasons France and the FRG have for clinging to it: none of all that is at the point of collapse, or of being sacrificed lightly in favor of revolutionary solutions. From the new growth to the European defense (sic), these solutions appear simultaneously indispensable in the long term, unfeasible in the short term, nebulous in conception on the part of those who propose them, and full of traps and hazards for those who, justly, would like to draw from them the inspiration for their policies in the medium term.

It is true that by balking overly much at the complexity and ambiguity of the situation one runs the risk of resigning oneself to the status quo or to navigation by guess-work. But if one is not aware of them, one risks precipitating changes one hopes to prevent, or encouraging faults one wishes to fight. A notion such as deterrence, a political and psychological situation such as that of Germany, a phase like the "hot peace": the nature of all these concepts is such that any truth formulated with respect to them can be turned on its head and risks being transformed into a catastrophic error if one wants to push it to its logical conclusion, or if one leaves it to the fantasies and frenzies of the "great simplifiers."

It is surprising that these great simplifiers are found less among the public than among the experts or leaders who claim to enlighten and mobilize that public.

If one believes the opinion polls, the French public, without wishing to abandon the national deterrent force and the Atlantic Alliance, supports movement toward a European perspective.

The American public for its part senses a deterioration in the balance of power between the United States and the USSR; it concludes from this that America must not only make a greater military effort but also that it must make a greater commitment to the protection of its allies, especially those in NATO, without however indulging in futile interventions in cases such as that of Iran or the participation of communists in Western European governments.

Finally, the German public continues as ever to believe in Europe; it believes less in detente than in the Golden Age of *Outpolitik* [in italics], in the early seventies; it senses that the balance is tipping against the United States. This leads it at one and the same time to repose less confidence in the U.S., and to value NATO more highly. None of the three groups appear to manifest a complacent optimism, or a defeatist or aggressive panic (1). This makes the dogmatic excesses of commentators even less comprehensible.

We will pass over the work of the brilliant journalist, casting doubt on changes in the balance of power in Europe, distorting the intention and substance of a report from which he draws conclusions opposite those which emerge from an attentive reading (2). We will pass over the two dapper socialist leaders, as comfortable with Marx as with Ceres, who in a few short lines accumulate a record number of errors of fact and beg the questions with stunning success ("The most striking fact about the recent period is that the United States and the Soviet Union have been employing the same approach to problems of security," declares one; "It is clear today that the two superpowers share the same planetary vision of world security," declares the other, going him one better, in sheer defiance of the installation of the new missiles in Europe and of the conflicts in the

Third World). Other affirmations of the same ilk succeed in combining the most debatable and mutually incompatible principles of the Gaullist tradition and the Social-Democratic tradition. "Treaties having delimited the spheres of the two superpowers, the danger lies in the one of our continent as a theater of conflict unleashed by the two superpowers and by them alone." Graduated response is the instrument of this concerted will of the two great powers to breach the thermonuclear taboo by common consent against each other in Europe; but on the one hand, the existence of the French force--uncommitted to combat--suffices to avert this danger, without posing any problem of credibility, and, on the other hand, the solution of the European problem would be "the withdrawal of stationed forces and strategic nuclear arms from the center of Europe" (which would truly leave behind denuclearization vast uncertainties as to the face of Germany, the possibility of domination by the USSR, and the outcome of battle (4)).

We will pass over Maurice Druon, the RPR (Rally for the Republic) deputy, committee reporter to the Western European Union, who employs his talents as a fantasist to affirm casually that the Germans are readying the nuclear bomb. We will also pass over the distinguished economist and the European soldiers and activists who, inversely, choose to adorn their calls for a European defense with cries of alarm as sensational as contradictory (Europe devoured by Carter and destroyed like Hiroshima), but without analyzing the divergent perspectives, situations, and interests of the western European nations and the scope they leave for common action (4). But it is more serious when real experts or onetime and future leaders compromise their credibility and prejudice the cause they claim to support. Thus, General Hackett, ex-commander in chief of the British Army of the Rhine, surrounded by the best military and diplomatic experts in the United Kingdom, launches a best-seller on the third world war which seems to result from an accumulation of the most trying and incomprehensible implausibilities: the USSR, to get out of internal difficulties, invades Yugoslavia; Washington sends in its "Marines"; the Russians attack Central Europe without using nuclear weapons; they allow themselves to be stopped, still by conventional means, decide to have recourse to the bomb elsewhere, and find no better use for it than to destroy...Birmingham (5)!

More substantial but, by this fact, still more serious, were the two brilliant exploits of the summer. One was the work of two excellent experts known for their intransigent support of the national nuclear force, General Buis and Alexandre Sanguinetti (who not long ago was still demanding the withdrawal of French troops from Germany) and who today propose, or seem to, or seemed to propose building Europe around a Franco-German nuclear collaboration; the other was the work of Henry Kissinger who, to give more force to his call for rearmament at all levels (American and European, nuclear, strategic, intercontinental, continental, tactical, even conventional, in Europe and beyond Europe) drew an outrageously gloomy picture, of his own past doctrinal errors and of American credibility during the difficult decade of the 1980's. In both cases, the appeal was not without

prophetic inspiration and practical import; in both cases, the argument ends by unjustly discrediting that which already exists and which it was hoped to strengthen (the French nuclear force in one case, NATO in the other), and by giving ammunition to the opponents of that which, in principle, at least, one hoped to promote: in one case European independence, in the other American recommitment.

All the spate of interviews, denials, clarifications, challenges, turnabouts, and winks which followed the 20 August interview of Buis and Sanguinetti only served to obscure more deeply the motive of their initiative: was it, as A. Sanguinetti seems to suggest, to save a French nuclear force which has become too costly and risks being obsolesced by technological advance, or, as General Buis sometimes seems to suggest, to prepare a future united Europe, or, as he implies at other times, to show, by extrapolating it to the extreme, that it is impossible? Could it be simply to persuade the Germans to contribute to the financing of a French force over whose use it would have no control? Could it be to allow a German finger on the nuclear trigger, with the problems of practical coordination and the dangers of separate utilization which that would bring with it? Could it be simply to prepare the conditions for a force which could only be held in reserve for that distant day when the President of the United States of Europe could on his own make it credible and acceptable? Would German withdrawal from NATO be a preliminary or a final curtain? Are the Soviet menace and Soviet superiority, as Buis and Sanguinetti affirm in opposition to the majority of their colleagues, quite exaggerated? In another vein, is the pursuit of detente leading, as they along with many French and Poles believe, to the reunification to which above all else German policy would aspire? And, in this case, why would the latter want to embark with France upon a European adventure, sacrificing simultaneously a not that inadequate American protection against a not that powerful and aggressive USSR, and a detente which gave promise of reunification? And why would France itself, if American protection has never been weak, and if the Soviet threat is hardly more formidable than before, want to change its policy in this spectacular way?

But what interests us here more are the conceptual rigidities and the errors of fact.

Thus, according to General Buis, "everyone knows that since the Soviets provided themselves with strategic nuclear arms capable of hitting the American sanctuary, the Americans have gotten NATO to accept the abandonment of deterrence in favor of the graduated response," and "the possible use of theater nuclear forces does not risk a retaliatory blow on American soil." (6) Besides, at the level of tools, that is to say of weapons systems realized by complementarity and the financing of the two great continental powers, the deterrent capability would have absolute credibility." (7)

As if graduated response and massive retaliation were not in fact two types of deterrence, about whose credibility one could debate endlessly (although

neither past experience, that of failures in Indochina, nor recent technological changes, confer any awards for effectiveness on the second). As if the ideas of absolute credibility--or non-credibility--were meaningless in the context of nuclear discussions necessarily founded on uncertainty. As if, once nuclear fire were unleashed, the Soviets could be certain, contrary to their doctrine, that there would be no escalation to the strategic level. And as if, conversely, the credibility of a Franco-German deterrent would not be influenced--beyond types of weaponry--by the type of threat the two countries were facing, and by the respective vulnerability of their societies, by the degree of redundancy in their military apparatus and the degree of solidarity in their policies.

Coming to facts, in the same article designed to show the naivety of NATO plans, General Buis-Chooses, in order to discredit them in a convincing enough manner, the old project--perennially proposed but never commanding wide support--of the Los Alamos laboratory based on miniaturized nuclear arms being able to strike only enemy forces operating on NATO territory. He does not say a word, by contrast, about the real plan (adopted in principle by NATO and which this autumn will be at the center of its discussions and of Soviet campaigns [of opposition]), consisting of putting in place on the European continent nuclear missiles capable, in response to the Soviet SS-20, of reaching the territory of the USSR.

General Gallois has maintained a similar strange silence, though his recent works evidence a more realistic appreciation of the complex and changing character of the technological and political situation than one finds among his belated disciples.

After having long predicted the denuclearization of Europe by the Americans and seeing in each withdrawal of vulnerable tactical nuclear weapons a confirmation of his ideas, he must explain the neutron bomb project. He does so by an audacious reconstruction of the SALT negotiations in which, as we understand it, tactical weapons were by definition not considered, and from which the advanced FBS [expansion unknown] systems, capable of reaching Soviet territory, have been excluded up to now--albeit they are preparing to make their appearance in the second and third stages. "In the course of the bilateral discussions deceptively called strategic arms limitation talks, the Soviets noted that they had not deployed any tactical nuclear weapons on the borders of the United States and, intending to negotiate a perfectly symmetrical agreement, they called on the Americans to remove theirs. But how to respond to such a demand without upsetting the allies, who see their safety only in the continuance of this formidable potential for destruction on their soil? Interim measures were taken. The Pentagon progressively removed the weapons of high yield and long and medium range and, in exchange, deployed widely low-yield shells in short-range weapons systems. An old technique suddenly exhumed, the enhanced radiation weapon which has been discussed much of late constitutes one of the means of responding to the Soviet expectation, all the while appearing to provide a compensation to the allies." (8)

How to reconcile this interpretation with the abandonment of the neutron bomb (the object of attacks by the USSR and of allied lack of enthusiasm) and especially with the idea (introduced to respond to the anxiety of Chancellor Schmidt about the Euro-strategic balance and today supported by the Americans despite the hesitation of the European allies) of replacing the Pershing I by more powerful and long-range weapons? Doubtless, without going so far as to join the camp of Sarre and Metchane in seeing here a joint Soviet-American determination to seal their agreement with a nuclear war on European soil (including of course the soil of Russian Europe!) one can see a danger of uncoupling. But what then to say of the logical status of a theory for which either withdrawal or installation of the same weapon would be equally convincing proofs of the same American intent to uncouple?

The Americans themselves are not free of such misunderstandings. Thus Henry Kissinger showed himself anxious, in his celebrated speech in Brussels, to reestablish the credibility of a widened American deterrent. In going against the grain to rehabilitate previous views, the notions of strategic superiority and counterforce, he ends up making such a radical critique of deterrence by the assured destruction of cities (the only kind of deterrence in which opponents of the graduated response believe) and on the extent of the respective vulnerability of American and Soviet forces in the 1980's that in fact he casts doubt, by the example of his own theoretical volatility or linguistic duplicity, on the commitment and the alliance he hopes to reinforce.

In light of this, European doubts will inevitably converge on the degree to which the program recommended by Kissinger would promise to restore American credibility: does the latter require strategic superiority? A first-strike capability? Or simply a greater capacity to hit military targets than what the United States already has? Beyond this, the plan to modernize theater nuclear forces runs the risk of being interpreted in a framework of "uncoupling" rather than one of "re-coupling." Kissinger's versatility and ambiguity should not be surprising, even if, this time, his acrobatics seem a bit rusty. It is more surprising to see French statesmen justly known as apostles of precision and enemies of glibness taking spectacular liberties with the most basic historical truths and with diplomatic prudence.

Thus, Michel Debre, who states one day that West Germany is trying to build nuclear weapons, the next that it is not, never wavers on one point: in all his articles, press conferences, and recent debates on the subject, he claims that "the United States and the Soviets agreed in 1973 in writing that their strategic arms were intended for the defense of their own territory and would never be used for the defense of others" (9), or, in another formulation, "when the Americans and Russians agreed, several years ago, not to employ nuclear weapons except in response to threats to their own territory, they wrote down in black and white the expression of

a reality which was indispensable to them' (10). Neither the Washington accord of June 1973 for the prevention of nuclear war, if that is the text of which he speaks, nor any other Soviet-American text, contains a provision of this kind, or makes a distinction between the employment of nuclear (or strategic) weapons for [protection of] the territory of the great powers or of others.

The notion of sanctuary, which is an obsession in French strategic thought, corresponds perhaps to reality; it certainly does not correspond to the avowed doctrine of the great powers; if one can see traces of it in certain Soviet propositions and in the protocol to SALT II, nevertheless the United States has stated since the time of the 1973 accord that it did not limit in any way its right to use nuclear weapons for the defense of its allies. It continues to reject proposals by the Warsaw Pact to NATO for banning first use of nuclear weapons; the commitment, made in the context of the Geneva conference on disarmament, not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear powers contains an exception concerning the allies of a nuclear power, precisely to cover the case of a conventional attack on Western Europe by the forces of the Warsaw Pact. Cyrus Vance's statement of 11 September 1979 re-affirms, in the context of present discussions, that the United States intends to use any means necessary, including nuclear, to defend Europe, even in the case of a conventional attack.

Would it do this if deterrence were dead? Nothing can prove it, but one can show that it has not pledged to refrain from it [using nuclear weapons], and that neither the Schlesinger doctrine, envisioning a role for the central systems in the European theater, nor the introduction in the European theater of nuclear weapons capable of reaching the Soviet Union, would be comprehensible if the commitment touted by Michel Dobry existed.

As to the article published even here by Michel Jobert (11), one can be equally astonished by his historical references. He said, for example, that it was after the Franco-German Treaty of 1962 (deprived, however, of any significance, as the author indicates, by its preamble), that the USSR renounced the quest for the reunification of Germany and applied itself to obtaining the signing of a peace treaty. In fact, it was in 1955, after the failure of the CED [European Defense Community] and the signature of the accords of Paris, that the USSR expressed to a delegation of Social-Democrats from Germany its opposition to German reunification, and in 1956 that Khrushchev declared to a French delegation: "Take care of your Germans, and we'll take care of ours." For the latter it was the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 which convinced Willy Brandt, as he has told it, of the necessity of accepting the GDR.

More generally, it is disconcerting to see Michel Jobert, armed with an article from the JOURNAL DE GENEVE, affirm in defiance of all German and Soviet testimony the plausibility of a unification blessed by the USSR in exchange for a German declaration of neutrality. Does this last notion,

implying withdrawal from NATO, spring from a diplomatic or classic legalistic sensibility, or from a psychological attitude, currently known by the name of Finlandization?

Michel Robert must be given credit for placing himself in the same tradition of "overturning of pros and cons" that is well demonstrated in the formulations of Khrushchev on the dynamic nature of the status quo and in the famous words of Willy Brandt: "To change the status quo, one must accept it," which defines the very essence of the European situation. He must be faulted for not seeing that the structural constraints of this situation, in forcing policies to rest all their hopes on the slow and imperfectly controllable evolution of ways of thinking, overshadow not only the methods but even the objectives themselves. They bar both strategies as deliberate and results as spectacular as those envisaged. Neither diplomacy nor military force can on this part of the globe and at this moment in history, aspire to the classical aims of conquest, neutrality, or national reunification. Beyond the veil of military scenarios and diplomatic formulas, the real stakes are psychological and political. They affect the degree of confidence or mistrust, or in other words the respective degrees of unity, dynamism and freedom of action of the two Germanies, the two Europes, and the two great powers; and they affect the scope of independence and influence available to the European nations, and in particular to France.

Questions Raised

The debate on all-round defense and whatever confusion our remarks so far have added oblige us to proceed to a positive reconstruction. We are to some extent released from this obligation by the recent articles of Francois de Rose, since we can only subscribe to his conceptual restatements and to his practical short-term recommendations, if not necessarily to his skepticism about the long term (12). What we would like to point out quickly, though, is a certain number of paradoxes and "perverse effects" which the complexity of the European strategic and political situation obliges any serious analysis to take into account, whether we speak of the balance of deterrence or of the evolution of the main actors.

/The United States and Europe: Coupling, Uncoupling, and Recoupling/ [in italics]

Let us leave the strategic situation. In one sense, the present debates on the value of American protection and the force of deterrence only resurrect both the great debates of the end of the fifties and the early sixties, and dilemmas inherent in the very idea of nuclear deterrence which were perceived by some from the first days of nuclear weaponry. In another sense, if the questions are still the same, the answers differ at each stage of the eternal circular debate in accordance with the evolution, sometimes diverging, of the three factors we have discussed above: the state of technology, the balance of power, and the state of political relations.

What is permanent is the dilemma of deterrence in general and more particularly the dilemmas of extended deterrence and of the connection between

the relative stability or instability at different levels, from the sub-conventional to the total nuclear.

The dilemma of the two faces of deterrence (the terms of the threat and the credibility of its being put into execution) exists even in the case of a nuclear monopoly; it is augmented when it comes to deterring an adversary capable in turn of responding with atomic reprisals and it is rendered still more acute when it comes not only to preventing an attack against oneself, but an attack (even more starkly, a conventional attack) against one's ally. Which is the greatest deterring factor: the degree of probability or the degree of destruction? An infinitesimal probability of total destruction or a certainty of infinitesimal destruction fail to deter: but, between these two [extremes], where is the optimum? Must the strategy of deterrence and the strategy of employment be yoked together, by only threatening what could be effectively delivered (this was Mr. MacNamara's tendency)? Or should one separate them completely, by threatening total reprisals while preparing for alternate courses of action should deterrence fail (as General Beaufre wanted)? Or should one bank everything on deterrence and surrender or commit suicide if it fails? Let us take note here of a paradox: the Americans favor credibility and the French massive reprisals: but the argument supporting the deterrence of the strong by the weak rests on the greater--because more credible--deterrent value of the threat of a smaller reprisal (assuming it is for protection of oneself or an immediate neighbor), compared to the threat of a reprisal more devastating but less probal exercised by a great protector.

While the conceptual debate may be permanent, the arguments of the two sides gain or lose strength according to the changes in technology. At the time when the essence of the strategic revolution introduced by nuclear weapons consisted in the enormity of the explosive power provided by a very small number of carriers, technology favored the arguments of supporters of massive retaliation, or of minimum deterrence, or of mutual assured destruction, while anything except anticity retaliation seemed marginal or utopian. A second revolution, not less impressive, was heralded long ago by A. Wolstetter (13): that of accuracy. Since its advent, discrimination, selective nuclear options, in short those counterforce capabilities other than the first strike totally eliminating the retaliatory forces of the adversary, became of central importance, and it was their opponents who found themselves on the defensive. Now we are watching the slow death of that dream, common to supporters of arms control and of deterrence of the strong by the weak, of a technological plateau which would permit stabilization of the arms race and assurance in the long term the invulnerability of forces, the vulnerability of populations, and a certain qualitative equality of nuclear powers.

From which emerges a new paradox in regard to American protection and French deterrence. In the short term, the United States finds itself in a difficult position, as Henry Kissinger emphasized, for practicing an active alliance policy and extended deterrence: Soviet progress has shifted the

balance of vulnerability, the American Minutemen becoming more vulnerable and the Soviet silos less so. But in the long term technological change favors rather discrimination, counterforce, indeed perhaps antimissile defense, which would enable the United States, if it can take advantage of it, to practice an extended deterrence and a more active and credible alliance policy.

For the French force, the situation is the reverse. At present it has certainly reached the highest level of credibility it has ever known. It is paradoxical that doubts are expressed about it by certain of its warmest supporters precisely at the moment when, even by the testimony of foreigners, it most merits being taken seriously, and when on the other hand the corresponding doubts about the United States seem to confirm the analysis of those who created it. But in the long term the general process of change is clearly working against it on the technological plane. The SS-20 of the Soviets casts doubts on the land-based components; more generally, if the qualitative race continues, there is no guarantee against a breakthrough in antisubmarine warfare or antimissile defense. The costs of the doctrine and use of the French force could be changed.

The arena where doctrinal, technological, military, and political considerations meet, in the center of traditional alliance controversies and of the present polemics is of course the Western European theater of operations, and especially the central front, and its relationship to the strategic balance.

The idea that nuclear stability entails instability on the conventional level and makes limited war more probable dated from the early fifties; General Beaufre added to this the idea of the crucial importance of tactical nuclear weapons designed to stabilize the lower level by destabilizing somewhat the higher level. In effect, from the time when reciprocal anticity deterrence by its very existence made extended deterrence difficult, and when both a general nuclear free-for-all and purely conventional response were equally unacceptable, nothing further remained but the effort to build a counterforce capability, whether on the strategic level, the tactical level, or on both together. In short, the central concept of deterrence became escalation, and continuity came to complement or substitute for a faltering superiority. The dictum of Schelling: "Deterrence is not based on the rationality of a decision but on the unpredictability of a process" remains more valuable than ever.

The real debate expressed today in terms of "decoupling" is that of the relationship between the different rungs of the ladder of escalation. Like all true debates it has no solution, apart from the certainty of unpredictability and the latter's intrinsic deterrent value.

The rational core of the absurd formulations we have discussed is this: Europeans and Americans both want to avoid war in Europe, of whatever kind,

and to prevent any such war from entailing total suicide if it should occur. But for the Europeans the difference between the two propositions is less than for the Americans, and they are thus prepared to accept a greater risk of total nuclear war, and the Americans a greater risk of limited European war.

If, from the point of view of deterrence, both share an interest in sustaining the continuity of the ladder of escalation, from the standpoint of employment, should deterrence fail, it would be in the interest of the Americans to look for discontinuity to limit the escalation. But the essential point is that, as long as their troops and nuclear weapons are stationed in Europe, they cannot be assured of finding it, and the potential Soviet aggressor, with even less assurance, would have an interest in eliminating these American human and nuclear hostages, if ever he attacked, because of their potential to carry the war to the strategic level. The words of the author of these lines more than 10 years ago (14)--"In the nuclear age only those pledges which can be fulfilled even if their author no longer wants to do so are meaningful," and "pledges without hostages are idle words"--seem even more applicable today than when they were written.

From which spring the inane categorically repeated assertions regarding each lower level--conventional, tactical nuclear, and today continental systems of medium range--as well as regards strategic nuclear forces or national tactical forces or an eventual European nuclear force, on the subject of their positive or negative effect on the American commitment and on the probability of escalation to the strategic level. One can only say: "We don't know" or "That depends," both on technological conditions and on the political context. In each case, there is a chance of decoupling because the Americans will have a tendency to try to limit the conflict to the lower level or to extricate themselves from risks they cannot control. In each case, there is a risk (or the possibility) of escalation, thus there is a recoupling and a deterrence because at each level the fact that a taboo (that of war itself or of nuclear weapons or of Soviet territory) will have been breached increases the risks of escalation to the next level.

If this ambiguity and unpredictability remain valuable under any conditions, the evolution of our three factors can tip the balance psychologically to one side or the other. Some Europeans, particularly in France, encouraged by a poor interpretation of Kissinger's declarations, think that with the stationing in Europe of several hundred thousand American soldiers, thousands of tactical nuclear weapons, and possibly medium range weapons capable of reaching the Soviet Union, American extended deterrence is reduced to zero. This is as absurd as to maintain, as some Americans try to argue and as some Europeans try or appear to believe, that, since the United States still retains the capacity to inflict serious reprisals on the Soviet Union, the enormous Soviet build-up serves no purpose and the strategic situation in Europe is unchanged from the sixties.

If the final results of extended American deterrence (a second strike against Soviet cities and European hostages) are still out of reach, the reversal of the balance of vulnerability, which is evident as much in the European theater as on the bilateral Soviet-American plane, nonetheless entails a major consequence: the Americans no longer have control over escalation, that is to say the choice of passing or not passing to a more advantageous higher level. The result is that, to the degree that despite everything they do retain some control, they will hesitate even more to take the step. Their deportment in other regions and in other areas, along with the differences of interest and perception which separate them from Europeans, are not such as to inspire the latter with confidence. From this fact, this fear, perhaps exaggerated, of a strategic decoupling, feeds a certain European political decoupling on the plane of detente if not on that of security.

In the final analysis, it is this reciprocal political decoupling which constitutes the real problem. The strategic question is not whether the Americans will defend Europe but /how/ and /who/ will decide on the strategy of deterrence and the means of implementing it. Similarly, on the plane of SALT negotiations, the question is not whether they are directed against Europe, or whether they leave Europe out, but /how/ they take into account the latter's interests.

Now in both cases the distinction between the territory of the two superpowers and that of their allies has tended to be accentuated. Curiously, this is more clear on the plane of diplomatic practice than on that of military practice: in the SALT II negotiations, the Soviet Backfire bomber is only considered a problem if it can reach the United States, and the SS-20 is not governed by the same rules which apply to its intercontinental kin. That implies an acceptance of the Soviet definition of what is strategic (that which can hit the territory of one of the superpowers) and, combined with the protocol to SALT II which suspends the deployment of land- and sea-based cruise missiles of range greater than 600 km, constitutes the first confirmation of the French theories of sanctuary. Reciprocally, the hesitation of some Europeans, especially the Germans, to accept as remedies to the European strategic imbalance either the neutron bomb or the medium range missiles, suggests a tendency to political decoupling in relation to the Soviet Union.

This is certainly why the soundings and current negotiations within the West and on the East-West plane seem to have a decisive importance. Once more, what will be decided will carry weight, one way or the other, according to the spirit in which the decision is taken. NATO nuclear modernization could itself have a "decoupling" significance or effect if, impossibly, it were subordinated to negotiations with the USSR which would confirm Soviet superiority in this domain; above all if it were accompanied by acceptance of American inferiority at the strategic level; or again, if modernization ended by limiting itself to weapons of range limited to western Europe.

Conversely, if it is linked to an augmentation of the American intercontinental counter-force capability to fulfill missions in Europe, if it does not look toward a regionally complete balance which would make that intercontinental role superfluous, and finally if it unequivocally involved the capacity to reach the USSR from European territory, it will play a decisive part in reestablishing the continuity between the territory of the two great powers and that of their allies.

If the Americans decide to install missiles capable of hitting the Soviet Union on German soil, and if the Germans accept them and bear the onslaught of Soviet protest, nothing could better demonstrate that the Americans are not in the process of creating sanctuary for themselves nor the Germans in the process of self-Finlandization.

It is the same with European initiatives. If the latter presuppose the dissolution of NATO, whether in the name of a French-German nuclear force, or in the name of disengagement from the great powers, which would lead, under color of collective security to the neutralization of Germany, and thus Europe, they could only precipitate decoupling from America. But if, without implying France's reentry into NATO or its partners' withdrawal from it, these initiatives strengthen in the European theater the presence, through the mediation of France, of a supplementary center of decision by giving it a European significance through industrial cooperation and strategic concert, they will contribute today to deterrence and tomorrow to the treatment of negotiations and crises, indeed of escalation.

In the longer term, they will contribute to keeping open, on the plane of SALT and MBFR negotiations as on that of strategic speculation, the European option which present political conditions preclude from becoming an operational reality but whose active preservation has an immediate political significance: that of a refusal to submit to anyone's veto.

If, instead of refusing alliance with the United States and detente with the Soviet Union, or submitting unconditionally to it, the Europeans choose it with eyes open, but still doing what is necessary to maintain the credibility of a European reserve option in case of decline or blackmail of one or the other of the superpowers, they will improve the long term quality of their relations with each of them. Without the freedom to be oneself, there is no constructive dialog.*

* This is the only point on which I would express a certain divergence, if not from Francois de Rose who declared in "France and the Defense of Europe" (Seuil, 1976) his hope that "the European nations will one day want to make of themselves an entity disposing of that essential attribute of independence which is the capacity for its own defense," at least from the articles he has written in LE MONDE. Lack of time and resources seems to argue more for nuclear independence than against it. As to the incompatibility of a military budget on the order of that of the Soviet Union with our values

/West Germany: Entangled (alliver or Poorly Chained Prometheus?/
[in italics]

Everyone must feel that the delicate balance between contradictory positions which characterizes European defense applies particularly to West Germany, at once because it is West Germany which is obliged to take military considerations most seriously and because its economic power and its division impose on it in turn both vulnerabilities and trumps, constraints and risks which multiply yet more these contradictions.

In a general way, one can speak of the multiplier effect of the German situation, an effect which, paradoxically, plays a paralyzing role for the policy of Bonn. The Germans are neither more pro-American, nor more pro-European, nor more nationalistic, nor more pro-Soviet than other Europeans; but, on the one hand, their situation forces them to be everything at the same time, and on the other hand, any time they emphasize (even to a lesser degree than their allies) one of these four dimensions, they excite such a concert of suspicions and protests that they must precipitously outdo themselves to reinforce the others.

In France, even if Raymond Aron seems to have struck the right note in speaking of "Gaullism in a minor key," (15) how much exaggeration there is in every direction!

One side tends to present the FRG as being always the Germany of Adenauer or rather of Erhard, whether to defend it, like those who have made of themselves the just and honorable witnesses to its conversion to western democracy, or to attack it, like those who have picked, in order to make themselves the anachronistic procurators of a German-American Europe, the moment when tension and misunderstanding between Washington and Bonn are so great that the latter turns toward Paris and Europe precisely to defy the former.

Others see a change so radical that they imagine, like Buis and Sanguinetti, Germany is ready to sacrifice NATO and detente on the altar of its

* and our political systems, one could turn back on F. de Rose the argument he employs in connection with the negotiations on medium range missiles. If one announces at the start of the game that one cannot match the effort of one's interlocutor, one gives oneself up for lost in the negotiations. However, the England of World War II made a mobilization effort more efficient than that of Hitler's Germany without renouncing its freedoms, and the great western countries maintained budgets in the fifties comparable to the Soviet Union's without adopting for all that its political system; this is again today the case with Israel. We would stress, in any case, that it is not a question of recommending such an effort today, but of recommending against excluding the possibility if changed political circumstances made it necessary, under threat of Finlandization. Let us recall finally that it is not necessary to be a fanatic believer in the "equalizing power of the atom" to think that a European nuclear force would not need to be of superpower magnitude to enjoy a respectable credibility.

rapprochement with Paris or even, like Jopert, that it is ready to sacrifice Europe, the West, and its own independence to throw itself into the arms of Moscow in exchange for reunification.

All these perspectives are false if considered in isolation or as absolutes. But they contain at the same time enough actual or potential reality to be able to lead to dangerous traumas, both for Germany and for the world, if leaders and partners are lacking in wisdom. On the other hand, if the former can channel them, they can lead to a decisive contribution to the autonomy of Western Europe, and to its security and influence on the evolution of Eastern Europe. As Christoph Bertram has happily pointed out in his review (16), if there is one thing of which Germans are conscious despite their new spirit of initiative, it is certainly that their fate is determined more by the international context than by themselves.*

But is there or not a new perception of this international context in the FRG? In our opinion, the dominant perception remains that of West German national interest (as opposed to pan-German) in terms of security (assured above all by the American alliance), prosperity (assured above all by the capitalist system) and legitimation (assured by the reconciliation with all its neighbors, especially France, in the framework of the building of Europe but also with the countries of the East in the framework of détente).

However, diminished confidence in the United States leads the FRG to search more actively for additional security (above all through détente) and prosperity (above all through Europe), as much to protect European currencies from the vicissitudes of the dollar as to protect the weakest economies from a collapse that would risk bringing with it the whole system. If there are no active politics of reunification--much less any of a serious nature--there is still an immediate human interest in the fate of the human beings in Eastern Europe and, in the long term, a historic interest in maintaining German culture beyond the separation into several states: the rewards of Ostpolitik along this double path are added to the considerations of security and prosperity to make the West German leaders circumspect regarding the idea of rupturing their relations with the East. Finally, a polarization of internal politics and of the international context could push some to the left of the SPD or to the right of the CDU toward what one could call in a crude way "self-Finlandization" in one case, and "German Gaullism" in the other. These two tendencies are today

* Cf. Herman Rudolph, "Welches Gewicht hat die Nation", FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, 29 March 1979. "For the governmental coalition no subject of discussion is more avoided than the idea that it is the international interest which must determine the scope offered to German politics and not the reverse, that is German national interest determining the direction of international politics." This is what Bahr was trying to say when he stated in a polemic manner that "peace would die before the nation."

very marginal, but one can perceive echoes of them in certain statements of Bahr, Wehner, and Strauss.

When an English observer wrote that in 1978 a West German Government "thought and acted for the first time on the basis of Gaullist or semi-Gaullist principles," (17), he referred to the creation of the European monetary system, in which he saw a challenge, or at least the hint of a challenge, to the dollar. But that did not imply for him a similar situation in the domain of defense. On the other hand, even as regards the economic domain and the increased interest attached by Chancellor Schmidt to European autonomy, everything is only "semi-".

One of the psychological bases of the Atlantic Alliance, German-American intimacy, has declined, not only because of the paucity of atoms at the summit, but also because of serious divergences of views and interests on the economy and, in a still more serious vein, because, as Gunther Gillesen has observed (18), the cultural and political elites of the two countries are less and less interested in each other.

Toward the East, the dreams of the SPD left, the aspirations of the East German dissidents emigrating to or published in the West, like Bierman and Haveman, those of the officials of Pankow, authors of the manifesto published by DER SPIEGEL, converge with the majority of the people of the GDR, and with a vague central European cultural consciousness in the West German public (19), to keep the German question open. In this sense, one of the interpretations of Adenauer's choice for Europe and of the recognition of the GDR by Brandt (suppressing the special situation of the FRG to make of it a Western European country like any other) is to some extent a failure.

Neither of these two developments should be seen in a dramatic or simplistic way. On the one hand, West Germany is not on the point of becoming Gaullist nor even of establishing an anti-American policy. It is much too conscious of its continuous--and indeed growing--need of American protection and of the unfavorable reactions it would arouse on all sides if it should try to play the big-shot.

From the point of view of NATO, polls indicate that by contrast to the year 1971, when optimism born of detente and Ostpolitik was actively encouraging neutralist tendencies, the present pessimism is leading to a return to NATO, which has never been as popular. 80 percent of Germans questioned support NATO in its present form, compared to 61 percent in 1976. 87 percent believe that the presence of American troops in the Federal Republic helps to guarantee peace, compared to 48 percent in 1970. 83 percent believe this presence indispensable and important compared to 72 percent in 1970.

In the other direction, the East, one finds a corresponding move toward hardening and pessimism. Only 22 percent of Germans questioned think

relations between the FRG and the Soviet Union are going to improve, compared to 56 percent in 1972. 73 percent are in favor of a more active policy toward the GDR; in 1972 this was only supported by 30 percent.

This last figure is one of the most interesting because it indicates that evolving opinion conforms more closely with the views of Franz Josef Strauss and the CDU opposition than to the federal government, not to mention Bahr and Wehner. But whatever the differences over degree of toughness or openness to maintain with regard to the USSR or the GDR, no important political figure from left of the SPD to the right of the CSU would be ready to envisage a new Rapallo, and to trade neutrality for reunification--a trade which no Soviet leader, however desirous of redrawing the map of Germany, is prepared to offer: never would the Kremlin let loose of an important Communist country (and one which is becoming more and more so, especially within CEMA) like the GDR, nor would it willingly risk the emergence of a great European power which, even and especially if it were neutral or communist, could exercise an attraction on Eastern Europe.

Even West Germans who would like to see their country play a bridging role between West and East do so starting from the primacy of the national interest of a West Germany anchored in the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community, rather than oscillating between the two camps. It is this which, each in his own way, the most serious and attentive observers of signs of the re-emergence of the German problem emphasize, such as Francois Bondy (who points out that of the four German actors--the two German governments and the two populations--only the population of the GDR continues to keep the question open through its pro-German consciousness; the other three, by contrast, accept the division) and especially Peter Bender. G. Schweigler, in a thesis based on extremely precise empirical data, goes even further, proclaiming the end of German national consciousness and the birth of two separate national consciousnesses, West German and--what seems more problematical--East German (20).

Certain French commentators cling to the ritual reference to reunification in the official speeches of Chancellor Schmidt; they forget that these occupy less space every year and that this year the "Report on the State of the Nation" particularly stresses the idea that the permanence of the nation is compatible with division into several states, that the first priority is peace, "precisely because of this division," and that it is a question rather of making the consequences of this division more bearable, by a policy of cooperative good neighborliness.

It is precisely from this double priority, peace and alleviation of the consequences of the division, that the true problems are posed.

First of all, the security policy is conceived as much a policy of detente as a policy of defense. The priority of the Atlantic Alliance is not questioned, to the contrary, but it is no longer exclusive; it is more and

more complemented by "reinsurances" (a Bismarckian term used by Chancellor Schmidt during Brezhnev's visit to Bonn in May 1978) both in the direction of the building of Europe and in the direction of the East.

Secondly, in this last direction, the value given to the human benefits of detente and to the maintenance of communications with West Berlin and the GDR entails both a direct and immediate risk, and an ambiguity which, in the long term, could generate both internal and external uncertainties.

The immediate risk is that the FRG may become vulnerable to Soviet blackmail in the area of inter-German relations and that this vulnerability could influence its attitude on East-West questions, including those which concern NATO strategy and arms control negotiations.

The ambiguity, tied to the very nature of the German and European situation, is accentuated by the Ostpolitik strategy of W. Brandt and E. Bahr and by its mixed bag of successes and failures. Its essential postulate was that to improve the relations between communist regimes and other societies and with their own, it was necessary to reassure them, and for this it was necessary to help them stabilize their authority.

What was not clear was whether this increased confidence was supposed to lead the communist elites to lower their guard and to promote--despite themselves and without their knowledge--structural change, saving off the branch on which they were sitting, or if the aim in view was a real stabilization which would allow them to keep their domination but to dispense with the more pathological measures resulting from their felling of insecurity.

It could not be proved, in the first case, that the communist leaders would not see through this game and turn it to their advantage; or, in the second, that their regimes were not structurally unstable and that conciliatory gestures, either by the West to the regimes or by the regimes to their peoples, could prevent the cycle of explosion and repression.

In any case, the experiment of the sixties gives testimony of a certain success for the Bahr-Brandt formula, which produced more concrete results in terms of improvement of the lot of individuals and of communications between the two Germanies than any other policy: but it also showed its fragility and its dangers.

The spectacular shift in West German public opinion about the GDR shows that the public expected more spectacular results from Ostpolitik in terms of internal changes in East Germany, if not in terms of reunification. On the other hand, the preservation of modest but real attainments is highly sensitive both to general tension and particular changes. This leads the upper echelons of the SPD to be reticent with respect to any change which could destabilize the Soviet regime: replacement of Brezhnev by more hard-line successors, but also developments in Eastern Europe of the Prague

Spring type, or in the international communist movement developments such as the Carter campaign for human rights, and of course NATO decisions on the subject of nuclear weapons (21).

A certain anxiety to avoid false hopes in one quarter and pointless irritations in the other constitutes a doubtless salutary European reaction to a certain kind of American irresponsibility. But such a degree of sympathy and solicitude for Soviet reactions risks leading the SPD to wager desperately on the present situation, even when it is shaky, and leads it to no less desperately try to satisfy everyone or worry more about upsetting its adversaries than its allies.

As long as the foreign context remains stable, this will not be of too much consequence. To the degree that conflicts or imbalances are multiplied and threaten to impose difficult choices, the attempt to maintain oases of detente (inter-German or inter-European) in a special or unconnected category risks playing the Soviet Union's game.

As Fred Oldenburg and Gerhard Wettig express very well in connection with Moscow's increasing utilization of the GDR, "a regional decoupling of inter-German cooperation from the overriding relations between the superpowers would correspond neatly to the interests of both East German and Soviet policy (22). The latter would never envisage either letting loose East Germany or West Germany's departure from NATO. On the contrary, it would make East Germany its instrument (as bait or means of blackmail), in order to make West Germany in its turn its instrument (as hostage or as advocate of concessions or unconditional detente) within NATO.

In the longer term, the ambiguity of objectives and results of the German policy toward the East in relation to the communist regimes means that the inevitable emergence of a new generation, less conscious of Germany's past culpability and more aware of its present weight, is occurring without the realization, and without the perspective of an approaching realization, of either of the two great rival postwar objectives which were supposed to overtake it: European federal unity and German reunification. From which comes the searching for a role as a western state, but including two components which, because they are undefined, are pregnant with possible frustrations: the European component and the inter-German component.

Up until now the FRG has conducted this search for a role in a remarkably constructive manner. It has succeeded in combining discretion and effectiveness in its negotiations with the East on political prisoners and German minorities, as well as in its efforts to organize financial assistance or mediation for Portugal or Turkey. It has always tried to act in association with the United States, or France, or both. But this role presupposed a relatively calm West Germany, in an international--or at least European--environment which was also relatively calm. If the international framework becomes polarized in the era of the "hot peace," and

if the same occurs on the internal political scene, as the candidature of F. J. Strauss would seem to indicate, this role and its doubly stabilizing effect--externally and internally--could be put into question.

Western Europe and particularly France should have a great interest in avoiding such polarization and, even more, in avoiding presentation of the European option in such a way that it only makes of Europe a divisive factor for the Germans and, by the same token, that it makes of Germany a factor for instability in Europe. The USSR by contrast could profit from it. Not that the foreign policy of the CDU need be fundamentally different: whether regarding criticism of the United States or dialog with the East, with emphasis on German national interests or on the unity of Europe, one finds statements of F. J. Strauss going in both directions. But the effect of a victory for the latter on acceptance of Western institutions by the left and on cooperation between Germany and some of its neighbors would be sufficiently negative to thrill the Soviet Union.

In a general way, the predominance of the left in western Europe offers to Moscow both advantages on the military plane and disadvantages on the ideological. The right in power offers both advantages and the corresponding drawbacks. The USSR does not have to choose between the one and the other, since it does not exercise a decisive influence on their respective fortunes; but its policy has become sufficiently complex and flexible to exploit both.

It is on this aspect of Soviet policy that we wish to conclude. We have not explicitly treated of the USSR, but its power and its policy constitute the implicit background of the two debates which we have discussed, that on deterrence and that on Germany. They bind the two together inextricably to the extent that, as we believe, the USSR has weighed the European situation more carefully, and has better adapted its strategy and medium term objectives to it, than have those who believe it intends to attack Western Europe, or those who believe it intends to make the great "trade" with Germany, or those finally who attribute to it a purely defensive attachment to the status quo.

What they do not see is, on the one hand, that the Soviet Union always has two irons in the fire and, on the other, that there is no contradiction for the Soviet Union in pursuing both military superiority and negotiations. The object is to prevent the unification and restrain the freedom of action of Western Europe, all the while augmenting that of the East. On the one hand, SALT negotiations, which create strains between the United States and Western Europe, and MBFR negotiations, which do the same for Western Europe and Germany; and on the other hand the installation of SS-20 missiles capable of eliminating all the military bases of Western Europe, and the offensive posture of Warsaw Pact armies, are aspects which can be contradictory when pushed to the limit but which normally are two complementary faces of the same policy.

Taken separately, military build-up would risk provoking a backlash through the strengthening of the West, and negotiations risk encouraging western influence in the East. Together they can encourage in Western Europe a feeling of confusion and of passive relaxation as much on the plane of armaments as on that of the ideological struggle. Moscow's ideal is a faint-hearted Europe dependent for its security on Soviet goodwill (23). The latter would certainly extend so far as to provide it with rationalizations designed to embellish with optimistic colors a choice born of fear.

If this analysis is correct, it should be relegated, provisionally at least, to the background of the polemics which we noted in the first half of this article. Those who believe in American protection as well as those who do not, those who see the danger of a new Rapallo and those who do not, should all recognize that, for the present, the question is whether the USSR can deny Europe the right to defend itself, whether by strengthening American deterrence or by instituting a purely European deterrence through collaboration between France, England, and Germany. Whatever be the merits of one or another solution, the essential point is that if one is content to let matters rest with evasions and contradictions, as in the case of the neutron bomb, the USSR will have acquired a right of oversight, control, or veto over any western, European, or German decision concerning deterrence and nuclear defense. And that, whether one calls it Finlandization or not, could be in the interest of neither France, nor Germany, nor the United States, nor Europe.

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2. P. M. de la Gorce, in LE FIGARO of 6 September 1979, speaking of the report of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (which he calls "National Institute"...) says it is a shout of alarm designed to support projects of the Pentagon, whose links with the institute are known to all. Now this report, very prudent and rather optimistic, is used by leftist critics of deployment plans and criticized (as is the entire orientation of IISS, favorable to arms control) by the "hard" wing of the strategic community. See on this subject the letter of F. Ikle to THE ECONOMIST of 10 November 1979 entitled: "The Nuclear Balance."
3. G. Sarre, LE MATIN, 15 September 1979, and D. Motchane, LE MONDE, 20 September 1979.
4. Y. Laulan: /"Visa For Disaster"/. G. Joly, P. Fontaine, et al.: /"Euroshima"/.

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18. /"Defiziten in Deutsch-Amerikanischer Verhaltnis"/, FAZ [expansion unknown], 31 July 1979.
19. See the articles of R. Lowenthal and F. Bondy in COMMENTAIRE 6, summer 1979.
20. G. Schweigler: /"National Consciousness in Divided Germany"/, Sage 1975.
21. See on this subject the articles of Barbara Spinelli in LA REPUBBLICA, in particular that of 29 July 1978, and her interview of H. Ehms of 26 July 1978.
22. F. Oldenburg and G. Wettig: "Der Sonderstatus der DDR in Europäischen Ost-West Beziehungen", BERICHT DES BUNDESINSTITUTS FÜR OSTWISSENSCHAFT_ LICHE UND INTERNATIONALE STUDIEN, Cologne, no. 21, May 1979.
23. Cf. "Who is Encircling Whom?", FAIRE, special issue on the USSR, July-August 1979.

BRIEFS

MERTES ON U.S. NEUTRON WEAPONS--Bonn--CDU politician Alois Mertes has the impression that the American Congress is increasing its pressure on the government in Washington to review President Jimmy Carter's 1978 decisions to postpone the production of the neutron bomb. Mertes, who had talks with Congressmen and government representatives during his recent visit to America, told DPA today that in view of the events in Afghanistan, a growing number of senators were demanding that Carter's symbolic defense reactions be supplemented with stronger and more specific measures in terms of military policy. According to Mertes, the demand to include the neutron weapon in the U.S. deterrent potential to offset Soviet tank superiority in Europe comes above all from influential senators as well as from the State Department and the White House itself. The CDU politician, who is the CDU group's disarmament expert, felt that the Europeans could prove their solidarity here. The production and deployment of the neutron weapon also had an arms control function, that is, it could prompt Moscow into taking agreed or unilateral measures in arms limitation. At the same time, Mertes pointed out that the Defense Department had told him that from the U.S. viewpoint, the consistent implementation of NATO's counterarming with medium-range missiles was more important now than the neutron bomb. [Text] [LD201330 Hamburg DPA in German 1102 GMT 20 Feb 80 LD]

CSO: 3103

PROBLEMS OF CREATING EUROPEAN NUCLEAR FORCE ANALYZED

Paris POLITIQUE ETRANGERE in French No 3, Dec 79 pp 461-479

[Article by Jean Klein: "France, Nuclear Weapons, and Defense of Europe"]

[Excerpts] The author, Jean Klein, was born in 1936. He holds a Doctor of Laws degree and is currently a researcher at the CNRS [National Center for Scientific Research] and the French Institute of International Relations. He joined the CNRS staff in 1968 and has worked primarily on the study of defense problems and international arms control matters at the Center for Foreign Policy Studies and the French Institute of International Relations. In addition to his research activities, he is a regular contributor to French and foreign reviews and teaches at the Strasbourg Institute of Advanced European Studies and the University of Paris-Sorbonne (diploma in extensive defense policy studies). He is the author of "L'entreprise du désarmement" (1964), and has also contributed to such collective works as "L'utilisation de satellites de diffusion directe" [Use of Direct Broadcasting Satellites] (1970), "Cooperation in Europe" (1971), "Europe 1980: l'avenir de relations intra-européennes" (1972), and "The Gun Merchants: Politics and Policy of Major Arms Suppliers" (to be published in 1979).

In the early 1960's, the French nuclear strike force encountered almost unanimous opposition in France and abroad. Today, however, there is general acknowledgement that this force constitutes the axis of France's military policy and is an essential element of European security. General De Gaulle's decision to develop a strategic nuclear force (FNS) is known to have been a bone of contention within the Atlantic Alliance. Moreover, during President John F. Kennedy's administration, Americans categorically opposed the project. This opposition clearly affected the climate of Franco-American

relations and it was not until the early 1970's that the United States changed its attitude before subscribing to the Ottawa Declaration [of Atlantic Principles] of 19 June 1974 which recognizes "the particular deterrent role of the French and British nuclear forces and their contribution to strengthening the Alliance's overall deterrence." Simultaneously, domestic opposition gradually abated as the FNS gained in credibility. And on the eve of the March 1978 legislative elections, an agreement had been reached between all political parties on the necessity of maintaining the nuclear force as long as there is no genuine disarmament furnishing safeguards at least equal to those provided by the strategy of deterrence.

Admittedly some of those who support maintaining a nuclear capability have ulterior motives for doing so. Hence it would be foolhardy to contend that all members of the French political community now have identical views on this subject. The speculation since 1976 about extending French nuclear protection to the FRG ("enlarged sanctuarization"), the theories being formulated about Franco-British nuclear cooperation, and lastly, the increasing number of arguments being voiced in favor of the establishment of a European nuclear force, all show, if need be, the diversity of views on the mission that could be assigned to the FNS within a possible independent European defense system. This issue has become particularly acute at a time when neutralization of the central strategic systems highlights the limitations of the American deterrent (1) and when progress in the political construction of Europe has Europeans considering a security system less dependent on the United States.

It is not our intention to settle this issue or to formulate models capable of reconciling the logic of the French nuclear deterrent with European defense plans. We shall more modestly try to outline the context in which the issue is raised and also draw a few lessons from past experiences. In so doing, we shall review the major orientations of French policy as defined in the 1960's and point out the new interpretations placed on that policy since 1974. We shall examine the controversies over nuclear strategy that have erupted in France these past few years, the attempts at European and Atlantic cooperation in defense matters, and France's attitude toward East-West negotiations on the military aspects of European security. We shall conclude by considering the possible political and strategic implications of an erosion of the military balance in Europe, and by examining certain measures that could be taken to restore the balance.

France's Strategy of Deterrence

There have been so many commentaries and official statements on France's nuclear policy that a systematic description of its origins and development would be tedious. It is important, however, to point out the differences between the concepts of the governments of the Fourth and Fifth Republics.

Governments of the Fourth Republic viewed the nuclear strike force merely as a means by which France could make itself heard in European and Atlantic councils and perhaps differentiate itself from Germany. In contrast, General De Gaulle availed himself of it primarily to successfully promote an independent defense and diplomacy. For instance, upon his return to power, he immediately advocated a reform of NATO that would reflect the new political and strategic realities and organize France's participation in deliberations on international security matters and nuclear weapons employment. President Eisenhower's and Prime Minister Macmillan's dismissal of [De Gaulle's] 17 September 1958 memorandum and the objections of the other allies to a tripartite directorate led the French Government to gradually reduce its participation in the integrated military organization before completely withdrawing from it in 1966.

Thus France's attitude toward NATO and the desire to preserve its decision-making freedom in nuclear matters have formed the stumbling block to most European attempts at defense cooperation. This basic situation will not change appreciably in the foreseeable future and there is every reason to believe that the French Government will not deviate from its present course, because a return to Atlantic integration would not solve the specific problems of European security or increase the possibility of counteracting American disengagement, should that trend become more pronounced some day. Furthermore, integration of the FNS into NATO would be tantamount to its disappearance as an independent element of the strategic balance, whereas from a French viewpoint, indeed even a European viewpoint, it is highly important to maintain and expand as additional deterrent capability separate from the American capability. Lastly, on the domestic front, keeping one's distance from NATO is considered to be the touchstone of an independent military and foreign policy and the present configuration of French political forces would no doubt prevent the government from revising decisions made in 1966. (34)

In the absence of Europe's political unification, Europe's defense is based, therefore, upon--in addition to the American commitment--the total sum of the efforts each European nation agrees to make for itself. This does not exclude maintenance of the Alliance or cooperation in specific fields. Yet attempts at cooperation in well-circumscribed sectors have thus far produced only modest results, and any systematic attempt to bring the defense forces of West European countries--nuclear forces included--closer together runs into insurmountable obstacles. The misadventures of Franco-British nuclear cooperation are a good illustration of the difficulties such an undertaking faces.

For a long time now, some experts have been considering combining the British and French capabilities so as to create the nucleus of a European deterrent force capable of offsetting the erosion of the American nuclear guarantee.

Exploratory talks were conducted for this purpose in the early 1970's, but it soon became apparent that implementation of such a plan would be difficult, if not impossible.⁽³⁵⁾ As a matter of fact, the French and British nuclear programs are not as complementary as supporters of cooperation imply. The cost of the joint development with France of the elements of a nuclear force assigned to the defense of Europe (in trust for Europe) is deemed prohibitive in London. Moreover, because British and American interests in this field are so intertwined, the operation's success depends, in the final analysis, on Washington's endorsement.

Even though in the United States there is a current of opinion favorable to development of a European nuclear force, it is doubtful that the U. S. Government would support such a project likely to jeopardize continuation of the strategic dialog with the USSR. In fact, the socialist countries, especially the USSR, are hostile to the formation of any West European military coalition which they view as a device by which the FRG could obtain a nuclear capability. Besides, West German leaders ruled out this eventuality and expressed very sharp reservations about a Franco-British nuclear agreement when that issue was very much in the news.⁽³⁶⁾ After all, most European countries renounced the nuclear option by signing the Nonproliferation Treaty and they are by no means enthusiastic about the idea of a European nuclear force. Indeed some, like the Netherlands, are openly hostile to it. As for the French Government, it seemed to have learned its lesson from the failure of the preliminary talks with the British Government, and in 1973, authorities in Paris were very skeptical about the prospects of nuclear cooperation with Great Britain.

Yet such cooperation was considered once again on the occasion of discussions about the future of the British deterrent force and in connection with the renewal of Anglo-American nuclear agreements. According to some reports, France did make some overtures, but these were rejected by Prime Minister Callaghan's Labour government.⁽³⁷⁾ We do not know whether the Conservative government headed by Mrs Thatcher is more favorably disposed toward such a project. It is probable, however, that the difficulties of the undertaking and the financial expense of cooperation with France will constrain British leaders to give preferential attention to negotiating an arrangement with Washington.⁽³⁸⁾ Moreover, it was the futility of attempts to reach a technical cooperation agreement with the British that prompted General Buis and Alexandre Sanguinetti to suggest nuclear cooperation with the FRG.⁽³⁹⁾ The ambiguities of their proposal, the conditions attached to it--notably the FRG's withdrawal from NATO--and the controversy it has created considerably limit its import. There is little chance that it can influence the defense policy of European nations. In presenting the FRG's 1979 white paper on national security and modernization of the Bundeswehr's structure, on 4 September 1979, Defense Minister Hans Apel specifically rejected any participation by his country in a nuclear capability even in the form of financing a Franco-German atomic force. For his part, the President of the French Republic categorically

ruled out "any proposal by France for the constitution of nuclear armament in the Federal Republic of Germany" because such a move would not be "consistent with either the interest of France, or of the FRG, or of Europe, or of detente." (40)

All things considered, France's initiatives in favor of a European defense organization appear to be a call for vigilance and a warning against faux pas likely to compromise the future more than the expression of a definite plan leading to establishment of a new EDC [European Defense Community]. In fact, at the present time there is no "European defense identity" and France's partners reject any military organization not closely tied to NATO in one way or another. Besides, the French Government itself recognizes the preponderant role of the United States in maintaining the balance that excludes the use of force on our continent.

Nevertheless, the Atlantic defense's uncertainties in "the era of negotiation," the impact of technological innovations on the military balance, the highly favorable consideration given to counterforce strategies, and lastly, the ambiguities of the ANT [tactical nuclear weapons] employment doctrine are all elements prompting new examination of the basic facts surrounding Europe's security. The French Government is inclined to view recent developments as confirmation of its earlier strategic decisions and has no intention of depriving itself of the trump card it holds by having a nuclear deterrent force. For this reason, it is planning to modernize and expand its arsenal and flares up against any such measure as a total nuclear test ban that could hamper this effort. Likewise, it is highly unlikely to renounce its decision-making independence inasmuch as the nuclear capability of a medium-size power is determined by the additional element of uncertainty it introduces into an aggressor's calculations, and integration of the FNS would make it lose this characteristic by reducing it to an appendage of the Atlantic system. Lastly, France does not plan to participate in SALT III⁽⁴¹⁾ because it wants to safeguard "the independence of its deterrent" and clearly show that its nuclear force is the "central system that protects its vital interests against all aggression and consequently cannot be compared to the intermediate-range weapons of the super-powers."

France's position on arms limitation negotiations in general is also different from the position of its partners despite the more open-minded attitude it displayed at the 10th special session of the UN General Assembly. For instance, France is still as reserved as ever toward the MBFR [Mutual Balanced Force] talks and, in May 1978, it proposed that all signatory nations of the Final Act of the Helsinki Agreement organize a conference on disarmament in Europe (CDE) that would discuss measures designed to enhance mutual trust, and the reduction of forces armed with conventional weapons in an area extending from "the Atlantic to the Urals." In spite of some favorable reactions, this proposal continues to incur objections, particularly because discussion of nuclear weapons is excluded from its

agenda. This is a crucial point and it is difficult to see how the CDE can possibly convene before the interested parties have agreed that the conference will discuss all aspects of regional disarmament. Such an approach would be warranted because of the intermeshing of conventional elements and nuclear elements in forces deployed on both sides of the line of demarcation and because of the desire of Europeans not to leave it up to the two superpowers to decide the fate of "grey area weapons" by negotiations over their heads. Yet the CDE also entails some risks to the extent that "bipolar compromises" reached under the cover of multilateral negotiations could put an end to France's nuclear decision-making autonomy, whereas the contribution of a totally unencumbered nuclear force will be essential on that far-off day when, despite the nature of the "beast" and national state circumstances, questions of security will no longer block the political construction of Europe.

FOOTNOTES

1. See speech by Henry Kissinger on 1 September 1979 in Brussels at a conference on NATO's future sponsored by the Atlantic Institute and the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies; published by POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, No 2, 1979, new series.
2. Speech by Couve de Murville in the National Assembly, 14 April 1966, "Politique étrangère de la France" [France's Foreign Policy], DOCUMENTATION FRANCAISE, 1966, p 70.
3. General De Gaulle's press conference, 21 February 1966, "Discours et Messages," [Speeches and Official Communications], Vol 5, p 18.
4. General De Gaulle's press conference, 10 November 1959, "Discours et Messages," Vol 3, p 134.
5. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's radio and TV address, 25 March 1975: "I have reflected at great length on this problem (of security) and I have come to the same conclusion as General De Gaulle once did, and that is that France must have an independent defense. France belongs to an alliance, but it must itself, independently, ensure its own defense," LE MONDE, 27 March 1975.
6. These speeches were published in the review DEFENSE NATIONALE in June and July 1976.
7. Pierre Messmer, who was prime minister in President Pompidou's government, said on this occasion that "It was a leap backward of 10 years in French military thinking," LE MONDE, 3 June 1976.

8. See article signed Alexandrov, "Legitimate Question: Where is the Doctrine of 'Enlarged Sanctuarization' Taking France?," PRAVDA, 9 June 1976.
9. This view was especially prevalent in the Federal Republic of Germany. See Adelbert Weinstein, "Giscard und der Atom-Mythos," FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, 20 July 1976, and Lothar Ruehl, "Später Abschied von de Gaulles Strategie," DIE ZEIT, 18 June 1976. Under the French Army reorganization plan, forces stationed in Germany were reduced by 9,750 men. The first withdrawals involved three artillery regiments (3,000 men) and began in the summer of 1976. In the meantime, 12 regiments have been deactivated but the Defense Ministry spokesman in Bonn considered these measures to have "only limited strategic significance," LE MONDE, 14 June 1977.
10. "Employment of Different Force Systems Under the Strategy of Deterrence," REVUE DE DEFENSE NATIONALE, May 1969.
11. See Pierre M. Gallois, "Le renouement. De la France defendue a l'Europe protegee" [Renunciation. From a Defended France to a Protected Europe], and Lucien Poirier, "Des strategies nucleaires." These two books were published in 1977 by Plon and by Hachette respectively.
12. See "The Second Ring," LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, July 1976.
13. See also Francois de Rose's statements made during a debate on national defense, LE FIGARO, 20 May 1976.
14. Jacques Vernant, "A Few Political and Legal Aspects of the Defense Debate," DEFENSE NATIONALE, August-September 1976.
15. See General Mery "An Army To Do What and How?," DEFENSE NATIONALE, June 1976.
16. Speech by Raymond Barre at Camp Mailly, 18 June 1977.
17. Speeches by Raymond Barre on 14 September 1976 at the INEDN [Institute of Advanced National Defense Studies] and on 18 June 1977 at Camp Mailly.
18. According to General Poirier, this phrase in Barre's Camp Mailly speech "undermines the coherence of a strategic speech that is of exemplary exactness in all other respects," "Des strategies nucleaires," p 393.
19. In his statement to the National Assembly on 15 June 1978, the defense minister said that solely forces armed with conventional weapons can "counter the beginnings of escalation, threats of circumvention, seizure of pawns, in a word all those actions that would generally tend to harm us without directly affecting our vital interests," JOURNAL OFFICIEL-NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (JO-AN), Parliamentary Debates, p 2,946.

20. See the paper read by Bruce Marshall at the Kiawah Island Conference on Comparative Military Policy, 8-10 November 1978: "Recent Developments in French Strategic Doctrine."

21. The Soviet press reacted vigorously against Foreign Minister Jobert's proposal to the WEU [Western European Union]. V. M. Vialen Kuznetsov. "The European Defense [Community] Once Again?," NEW TIMES, No 49, December 1973.

22. See Michel Debre's interview in LE MONDE, 7 September 1974, and the observation made by NATO secretary general Luns in an interview given UPI [United Press International], ATLANTIC NEWS, 15 January 1975.

23. See the President of the Republic's interview given LE FIGARO, 21 May 1975. See also his conversation with newsmen in the Elysee Palace on 14 July 1976, LE MONDE, 16 July 1976.

24. JOURNAL OFFICIEL (JO-AN), 10 April 1975.

25. ATLANTIC NEWS, 28 February 1975.

26. See TIME, 13 October 1975, p 13.

27. Statement made on 1 July 1974 following talks in Paris with Giscard d'Estaing and Chirac.

28. Defense minister's reply to written question from M. Chevenement, JOURNAL OFFICIEL (JO-AN), 14 December 1975.

29. The GEIP [Independent European Program Group] includes the 10 member countries of Eurogroup plus France.

30. See the foreign minister's reply to written question from Michel Debre, 23 June 1978, JO-AN, 23 September 1978, p 5,228.

31. See the foreign minister's reply to written question from Michel Debre, 21 June 1979, JO-AN, 15 September 1979, p 7,289.

32. In his reply to a written question from M. Longueque, the defense minister explained that "diversified tactical nuclear weapons are necessary in order to give our forces of maneuver an adequate deterrent capability against potential aggressors armed with similar weapons or having a pronounced superiority in conventional weapons." JO-AN 31 August 1974. In a 27 August 1979 speech at the opening of the 32d Congress of the Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers in Avignon, Defense Minister Bourges recalled that in Europe "France was compelled to palliate the disparity in conventional forces by having a significant atomic capability which forces the enemy to change its type of warfare." It follows, therefore, that while

deterrence is indeed the foundation of our strategic doctrine, "It does encompass various means which far from diminishing its credibility actually enhance it." Thus the value of our conventional forces is increased by "tactical nuclear weapons that complement our system of deterrence."

33. See the reply to a written question from M. Chevenement, 21 September 1974, JO-AN, 8 November 1974.

34. See our article "The French Left and Defense Problems," POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, No 5, 1978.

35. On this subject, we refer our readers to Ian Smith's article "Future Conditional. The Prospect for Anglo-French Nuclear Cooperation," whose conclusions are still valid, ADELPHI PAPER, No 78, August 1971.

36. See FRG foreign minister Walter Scheel's interview, LE MONDE, 25 August 1973.

37. See British Defense Minister Fred Mulley's interview, LE MONDE, 27 February 1979, and report in THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, 16 April 1979.

38. See lecture given at the IFRI [French Institute of International Relations] on 18 June 1979 by John Roper, Labor member of parliament, "What Nuclear Options for Great Britain and Europe?"

39. "Sharing Our Nuclear Capability with the Germans?," an interview with Georges Buis and Alexandre Sanguinetti, LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, No 771, 20 August 1979.

40. President of the Republic's televised interview with four newsmen on FR3, 17 September 1979.

41. See Francois-Poncet's speech before the Geneva Disarmament Committee, 24 January 1979 (Disarmament Committee Proceedings, CD-PV2) and Giscard d'Estaing's 15 February 1979 press conference.

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CSD: 3100

VREDELING WARNS OF CONSEQUENCES OF ANTINUCLEAR WEAPONS STAND

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 18 Jan 80 p 7

[Article by Henk Vredeling, member of the Commission of the European Communities at Brussels: "The Hangover After the NATO Nuclear Debate"]

[Text] Almost everybody has a hangover feeling after the debate in the Second Chamber on modernization of the nuclear weapons stationed in Western Europe. The only result is that the Van Agt cabinet will continue in existence. Ultimately that seemed to be the actual stakes, both for the opposition and for the governing parties.

The net result is that from now on the Netherlands will be known in NATO as a problematical ally. That places our country in isolation. This isolation was purposely sought by many of the opponents of modernizing the nuclear weapons on the basis of the Calvinist watchword: "In isolation lies our strength." As I followed all of that from a certain distance, a slight feeling of astonishment came over me. I still have vivid memories of the uproar that broke loose in 1974 when the Den Uyl cabinet's defense bill appeared. The bill contained a provisional halt to the mechanization of the fifth division. There was not room enough in the house!

Many will also still remember what happened when the then minister of defense, in consultation with his colleague the minister of foreign affairs, postponed the replacement of the Royal Dutch Navy's "Neptune" long-range patrol aircraft. Rebellious crews from the Naval Air Service almost flew the turret of the Binnenhof into the court pond! In that respect the current minister of defense apparently has the Dutch armed forces under better control.

And that despite the fact that the Netherlands has now made itself partly independent of the integrated NATO defense structure. I still remember that at a meeting of the ministerial Defense Planning Committee there was an effort to make me, speaking in the name of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, shut up when the secretary general of NATO said that it was not proper to question the application of NATO strategy at a NATO meeting!

Causes

Just why is it that the decision on modernization of NATO's nuclear potential in Europe has become such a controversial subject? PRAVIDA, 17 November 1979, reminds us that the decision in principle in favor of modernization was reached back in 1975. (A translation of the article can be found in the INFORMATION BULLETIN of the embassy of the USSR in the Netherlands, 1 December 1979.)

At that time not a single rocket of the SS-20 type had been developed, so PRAVIDA would remind us, adding quite properly and correctly, "in the European areas of the USSR." What PRAVIDA wisely omits to state is that they were in fact deployed in the Asiatic areas of that same Soviet Union (China), even though the American prognosis even then was that they would be stationed in the European areas of the USSR as well.

It was for that reason that the Americans then reached a decision in principle to modernize the tactical nuclear weapons in Western Europe and distributed that decision for the information of their NATO allies. That was then accepted as due notice by all of the NATO allies in the Nuclear Planning Group. No attention at all was paid to that in the public discussion at the time, as all of that was snowed under by the disproportionately great interest attracted to the phenomenon of the so-called "mini-nukes" (even more disproportionately in the Netherlands).

Later the action surrounding the neutron bomb demanded all the attention, although that was only one (and, as it now appears, far from the most important) component of the decision of the decision to modernize.

In HET PARDOL, 20 December 1979, Bart Tromp wrote an article worthy of consideration concerning what was disastrous in the Dutch position, but with this reservation: in one important factor he confused cause and effect. He says that the new intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Western Europe decrease the credibility of the American strategic guarantee, since they create the possibility of a nuclear war in Europe that the United States as such would be able to stay out of.

But after Kissinger's speech early in September last year, Tromp should have known better. That guarantee has long since disappeared. (General de Gaulle was the first to realize this.) The modernization of the intermediate-range nuclear weapons is a result of the dropping of this guarantee, not the cause.

The Americans, however, do not want to shirk the responsibility for a nuclear defense of Europe entirely. They are making new weapons systems available (cruise missiles and Pershing II XR's) which a number of Western European countries could acquire, although, of course, their nuclear warheads would remain entirely under American supervision.

Forgotten

It is much too often forgotten that success of the Dutch motion (no decision to produce, at least not in the planned numbers; no decision to deploy) would have brought about a much greater danger. If the Americans had abandoned the modernization of the intermediate-range weapons in Western Europe, a very autonomous force would have been activated, namely the still latently present possibility of the creation in Western Europe of a European nuclear force. It would have represented a very strong stimulus for closer cooperation between France and England on the modernization and expansion of their national nuclear defense materiel, which they would later have been able to place at the disposal of other Western European countries.

It is very questionable whether West Germany would not have succumbed to the temptation of such an offer. Presumably the West German government would demand (just as it does now) that it not be the only non-nuclear West European country, and that it would accept that offer.

In the situation just outlined, Italy, too, in my confirmed opinion, would accept that offer. It is also far from certain that Belgium would have supported the Netherlands in its opposition to such a European nuclear force. Belgium, after all, has much less of a neutralist tradition than the Netherlands.

Western Europe has finally become aware of the fact that it can no longer count on the possibility of an American "General Nuclear Response" in the event of a Russian aggression in Western Europe. It is now entirely dependent on America's readiness, in the event of a conflict with the Soviet Union (e.g., over a European Afghanistan: Yugoslavia), to take the step of using the modernized nuclear weapons potential in Western Europe if need be.

Nobody has yet questioned the American willingness to take that step. But is not questioning it the logical conclusion from the fact that the credibility of any deployment of the American strategic nuclear weapons has disappeared?

Would the Americans be quite certain that the Soviet Union would not employ its strategic nuclear force against the United States if America were to give the green light for employment of the intermediate-range rockets stationed in Western Europe against the territory of the Soviet Union?

Would it actually make any difference to the Soviet Union whether its military installations or its cities in western Russia were threatened or destroyed by American rockets stationed in Western Europe rather than those stationed on American territory or American submarines or aircraft? Even though we are dealing with very complicated questions here, on the other hand it is also very simple: to ask the question is to give the answer.

One Solution

In fact, there is only one solution left for Europe: making both Western and Eastern Europe atom-free. Only if a serious pattern of negotiations on the subject can be developed, which involves the option of a European nuclear force including the French and English nuclear forces, is there a chance of breaking the vicious circle. This serious pattern of negotiations will not come into being if Western Europe should unilaterally renounce nuclear weapons (let alone beginning in the Netherlands). This negotiating pattern must be the essential stakes of SALT II.

If the Netherlands wishes to be involved in those negotiations, it is essential for our country to participate in the inevitable decision of NATO to modernize and deploy the intermediate-range nuclear weapons, with the proviso that the step of deployment shall not be taken if the discussions with the Soviet Union lead to a limitation (up to and including abolition) of their SS-20's and other nuclear weapons systems threatening Western Europe.

The Dutch political parties should stand up for this strongly in their European cooperative organizations; they would only increase the strength of their credibility if they were to declare themselves in advance to be willing to bow to the will of the majority in reaching political decisions.

A policy whose hard core is "If I don't get my way I won't play" is not only laughable in this connection; it is counter-productive. That would be obvious to everyone if we were to read Luxembourg in place of the Netherlands. But we must not forget that with respect to the question at issue here, the difference between the Netherlands and Luxembourg is not so great.

We have one more thing to say from the heart. Bart Tromp says, "The repugnant outcry ('idolatry,' 'heathenism') from all manner of pulpit speakers has made it clear in a way that we are not at all used to how disastrous the combination of religion and politics is." He describes this picturesquely as "a massive avalanche of screams after the fashion of, 'Dear, is the Bokma chilled?'"

Sabotage

The case appears to be more serious, though.

The leader of the IKV [Interdenominational Peace Alliance] demonstration against modernization of the nuclear weapons said on television that in the event of stationing or transportation of the modernized weapons systems in the Netherlands, there would be room for civil disobedience consisting of blocking harbors, holding up trains, etc.

If that should start happening, a very serious situation would come into being. We must assume that at that time there would be a parliamentary majority in favor of the stationing of these weapons. The minority, then, would not be willing to bow to the will of the majority. But what is more

serious is that this minority would be sabotaging the majority by the use of active or passive force. That will result in irrevocable reactions from the authorities who are engaged in carrying out the majority's decisions (i.e., the Royal Dutch Army).

It is also possible that these actions would also evoke reactions (the word says it all) among the civilian population. I still remember how, in a much more innocent situation (it was in connection with the Den Uyl government's decision not to replace the "Neptune") a big demonstration of naval personnel in uniform took place in the RAI (Bicycle and Automobile Manufacturers' Building). Formally that was not an act of civil disobedience, but it came very close to it.

When "left" and "right" begin to fight in the street a very grim situation comes about. Generally people then begin to call for a strong man, whether from "left" or "right." The two are equally ruinous to democracy.

It is very thought-provoking that the IKV is led by people (or is it really just one person?) who are already very prematurely playing with thoughts of civil disobedience of the aforementioned kind. It reflects a kind of power thinking that we claim to reject right now.

Doubt

Is the Netherlands' position strengthened by the stand of the Dutch government and the Dutch parliament? I make so bold as to doubt it. Inasmuch as the government and the parliament have not chosen to take any responsibility for the decision to produce and have postponed the decision to station, the Dutch influence in favor of coming to serious disarmament negotiations, particularly in the field of nuclear armament, has lost force. We know very well in advance, do we not, what people abroad will say about Dutch initiatives in that field: *"It's easy for that country to talk; it didn't accept any responsibility itself, did it?"*

In that respect the position of Belgium, a country comparable to the Netherlands, is much stronger. Generally speaking it is clear that Belgium's foreign policy position carries more weight than that of the Netherlands. The period of the Den Uyl cabinet, with Van der Stoep as foreign minister, may constitute an exception. The Netherlands must not think that an increase in "nuisance value" is equal to a stronger position in foreign policy.

Even the Den Uyl cabinet, with socialist ministers in the Ministry of Defense for the first time in history, was not able to establish the reputation of the Netherlands as anything other than an entirely trustworthy NATO ally! However, the temptation must be very great for the opposition to overtake and pass the Van Agt cabinet with regard to the NATO "left."

Not long ago Van der Stoep, former minister of foreign affairs, expressed deep concern about that, which I share. The opposition in the Second Chamber gives the impression that it gets the inspiration for its position

on the question of modernizing nuclear armaments from the IKV. What are they going to do with a position like that if the PvdA [Labor Party] gets another chance to carry the responsibility of government? And with a position like that, what is the PvdA doing in the Federation of Socialist Parties in the European Community?

Maneuver

Within the European Community, too, the Netherlands has maneuvered itself into a remarkable position. Of the nine member-states of the European Community, eight are also members of NATO (all except Ireland). Of these eight, France assumes a separate position in that within NATO it has withdrawn from the integrated command structure. Denmark, too, has always held a somewhat distinct position within the whole of NATO. The Netherlands has now also placed itself in an exceptional position.

This is the more surprising because up to now the Netherlands has had a special place within the NATO defenses. Along with the Federal Republic [of Germany], Great Britain, and the United States, within the central sector of the NATO defense system, running from the Baltic to the border of Switzerland, we occupy geographically a part of the defense of this central sector (in the very vulnerable North German plain) on our responsibility.

Can the Netherlands continue to accept this NATO task if we are going to assume a separate position on nuclear defense, which, after all, is an integral component of NATO defense as such?

Over the long term that is certainly not tenable, considering that the modernization of the nuclear arms forces entails gradually discarding the existing potential, including the arms now in use among the Dutch armed forces.

The Netherlands was already reducing the number of our armed forces' nuclear tasks. There is quite a lot to be said for that from the point of view of efficiency. The Den Uyl cabinet made this better "assignment of missions" a central point of its defense policy. But the Netherlands has never had much success with this, primarily because our allies have never been willing to accept our efficiency argument, as they were afraid that this argument was being used as a cloak for our gradually easing ourselves out of the nuclear defenses as such.

Right

Because of that suspicion the FRG, e.g., was never willing to take the nuclear task of the Lance weapons system over from us in exchange for an expansion of the Netherlands' conventional weapons tasks in the Central Sector, although there was every reason to do so on the basis of rational considerations of cost savings. In the future our allies, and in particular the FRG, will be able to say with reason that they were right in their suspicion.

In the Netherlands the Van Agt cabinet has been saved. But a big foreign policy problem has been created for the next cabinet formation, which will be solved in a cabinet formation, almost by definition, on the basis of domestic political considerations.

The opposition thought they were digging a pit for somebody else, but they may very well fall right into it themselves.

8815

CSO: 3105

SWEDEN TO GET FIRST NORWEGIAN NORTH SEA GAS IN 1981 OR LATER

Stockholm: DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 30 Jan 80 p 3

[Article by Per Sjogren]

[Text] "The earliest date that Norway can make concrete proposals on exporting natural gas from the North Sea shelf would be the spring of 1981," information director Egil Helle of the Oil and Energy Ministry in Oslo told DAGENS NYHETER. This was a comment on Danish reports that co-operation between Norway and Denmark on North Sea gas was just around the corner.

Norway now has three oil and gas fields in production. The oil from Ekofisk is piped to England while the gas goes to West Germany. The Frigg field produces only gas which is piped to England.

Oil production at the Statfjord field began late last fall. It is estimated that the Statfjord field contains 60 billion cubic meters of gas but that is not enough to make it economical to pipe the gas out. The gas is being kept back now but toward the middle or end of the 1980's it must be extracted if oil production is to continue.

New Finds

Therefore Norway has hoped that a new find would make it commercially feasible to extract the gas in the Statfjord field.

It looks as if this has now happened. Last summer what appears to be a large quantity of gas was discovered in block 31/2 in the North Sea. (The entire shelf is divided into blocks 100 kilometers by 100 kilometers.) Shell is the operator in this field, in other words that company is in charge of the technical work there.

Hopes are high that gas will also be found in three adjacent blocks. These blocks will be assigned to Norwegian companies. A decision will be made soon.

When the Norwegians have determined how much gas there is in the area they will decide where it should go. The new finds lie southeast of Statfjord.

Auxiliary Pipeline

One possibility is to connect both fields to one pipeline. This could go either to England or to the continent. West Germany, France, Belgium and Holland would like to buy Norwegian gas.

A pipeline to the continent from the Norwegian shelf could also have an auxiliary pipeline to Denmark. In that way Sweden could also be included.

The various possibilities are being studied but there will be no concrete proposal from Norway before spring 1981.

6578

CSO: 3109

GENERAL KUNTNER DISCUSSES EUROPEAN STRATEGIC POSITION

Vienna OESTERREICHISCHE MILITAERISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT in German No 1, Jan-Feb 80, pp 1-5

[Article by Wilhelm Kuntner: "The Strategic Situation in Europe--Review and Outlook"]

[Text] 1. Arms Race and Peace Efforts

Never before has there been as much talk and publicity about peace, detente, arms limitations, and disarmament as during the past decade. By the same token, there has never been a phase in history during which greater efforts were made to increase and improve the armament potential as during the Seventies. The contradiction between rhetoric and practical development is obvious.

Of course, if we look further back into the history of mankind, then we are less astonished at this phenomenon. From a study by the sociologist Jacques Novicow we learn that, over the past 3,360 years of human history, there were only 227 years of peace while for 3,133 years nations were again and again at war somewhere.

But that fact should not produce resignation in anybody who wants a more peaceful world; it should however warn us against illusions. The only frightening thing today--and that applies above all to the industrialized world--is that the means for mutual extermination have assumed a by now unimaginable degree.

No matter how much one should approve the demand for immediate and complete disarmament--such as we find recurring in numerous multilateral and unilateral declarations--we must nevertheless be aware of the lack of realism in such proposals. Of course, every government or group tries to place itself in a particularly favorable light through such demands and only manages to embarrass addressees. The inherent risk is small because, at least for the foreseeable future, no country will probably be prepared to do that, unless it wanted to drop even minimum requirements for its own security.

The relativization of the renunciation of force, be it regional or be it connected specifically with the means of exercising force, generates more distrust than would be good for the process of detente. Can we today really still distinguish between bad or very bad weapons, in other words, conventional or nuclear weapons? Is it really possible, in case of military confrontation between alliances, to program differences in weapons employment or are not such proposals after all exclusively designed to cause trouble between pact partners?

Although we may admit that the subject of arms control is becoming more and more complex and complicated and although it therefore also seems credible to try to break the problems up over various negotiating bodies, one must never overlook the danger that the negotiating partners, but above all their populations, lose a clear view of what is going on. Things that are confused and unclear however cause uncertainty and one is then only too readily inclined to fail to see the forest for all the trees. As a result, in most cases, everything is pushed out of the way.

In Europe we have become accustomed to live with the dilemma of the contradictions between increased armaments and arms improvements as well as efforts to hold them down or bring them under control without worrying too much that this might gradually create a security deficit and this is the case because of a comparatively long period of nonwar.

The very concept of security today, more than a few decades ago, calls for a thorough definition. If we look for a definition of the concept of security in public discussions, we will first of all get some very superficial and extremely subjective replies. There is a broad spectrum of definition approaches from the restriction of security against exclusively military threats via security against loss of jobs, security against crime or terrorism, security for the protection of life, all the way to securing the quality of life as such. Few people are aware in this process that the image of the threat has changed completely during this century and that an excessively selective filtering process therefore turns out to be impossible. Numerous individual elements will enable us to view the overall problem complex from a more realistic angle only in terms of their sum and their mutual interdependence.

Until the end of World War II, everyone generally accepted the strategic principle of using all military and nonmilitary means in pursuit of policy; but at the latest by the beginning of the Sixties, especially the superpowers were bound to have doubts as to where this kind of thinking might lead. After all, the United States and the USSR suddenly found themselves confronted with a situation of "too much in the way of instruments of power"--a situation which they could no longer be sure of being able to cope with by means of the conventional employment doctrines.

The consequence was the development of the "assured counterstrike concept" which to this very day constitutes the foundation of a relative peace, a "peace based on fear." Certainly it would have been possible through a "first strike" to wipe out the particular potential enemy but his untouchable "retaliatory weapons" which would in that case likewise still be available nevertheless would have inflicted just as unbearable losses upon the aggressor.

Today, as we approach the Eighties, we must seriously ask ourselves whether this will be predictable also in the future with the degree of absoluteness which was confirmed in terms of its correctness due to the development of the past three decades as far as the industrialized world was concerned. It was especially in recent years that there was no lack of serious warnings and efforts to find a way out of the contradictions between rearmament tendencies and the objective compulsion to cooperation among two antagonistic systems of society. The success achieved here however is not really sufficient to enable us to speak of a breakthrough.

2. Political-Strategic Doctrines

Is it the political doctrines which heat up the arms race or is it the so-called military-industrial complex which determines doctrines? In an attempt to find an objective answer to this question, one will have to admit to oneself that it is hardly possible to eliminate the subjective approach. The doctrines themselves likewise contain subjective elements which are tailor-made for the implementation of political objectives. The political analyst would have to abandon any attempt at coming up with a situation estimate if he were to tackle the interpretation of the available literature without any predetermined values.

Definition-related differences of concepts such as "imperialism, capitalism, democracy, class struggle, detente, human rights"—to mention just a few--in the opposing social systems and beyond them even within system groups show very clearly that the individual's own position is of decisive significance in any judgment. This does not at all sound scientific but it is very close to reality. The Soviet concept of strategy is undoubtedly broader and more dynamic than the corresponding concepts of pluralist democracies--of course with the reservation pertaining to the subjectivity factor we have just mentioned. The Soviet Union sees the world as a single "strategic theater" for the historical conflict between "capitalism" and "socialism"; the United States is more inclined toward a division of tasks, adjusted to the intellectual-technological development state coupled with the inclusion of optimizable liberalization tendencies.

It would be fatal if one were to try to exchange the concepts of Soviet "doctrine," "military strategy," "military science," and "military art" among each other or if one wanted to use them as synonyms. The Soviet Union's military strategy is definitely very closely related to the political

objectives and is therefore a component of a solid scientific system. Military science is included the social science, in other words, it is the sum of scientific factors and their interconnections regarding the perception of war as an armed struggle in support of certain class interests.

The "Encyclopedia Americana" on the other hand considers strategy to be "the art and science of developing and using the political, economic, psychological, and military forces of a state for the sake of the maximum possible support of government policy in war and peace."

Offhand one should think that only linguistic differences come through in the approach to the definition of terms employed by the two leading powers of two systems that are totally different in terms of social policy. It is only the thorough interpretation of political objectives that can give us further information as to whether primacy should be assigned to power-policy-dynamic or security-policy-static interests.

While one side is concerned with ideological expansionism, the other side is afraid of losing access to vital resources in case of any change in the power and influence situation. But this simplification is today--just a few decades after the outbreak of the great ideological conflict--permissible only with restrictions. The predicted shortage of a series of presently indispensable raw materials forces all industrial countries to add the economic problem complex as a new dimension to the classical confrontation model.

The policy of detente seems to be that "vehicle" which would be suitable for moving a series of problems, existing between East and West, toward a less confrontation-oriented solution: Arms limitations, cooperation in the economic and humanitarian sphere, reduction of mutual distrust, avoidance of misinterpretations and prevention of missteps involving a danger of war. The problem solutions were and today still are overshadowed by the preconditions which are inherent in the system and which are conditioned by the time factor. This not only makes it difficult to launch a detente process but it makes it even more difficult to promote such a process.

The SALT-I Treaty signed in 1972 between Brezhnev and Nixon, in spite of some substantial objections by a series of political and military experts, provided dynamic impetus for the initiative of a phase of conference strategy. The positive outcome of the CSCE with the spectacular representation of 35 heads of state or heads of government in Helsinki only served to raise expectations even higher.

This optimistic reaction however had to yield to a skeptical realism already during the second half of the Seventies. This kind of observation should not lead to the conclusion that the period of detente is already over. It is only designed to warn against illusions to the effect that one could put an end to the "Cold War" with one conference and that one

could consider the so-called "positive peace" as being secure. Any development, especially any development with such ambitious goals, is bound to run into setbacks. It has its ups and downs. It was a series of factors that triggered a considerable braking effect; SALT II, due in 1977, did not come for another 2 years. This meant that a strong impulse had been given not so much to the quantitative but rather to the qualitative arms race between nuclear-strategic systems.

In this connection we come to the Vienna troop reduction conference. The improvement of Eurostrategic weapons and entire battlefield weapons systems, whose inclusion into any of the forums, created for arms limitation, has not taken place to this very day, raises doubts as to whether the world and especially Europe are not supposed to be put to sleep with the help of disarmament rhetoric. The differentiated views as to the evaluation and implementation of human rights is likewise not liable to promote detente. Another thing that is of essential significance is the contradiction-- as seen by the West--between Soviet detente efforts in Europe and the simultaneous forcing of conflicts outside of Europe, either through advisors and weapons shipments to so-called liberation organizations or by encouraging "surrogates" to render direct military assistance.

For quite some time now there has been a dialog between political and military experts on the concept of "offensive or defensive capacities" in the military pact systems. One probably can agree that a country or a military alliance, whose offensive capacity seems to be excessive, by virtue of that fact does not also display the political desire for aggression. But there is reason to worry when we look at the fact that, in the presence of an offensive potential in case of change in the political determination, such a potential would be immediately available in order to implement political goals also by force of arms. Here we are certainly concerned not only with the potential and the army organization structures but certainly also with the deployment of specific offensive elements. In other words, this means that undoubtedly the comparative statistics--for example, looking at armored units--play a certain role in any comparison of two opposing alliance systems; but another factor to be considered is whether the bulk of these forces is stationed near the line of demarcation already in peacetime and, so to speak, could launch an immediate attack or whether those forces are being held in readiness as counterattack forces more in the depth of the country's area. Accompanying indicators among other things are the assembly of bridging equipment and the distance of logistic support facilities from possible confrontation forces.

The background of the doctrinaire thinking models will have to be given even more consideration. Even though it may look like a play on words or perhaps even a case of hair-splitting, there are fundamental differences between the defense concepts of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. If we read the technical literature and if we run into the concept of "forward defense," then we mean by that the Western concept whereas the East is matched up

with the term of "forward defense." Although there are many Eastern experts who present these differentiated technical terms as the product of Western writers, they nevertheless do agree that their defensive concept is based on defeating an aggressor on the latter's own territory. There is however probably no need to mention the fact this can be done only through an attack.

If we introduce another element in the form of the numerical disparity between conventional units, as well as the geopolitical aspect, then we need not be astonished that the West is worried time and again about just how "peaceful" peaceful coexistence is really supposed to be. We know all about the hitherto fruitless and rather frustrating statistical debate during the Vienna troop reduction talks where it has so far not been possible to create a mutually agreeable point of departure.

Although the neutral observer has hardly any access to detailed information and although he must base his arguments mostly on technical publications available to the public--and of Western origin in most instances--he must nevertheless be inclined to consider that there is a numerically significant superiority of Warsaw Pact troops in Central Europe. That does not mean that the personnel strength data introduced by the Eastern negotiating partners are falsified. That seems unthinkable. By the same token one must not assume that the Western Alliance introduces deliberately false and numerically higher estimates in order to attain a better negotiating position. Neither side can afford this sort of thing, nor would it want to do that. If therefore there is nevertheless a considerable difference, then the cause must be found in the differing counting criteria. It would not appear to be too difficult to find out what those criteria are if the intention to reduce troop strength is genuine, coupled with the goal of achieving a mutual and reduced upper limit which has already been recognized by both sides.

Although some people so far have been talking in terms of a general balance between the two military alliances, the global strategic nuclear weapons systems, the qualitative lead of NATO in precision weapons in the battlefield sector, but also the more flexible command systems of the West were also thrown into the scale.

3. New Armament Dimensions

Last year, SALT II was signed in Vienna between Brezhnev and Carter, that is, the follow-up agreement after the SALT-I treaty signed in 1972 between Brezhnev and Nixon, on the general basis of a blanket agreement which Brezhnev and Ford had signed in 1974 in Vladivostok, concerning strategic arms limitations. The ratification debate in the United States Senate but the technical dialog in the media likewise reveals the concern here and there as to whether, because of that treaty, the Soviet Union might not temporarily be granted a "third-strike capability"--at least during the first half of the Eighties.

The unrestricted advocacy by the countries of the Warsaw Pact as against partial skepticism among the Americans as well as the rather very cautious positive echo from Western European politicians enable us to conclude that the East expects at least an improvement of its overall strategic situation as a result of SALT II.

But if this treaty indeed were to jeopardize the retaliation doctrine of the United States, then we would be dealing with a certain military option of conducting a regionalized conventional war in Europe. The development of the Soviet Eurostrategic nuclear potential likewise is not suitable for giving Western Europe a stronger feeling of security.

The optimism, which was expressed during the phase involved in the signing of SALT II by both negotiating partners, as well as the hope by the public at large that, at the very latest after ratification, the way would be clear toward making the detente process irreversible can hardly be shared today, just a few months later. A series of fundamental and grave questions will have to be resolved before one can say anything along these lines.

Of course, at this time there is no reason for doubting the desire of the Soviet Union to achieve peaceful coexistence between the two social systems. In spite of numerous instances of friction, the compulsion toward cooperation and thus toward European detente policy, albeit for differentiated reasons, seems to be stronger than the intention of converting military means into political goal concepts. But the frightening thing still is that a revision of the objectives would immediately be backed up by the military-structural prerequisites.

But even if--especially because of the lack of detailed technical knowledge--one admits only that SALT II brought about the establishment of a certain parity in the global-strategic sphere, one must not contemplate this fact in isolation. The further development of the so-called grey-zone weapons, above all their production and stockpiling--carried out by the Soviet Union so to speak parallel to the detente process--created a frightening situation.

To be sure, medium-range rockets on Soviet territory, aimed at Western Europe, have been in existence for quite some time. They were covered by the FBS (Forward Base Systems) of NATO. The conversion of the Soviet Union from the obsolete SS-4 and SS-5 to the modern SS-20 to be sure introduces an entirely new dimension. Mobility, multiple warheads, greater accuracy, and reloading possibilities create the compulsion for a thorough review of the military-strategic situation. On top of that we have the recent introduction of the Soviet Union's Eurostrategic bomber, under the code name "Blackfire." If we also consider the improvement of the air defense system of the Warsaw Pact, which would seem to reduce the intrusion capability of Western bombers, then we have an additional factor of imbalance.

At the very latest since the speech by Secretary-General Brezhnev on 6 October 1979 in Berlin, the military dialog was heated up both between the alliances but also within the Western Alliance. In addition to some approaches which should certainly be considered positive, we must neither underestimate the accompanying warning, nor are the general statements sufficient to enable us to expect a reversal of the trend in stepped-up Soviet armament efforts so far.

There is no doubt that a continuation of the arms race will make detente efforts more difficult and, in the end, impossible. But since nobody can afford to speak against detente--because after all one could not at the same time offer a more desirable alternative--there is the great danger that detente policy will be turned into detente rhetoric, just as it happened in the case of disarmament policy. But there is likewise no doubt that there will be no detente if the military balance continues to shift toward a threatening disequilibrium.

The conflict with capitalism is and remains the goal of Soviet ideology. "Peaceful coexistence," a Soviet synonym for "detente," is a vehicle for the continuation of the class struggle in the ideological, intellectual, cultural, and economic areas, when the means of direct force also entail self-destruction. Looking at it this way, we can also resolve the contradiction--which the West often does not grasp--of, on the one hand, pursuing the detente policy within the industrialized world and, on the other hand, very resolutely supporting military conflicts on other continents. This regionalization of detente makes it difficult for many observers in the West to have any confidence in the genuine and long-term desire of the Soviet Union for detente.

Only military parity between opposing social and alliance systems, with a reduced potential which is certainly desirable and should be worked for, as a kind of "strategy of fear," can enable the policy of detente to lead toward longer-term stability for the industrialized world.

An abandonment of this principle would have to declare detente to be a policy in a "standby position." But military parity must not be combined with the continuation of the arms race if the structural offensive character of the fighting forces becomes convertible.

Of course, there is also compulsion for Soviet policy not completely to leave the road of European detente policy. First of all, the Soviets will have to consider the situation in the Far East. Although it is to be welcomed that the PRC has emerged from its isolation, although one must understand the need of this heavily populated country to catch up to Western technology, one must at the same time understand the worry of the Soviet Union that it might some day find itself confronted with a nation of a billion people at its border. Besides, one must look at the economic situation in the East Bloc. There again it is becoming

increasingly difficult to get the people to understand why they should have to go on doing without consumer items. One should not think that their assumption to the effect that the West is forcing rising dissatisfaction among the citizens upon them through constantly rising arms expenditures and the attendant downgrading of the quality of life--one should not consider that assumption to be merely propaganda.

4. Outlook

The year 1980--as programed by the countries participating in the CSCE--was to be another milestone on this narrow path of detente efforts. The second follow-up conference of the 35 participating countries is scheduled for November in Madrid. It has been said and written for quite some time that Madrid must not become a tribunal, as happened in the case of Belgrade (1974, 1978). The prerequisites for success have been established. Moscow seems ready to accommodate the ideas of neutrals and nonaligned but also some pact countries with respect to the development of confidence-promoting measures in the military sphere. In the West there seems to have been a certain realization that the question of the implementation of human rights throughout Europe could be handled in a more delicate and less offensive manner, without deviating from the conviction as to the correctness of the principle. The East and West show more understanding for the practicality of economic cooperation in their mutual interest. Nevertheless, expectations should not be pegged too high. There are too many points of friction which are to be feared here and which overshadow the coming years.

First of all, we would have to ask ourselves how and whether there will be a continuity of political objectives in the two leading powers. The foreign policy of the United States will be very heavily influenced by the election campaign and what presidential candidates say during that campaign, in the light of past experience, mostly does not create a suitable climate of trust for further necessary negotiations. But it seems that there will also be a change in leadership in the Soviet Union. Here, past experience teaches us that we are going to have a period of uncertainty in our situation estimates. Will those heavily ideologically oriented forces prevail which consider their vision of the collapse of capitalism confirmed by the anticipated social-economic problems of the market-oriented West and which step up methods of psychological warfare and at the same time employ their raw material resources as instruments of pressure or will those soberly oriented technocrats remain in power who realize that the East can catch up only through cooperation with an economically strong and efficient West?

Secondly, there was a very important decision under debate in the Western Alliance in the area of modernization and follow-on procurement in the medium-range rocket sector, coupled with proposals for arms controls in the European area. The decisions adopted in Brussels on 13 December

1979 to be sure consist of a very carefully balanced option—because practical implementation will take many years—combined with an arms control offer designed to reduce the existing potential; those decisions will cause a deterioration in the political climate at least temporarily. The propaganda effort by the Warsaw Pact countries to prevent that was entirely too big. If blame for the acceleration of the arms race is now placed upon NATO, then a postponement of the follow-on arms procurement decision would have cast doubts upon the resolution and solidarity needed to defend Western Europe.

As our third point we have the problems of the North-South dialog, in other words, the population explosion in a series of developing countries, the reduction of the "gap between poor and rich" resulting from that, the rising level of starvation in many parts of the Third World and the Fourth World, the increasing shortage of certain raw materials, and the use of sensitive raw materials as a weapon. To be sure, the industrialized West, for example, would get to feel a raw material shortage sooner than the Soviet Union which for the time being is still autarchic. But a West with a low output will be forced to reduce its economic relationships and that in turn will cause economic trouble for the East.

Fourth, there have been some completely new developments in the Near East and the Middle East which many observers did not expect. Not only the split of the Arab Camp resulting from the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, not only the emancipation process of the PLO, from a violent revolutionary liberation organization to a more widespread political force, created differences of opinion within the Western World, but also and above all, the "Holy War," given religious motivation by the Islamic Shiite leader, resemble a "ticking time bomb" which threatens not only the world of Islam. Both the United States and Western Europe are getting to feel this phenomenon but even the Kremlin should realize that it cannot remain an unconcerned spectator, especially not a confidently waiting third party. The Khomeyni bacillus could spread to the approximately 40 million Muslims on Soviet territory only too easily.

By way of summary, there is reason to fear that the Eighties will produce higher levels of instability than was the case during the past three decades. A phase of Cold War was followed by a period of detente skepticism. The latter was replaced by a phase of detente euphoria around the middle of the Seventies. Today we are looking forward to a period of sobering up as far as detente is concerned.

Power policy and security policy are still determined by men who belong to the generation of World War II in terms of experience or memories. They know all about great suffering and they therefore also have an idea as to what the effect of any renewed military confrontations could be.

5. Conclusions From the Austrian Viewpoint

Austria is interested in genuine detente and, considering its geopolitical situation, must certainly also be interested in this. As a small neutral country, we are in favor of troop and arms reduction, of course in a balanced form, because constructive neutrality policy and the preservation of permanent neutrality will depend extensively on the regional and global balance.

The Austrians will continue to have to demonstrate their determination to discharge their military obligations, deriving from international law, toward all sides involving potential conflict partners without allowing any doubts to arise, as has been the case so far, that there cannot be any ideological neutrality for them--and proof of that, for the outside world, as well as confirmation domestically, might be seen in the big 1979 autumn maneuvers in terms of a credible contribution.

In the North-South dialog, Austria must--as in economic relations with the Eastern European countries and their government-controlled trade system--realize that its behavior models are fashioned by a market-oriented economic system.

Of course, Austria will try--without overestimating its significance--to provide an impetus for the detente process and thus for peaceful developments especially in Europe on all political-strategic levels through constructive ideas. In this process we are going to have to accept setbacks. But we need a realistic situation estimate as to the possibilities and limitations determined by the uncontrollable prerequisites prevailing in a small country.

What then would have to be done, from the neutral viewpoint, in order to be able to judge the outlook for the Eighties to be more optimistic than is being done worldwide today?

For that we would need success in holding the arms race down, coupled with the simultaneous preparation of confidence-creating verification models and we would also need the restoration of military parity. Besides it seems necessary to review the so-called defense doctrines and to contemplate an adjustment of forces and organizational structure. More openness in arms technology options and greater transparency of defense budgets are just as important as better cooperation in problem solutions for the developing countries, placing ideological and power-policy interests on a secondary level. Last but not least, the current situation should force the communist countries to subject the ideology, based on experiences of the past, to an unemotional criticism in terms of its correctness and usefulness for tomorrow and also to undertake corresponding adaptations but likewise to assign more significance to the implementation of human rights at home and thus to avoid any influence from the outside.

One must realize that this sounds very ambitious. The degree of optimism and determination, with which we tackle the problem solutions from all angles, will determine whether the cooperation of nations in Europe in the future will reveal regressive, stagnating, or progressing tendencies. But detente will remain only an illusion without a serious effort to attain those objectives, even partly, that is to say, objectives which perhaps many people consider illusionist but which imply a major effort on both sides of the dividing line between the social systems.

5058

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SELECTED PUBLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCES

Paris REVUE FRANCAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE in French No 1, Feb, No 2, Apr, No 3, Jun, No 4-5, Aug-Oct, No 6, Dec 79

[Feb 79, pp 129-167]

[Excerpts] Dufreune, Mikel--"Subversion, perversion" (Subversion and Perversion)--Paris, University Press of France, 1977, 21 cm, 191 p (Politics Exploding)

There are two recurring themes in this work: one, an analysis of authority and autonomy in the political arena, and the other, an analysis of individual responsibility in term of transforming the social-political system. Perversion, aside from any connotations of psychoanalytical nature, is pure violence related to domination (having torture as its extreme); subversion is the rejection of the system and the search for a new world which, ideally, can be realized only through worker-management itself being again and again called into question. A fertile and convincing book which, despite extremely intellectual reference, is very highly readable, at the same time having a certain poetic quality.

Georgopoulos, Constantin L.--"La democratie en danger. Sa structure actuelle, ses problemes" (Democracy Endangered. Its Present Structure and Its Problems)--Paris, General Law and Jurisprudence Publications, 1977, 22 cm, 240 p.

The growing ascendancy of executive authority and the continual reduction of the prerogatives of the legislative authority are familiar themes since the end of World War II. Analysis of this phenomenon is summarized here by a professor of law who is a former dean of the Athens Law Faculty, without introducing any actually new elements, except for the number of examples chosen to illustrate the thesis.

Molina, Gerard and Vargas, Yves--"Dialogue a l'interieur du Parti communiste francais" (Dialogue Within the French Communist Party)--Paris, F. Maspero, 1978, 22 cm, 153 p (Independent Publication, 342).

In the authors' opinion, the Communist Party, since signing the joint program, and more particularly since the 22nd Congress, in order to avoid Stalinist

deviation has adopted a liberal petty-bourgeois deviation. There are differences among official pronouncements, the party line, and the demands of the masses (feminism, ecology, soldiers' committees, and so forth). As far as the authors are concerned the French Communist Party must strengthen the "revolutionary" current (hence neither Stalinist nor democratic) within itself to reestablish the links between active party members and the leadership and assure the party's progress. In truth a curious book: very frequently annoying because it is partisan and dogmatic; it makes apparent aspirations which are sometimes equivocal and sometimes traditional. Last, one can not very well discern what the authors wish the French Communist Party to be.

Deligny, Henri--"Chirac ou la fringale du pouvoir" (Chirac, or the Lust for Power)--Paris, A. Moreau, 1977, 2 cm, 444 p + index.

It has often been regretted that French political history or political science has had little devotion to biography. But must it adopt such under the pressure of current events by means of press clippings quickly gathered together, and with a style not academic? As a matter of fact the "political" study of the individual remains to be written and it is perhaps too soon for it to be done.

Macciocchi, Maria--Antonietta--"Après Marx, avril" (After Marx, April). Translated from the Italian by Michèle Causse, Daniele Guillerm, Gérard Hup, and Yaun Moulier. Preface by Leonardo Sciascia, Paris, Seuil, 1978, 21 cm, 191 p ("Tel quel" Collection)

Or how an active communist, former deputy from Naples, abandoned strict Marxism-Leninism to become a revolutionary leftist: a revolutionary leftist more social and intellectual than political, closer to the Parisian salons than to the laboring masses. There are several bits of enjoyable bravado in this book: the author's defense of her thesis at the Sorbonne, in the beginning of 1977, before several leading lights of French political science; a visit to the La Borde Clinic where Felix Guattari is attempting to practice psychiatry and revolution at the same time; and the expulsion of the author's Roman cell after its participation in the demonstrations of the Italian revolutionary movements in Bologna. In this book there is also a description of Italian "revolutionism" along with an incisive critique of the Italian Communist Party and its principal leaders. This is an intelligent book, often humorous, yet nevertheless unpleasing, perhaps partly because of the notoriety, which bears too much resemblance to a fad, of the author.

Rony, Jean--"Trente ans de parti. Un communiste s'interroge" (Thirty Years in the Party. A Communist wonders)--Paris, C. Bourgois, 1978, 18 cm, 230 p

This is a fine book, this autobiography of an active communist faithful to his party despite its changes of party line, its doctrinal waverings, and its ideological and tactical retreats. The author in particular poses the problem of the role and status of intellectuals in a party which above all wants to be a workers' party, advance guard of the revolutionary struggle. A devalued status yet an essential function, indispensable to the evolution

of the Communist Party. Criticisms directed toward the party, moreover, are not lacking: deficiencies of internal operation and democratic centralism; deficiencies in... [remainder of text not provided].

Garcia, Andre--"Les instruments de la politique française du commerce extérieur" (The Instruments of French Foreign Trade Policy)--Paris, La Documentation française, 1977, 27 cm, 68 p (NOTES ET ETUDES DOCUMENTAIRES, 4404-4405, 2 September 1977)

This excellent study, which will be useful to all who are interested in French foreign policy, first covers the scope of a policy linked to general economic policy and foreign policy. The study describes its methods, administration, and related organizations. The author next analyzes the essentials of French foreign trade policy by what means and with what difficulties it has been transformed, after having been continental and protectionist, into a policy open--and hence exposed--to international competition.

Vivian, Pierre--"Reflexions d'un Français sur le mystère Chérac" (A Frenchman's Reflections upon the Chérac Mystery)--Paris, J. Gracher, 1978, 21 cm, 190 p + bibliography

Vivian, who wishes "the modest voice of an ordinary Frenchman" to be heard, attempts to elucidate for the public the "mystery" of the one who, according to him, has "again given a taste of the Resistance to an entire class of French society." To be skimmed through for the sake of curiosity because it is rare, in the long series of political biographies, to see a personality showered with fulsome praise in such unrestrained manner. That said, one still does not see, after reading it, wherein is the Chérac "mystery."

[Apr 79, pp 317-363]

[Excerpts] Maudel, Ernest--"Critique de l'Eurocommunisme" (A Critique of Eurocommunism)--Paris, F. Maspéro, 1978, 18 cm, 319 p (Maspéro "Petite Collection," 188)

The director of the Fourth Internationale considers that Eurocommunism has its origins and deserves its errors, as well as its possible failures, from the original sin of Stalinism, namely the establishment of socialism in a single country. The logical result of a process commenced in 1925-1927, Eurocommunism--a reform step--still ignores international revolution. A dedicated partisan of confrontation, the author compares the "strategy of exhaustion" of Kautsky to the "gradualism" of Eurocommunism, from which he derives the equation: Eurocommunism equals social democracy.

"Nouvelles (Les) voies au socialisme, Parti communiste d'Espagne, Parti communiste italien, Parti socialiste italien." (The New Roads to Socialism; Communist Party of Spain, Italian Communist Party, Italian Socialist Party). Texts selected and presented by Maximo Loizu and Eric Jeanneret. Preface by Santiago Alvarez--Geneva, Adversaires, 1976, 22 cm, 229 p

A collection of texts considered to be the most enlightening upon the re-birth of "Eurocommunist" and socialist thought in the last few years. The work is parallel with that by H. Portelli and M.A. Bosi already published in France; it must nevertheless be stated that the introduction written by them relating only to the communist parties is more profound and opens more perspectives of study. Loizu and Jeanneret's choices are felicitous. Much more questionable is their conclusions on the present evolution of the Italian Socialist Party, about which the least that can be said that it has very superficially renounced anticommunism. Perhaps, also, it would have been desirable to wonder about the correspondence between the pronouncements and political practice of the Spanish and Italian communists.

Daix, Pierre--"La crise du PCF" (The Crisis of the French Communist Party)--Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1978, 21 cm, 247 p

A defender of Solzheretsyn, Daix has gone along his path with a self-criticism and now, today, with an analysis of the ideological freeze rampant within the French Communist Party since "the catastrophe" of "The Goulag Archipelago." As a matter of fact, it all began with the rejection of "destalinization" dictated by Thorez, which has resulted in a backwardness that, 20 years later, still has not been overcome. To maintain its strength the party is therefore compelled to barricade itself behind a three-fold protective barrier: defense of the party whose history is reconstructed in such a manner as to prove the correctness of its predictions, defense of the ideology, with the result that scientific materialism has become the screen for the century's greatest undertaking of irrationality. By rejection of any idea of crisis--be it that of the world or of the communist party--the party which prides itself on being the party of the workers' "movement" is no more than the fortress hindering the revolution of the 21st century, which will be the explosion of information, in doing its work.

Donolo, Carlo--"Mutamento transizione? Politica e societa nella crisi italiana"--Bologna, Il Mulino, 1977, 19 cm, 141 p (Il Mulino Universal Paperbacks, 61)

Often pertinent reflections upon the evolution of the Italian political system since the great crisis of 1968-1969 and upon the profound significance of the present times, denoted by the 1976 elections. In the author's view the crisis which today pervades Italian society is based upon the indistinct alternatives of what he calls "changes," that is, the adaptation of capitalism, and "transition," that is, passage into a different society. Since 1976, capitalist reformism (that of the Christian Democrats) and worker reformism (that of the Italian Communist Party and the labor unions) are vying to change the Italian state, but the processes which affect the social movement, among which autonomization is being promoted by the Italian Communist Party's present behavior, are not being reckoned with.

Juquin, Pierre--"Programme commun, L'actualisation a dossiers ouverts." (The Joint Program, Updating with Open Records). Preface by Charles Fiterman, texts by Georges Marchais--Paris, Editions sociales, 1978, 21 cm, 187 p plus bibliography.

To the questions Frenchmen have asked and are asking about the failure of the negotiations undertaken by the parties of the left with the view of bringing the Joint Program up to date, Luquin provides an answer, that of the French Communist Party. It is somewhat a film of events he offers here, with supporting documents. Written before the legislative elections in March, in the perspective of a "probable" victory for the union of the left, his book has not yet in some respects lost its timeliness in the beginning of 1979 (see through all the pages the continual and virulent criticism directed at the Socialist Party and its leaders).

ECOLE NATIONALE D'ADMINISTRATION [National School of Administration] (Paris) Mendes-France Class--"La Defense nucleaire de la France. Recherche et developpement a fins militaires" (Nuclear Defense of France. Research and Development of Military Purposes). Two theses of the Mendes-France class of the National School of Administration--Paris, Ed. L.J., 1978, 23 cm, 195 p (Les Sept Epées [The Seven Swords], Publication No 11)

[Apr 4, pp 506-588]

[Excerpts]

Bibliographic Notes

Caciagli, Mario--"Democrazia cristiana e potere nel Mezzogiorno. Il sistema democristiano a Catania"--Florence, Guarraldi, 1977, 22 cm, xii plus 521 p

A veritable epitome on the Christian Democracy of Catania, this work, edited by Mario Caciagli nonetheless widely surpasses the terrain of the local inquiry conducted by an entire team of political scientists. Its conclusions in fact apply to the whole Midi [southern part of the country] and are also enlightening on the national scale. No doubt only a minutely detailed case study makes it possible to take apart, with so much precision, the mechanisms of a complex system and respond in some way to the questions posed by the continued presence, in power, of a Catholic party in Italy in spite of profound changes in society.

At the local level, in the first place, the book presents extremely detailed information--largely unpublished, thanks to the utilization of the party's archives--on the structure and operation of Christian Democracy in Catania. This ranges from the internal organization (the number, size, and establishment of sections, the quantitative and qualitative evolution of new members, replacement of the elite, and decision making process) to election results, and passes through direction by local authority. Above all, Caciagli and his team apply themselves to a thorough analysis as possible of the entire system of authority progressively constructed by the Christian Democratic Party on the basis of both control of the stream of public subsidies which make possible its position as the dominant governing party and the very close relationship it has formed with the driving sector of the local economy, that of construction. The pages concerned with the simultaneous growth and the reciprocal aid of the party and the industrial sector in full expansion (the construction "boom" in Catania in the 1950 decade corresponds with the assertion of the new Christian Democratic leadership class in the country and the region) as well as those which describe the capturing by the Christian

Democrats of the principal power centers in the political society and in the civil service (local and provincial administrations, quasi-state organizations, hospitals, and so forth) are among the best written in Italy upon these subjects. The ambition of this work is in fact quite different from description and the reconstitution of these mechanisms opens into the basic questions related to the nature and function of Christian Democracy. In between the European and American models of mass conservative parties and party machines the authors have opted for an original type of "mass consumerist party." Its definition has the advantage of restoring several dimensions of the party:

Modernity with respect to the old parties of representation (professional politicians have replaced the former notables and state consumerism made possible by control of public organisms has taken the place of private consumerism);

its inter-class nature is consolidated by the distribution of individual and corporate projects; and

its capability of mediating between various interests (a study of Christian Democratic administrative activity in local and regional decision making bodies enables it to be determined in favor of which interests the party has declared itself, depending upon the type of mediation involved.

Following the tradition established by the best works on the southern parties, such as "Peasant Communism in Southern Italy" by S. Tarrow and "Votere e società a Napoli nel dopoguerra" by P. Allum, Caciagli's work in addition shows in excellent fashion the relationships between the political and social systems. It is clear that the principal characteristics of Christian Democracy stem in part from its adaptation to a certain type of political culture, fragmented and individualistic, and to a certain stage of economic development marked by the absence of a genuine industrial proletariat, the importance of the tertiary sector, and the dependence upon the national economy and that of the state, which are those of the Italian Midi. But a national dimension is encountered in several ways. First, in the slant of the development theory which its authors have adopted, that of "internal dependence" which considers underdevelopment not simply as the absence of development but as a consequence of capitalistic development. In the Italian case this leads to stressing close connection between development in the north and underdevelopment in the Midi. In recalling similarities between the history of Christian Democracy in Catania and that of the national Christian Democracy with the individualization of three fully corresponding phases: a phase of installation at the end of the 1940 decade, a phase of stabilization and full possession of authority with the accession of a new elite and the "dorotheen" tide, and last, a phase of crisis since the beginning of the 1970 decade. The great coherence of the work--despite its collective nature--the convincing force of its demonstration, the seriousness of its inquiry in the field should make it possible to believe that the Christian Democratic phenomenon is finally explained and that the definition of a "mass consumerist party" is completely satisfactory. However, the impression persists that the thesis is restrictive,

that it sheds light upon only one aspect--no doubt the most important--of southern Christian Democracy, but there exist another aspect which the authors of this book have left in the dark, that is, the ideological-cultural aspect. The influence of the Church and of related organizations--Catholic Action, Christian trade unionism, and so forth--has been ignored as though it did not exist or existed only to function for the defense of the dominant bloc's interests. The use of opinion polls would not doubt have shown--as has been shown in Italy, as a whole--that the concept of "subculture" still remains one of the principal instruments in interpreting the nature of parties. After all, Christian Democracy is also a Catholic party.

Genevieve Bibes
Center for International Studies and
Research

Political Forces and Behavior

Althusser, Louis--"ce qui ne peut plus durer dans le Parti communiste"
(What Can No Longer Continue in the Communist Party)--Paris, P. Maspero,
1978, 18 cm, 123 p (Theory)

Written on the morrow of the defeat of the union of the left in the March 1978 elections, this little book is a severe indictment of the political and organizational practices of the French Communist Party. Here Althusser has combined the series of articles published in LE MONDE 24-27 January 1978, preceding them with a preface in which he analyzes the reaction of the French Communist Party leadership in the face of the party's internal disputes. He demands that more overtures be made, that there be more "transparency," in short that there be more democracy within the party. But what he wants above all to show is that the "strange defeat" of March was essentially the result of a changed line imposed from above upon the communist party members because "it was strengthening of the party against the threat of the socialists which the leadership considered the No 1 objective"; the political practice of the French Communist Party's leadership at present "tends to duplicate the bourgeois political practice to the extent that it separates the leadership from the party members and the party from the masses." Whence there is a call for a transformation from top to bottom of the party, for a genuinely democratic centralism, and a continual liaison between leadership and membership and between party and popular masses.

Bocca, Giorgio--"Il terrorismo italiano, 1970-1978"--Milan, Rizzoli, 1978,
22 cm, 157 p

A very personal work by one of Italy's most noted journalists on the armed extreme left in Italy. Bocca believes that he detects two origins in the terrorist movement, particularly the Red Brigades: dissident Catholicism and Stalinism, but that is not always convincing. He attempts to analyze, sometimes not without a certain sympathy, the motivations of those he considers to be the "armed revolutionary party." Therein lies the interest of this book. Bocca also shows into what the Red Brigades have evolved in the

course of the last few years and he rejects the usual explanation according to which they are no more than the pawns of a foreign power. In his opinion the Red Brigades were born of the Italian situation. But one cannot accept his statements relative to the classical left: how can it be said that "the communists for more than 40 years have been the enemies of parliamentary democracy" or that "violence and intolerance in the factories" have been covered up by the unions? Likewise, when Bocca writes that Italian employers are both "tyrants and philanthropists" because they exploit the workers and yet lose money, he hardly carries conviction.

Gallissot, René, editor--"Mouvement ouvrier, communisme, et nationalisme dans le monde arabe" (The Workers' Movement, Communism, and Nationalism in the Arab World) Studies coordinated and assembled by René Gallissot, with M. Al-Charif, A. Ayache, J. Bessis, J. Couland et al.--Paris, Editions ouvrières, 1978, 24 cm, 292 p plus bibliography (Social Movement, Publication 3)

Communism and nationalism are customarily presented as two opposed, indeed incompatible, entities in the Arab world, following upon W. Laqueur, and on the basis of the reference work by M. Rodinson. Together with a team of historians Gallissot returns to the real country, going beyond political interpretation and cultural analysis in order to effectuate research into social history: on the origins of the workers' movement in Arab countries, the development of unionism, the socialist and communist involvement in these countries "in national labor" in the face of a colonial situation. In the introduction he traces the birth of socialism in Arab countries concurrently with Arabism and that of the workers' movement, then communism (from 1920). These trends engender "populist" nationalism which were to become the official "socialisms" after World War II. The colonial period is brought to mind by R. Tlili ("The Socialist Federation of Tunisia and the Islamic Question, 1919-1925") and by G. Oued ("The French Left and the Young Moroccans, 1930-1935"), two studies which emphasize the scornful ignorance of French progressives as far as Islam was concerned. Three contributions serve to relate, concretely, the bases and positions of early communism: In Algeria, A. Rendiaf studies the work of communist party members up to the Popular Front; in Palestine, M. al-Charif shows Palestinian unions caught in a vise between Histadruth and Arab employers, and in Morocco, by A. Ayache. Next, two long range studies: one by J. Couland, an erudite examination of Egyptian unionism history from 1899 to 1953; the other by M. Hadri, on the inconsistencies of the Iraqi Communist Party having to contend with the questions of Arab unity and Kurdish nationalism. Last, H. Hamza analyzes the defeat of the Tunisian Communist Party faced with the nationalist question (1943-1946): not a defeat for Marxism but for "USSR centralism." J. Bessis shows that the independence obtained by the political class had little impact upon social struggles and the actual country (1953-1956). These studies supported by direct testimony and first-hand documents, especially in Arabic. They contribute a great deal of information and different shades of thought to an important discussion because it is deep-rooted in the Arab reality of the present.

Gardet, Louis--"Les hommes de l'Islam. Approche des mentalités" (The Men of Islam. An Approach to the Mental Attitudes)--Paris, Hachette, 1977, 23 cm, 445 p plus bibliography and index (The Times and the Men).

This work helps to a better grasp of the importance of Islam today in the Arab world and in other parts of the world. This is an outline of the history of Moslem thought and mental attitudes since the beginning of Islam. The fourth section, on contemporary Moslem mental attitudes is the one which will enlighten us the most in our research into contemporary Moslem politics. But it is this contemporary perspective which casts a rather original look, for a religious philosopher, upon classical Islam: a "social-cultural phenomenology" of the social classes; this tentative is of great interest for understanding Moslem societies of our times since it is always to the glories of Islam which the present streams of thought in Islamic lands refer, at least in the Arab world. Excellent notes on the two main streams of thought and of social-political activity in the Arab world; the Basm and the Moslem Brothers. An index and a very valuable analytical table.

Lecourt, Dominique--"Dissidence ou revolution?" (Dissent or Revolution?)--Paris, F. Maspero, 1978, 21 cm, 99 p (Independent Publications, 346).

A disciple of Louis Althusser, well known for his works on Bachliard and the Lyssenko affair, Lecourt in this short but weighty work tackles the question of the dissidents in socialist countries. He states that the fate of the dispute in the East remains a puzzle but his words mainly concern the West. Solzhenitsyn on the right and Pliouch on the left are serving as the pretext for an anti-Marxist campaign whose heralds are the new philosophers. Basically nothing new as far as Karl Popper, Hannah Arendt, and Albert Camus are concerned. In passing Lecourt denounces the truly "fraudulent misuse" of Michel Foucault's research by the ideologists of capitalist regimes in search of questionable scientific support. In his opinion "Western ideology of dissidence at last shows itself for what it really is: an ideological combat formation...which legitimizes and accentuates...the evasive reaction of Western intellectuals in the face of the 'crisis' in 'their' Marxism" (p 91) and enables imperialism to "exploit, for its own advantage the crisis in the communist movement and its own crisis" (p 97).

"Sozialistische und Kommunistische Parteien in Westeuropa" Vol 1 "Südlander"--Opladen, Leske, and Budrich, 1978, 19 cm, 386 p plus bibliography (Uni-Taschenbücher 761, Political Science).

This first volume devoted to the socialist and communist parties of the Mediterranean countries of Europe combines a series of reports by different authors: they discuss the historical development, programs, and parliamentary status of the socialist, social democratic, and communist parties in France, Italy, Spain, and Greece. The objectives, prospects of success, and political and social-economic concepts of a united Europe of these various parties are analyzed in each of the reports. This work, which has assembled a large bibliography, is especially intended for students of political science.

Boumediene, Houari--"La strategie de Boumediene" (Boumediene's Strategy). Texts selected and presented by Paul Balta and Claudine Rulleau--Paris, Sindbad, 1978, 23 cm, 161 p (Arab Library: Political Texts Collection).

A collection of Boumediene's texts classified by subject: the Algerian nation (in its fight for complete independence), "the revolutionary government" (that is, according to the authors, the regime instituted by Boumediene in 1965) and its crisis in 1967 and consolidation in 1977; the related theme of political and social institutions from the simple commune to the people's assembly, with the party's ambiguous role; also the subject of the three revolutions--industrial, agrarian, and cultural--with planning, petroleum, mobilization of students in the countryside, and Arabization; and last, Algeria in the world, its relations with France, with East and West, with the "Arab fatherland," Africa, and the Third World. The Palestinian question and the war in the western Sahara are treated in connection with Algeria's Arab policy. A brief chronology from 1926 to 1954, more detailed from 1954 to 1977.

Chirac, Jacques--"La lueur de l'esperance. Reflexions du soir pour le matin" (The Glimmer of Hope. Reflections in the Evening for the Next Morning)--Paris, La table ronde, 1978, 21 cm, 236 p

The title is borrowed from General de Gaulle but the inspiration is closer to Georges Pompidou who remains the master to be believed, which explains why economics here takes precedence over politics. The main business is still industrialization whose victory over the supporters of "collectivism" was in a way the prerequisite condition. Written before what has been called the "Cochin appeal," the book, even though it explains the reason for supporting Giscard d'Estaing in 1974 (how does one support a candidate beaten in advance?) nevertheless remains circumspect on European politics of the first 2 years of the 7-year presidential term and in particular on the conditions under which the election, by universal suffrage of the European Assembly was decided.

Simonot, Philippe--"Les nucleocrates" (The "Nucleocrats")--Genoble, Grenoble University Press, 1978, 22 cm, 316 p plus index (Capitalism and Survival).

Director of the CEA [Atomic Energy Commission] and the EDF [French Electric (Power) Company], high officials and large employers in the nuclear industry have been meeting periodically for more than 20 years as the Consultative Commission for Production of Energy of Nuclear Origin (PEON). There, according to the author, is found the main center for decisions bearing upon civil nuclear applications. Among these "nucleocrats" is a limited nucleus (27 persons) distinguished by the long duration of their presence in the PEON Commission; this nucleus of "permanent members" is the subject of an analysis in depth. In toto the author has engaged in 20 conversations on the decision process in matters of nuclear policy. Lacking a rigorous theoretical framework, the work does not provide comprehensive results about the decision process in the nuclear domain but, in the course of the conversations the reader's interest is attracted by information which is often unpublished.

Whether it be of conflicts between the CEA and EDF, the vicissitudes of the "French system" for production of nuclear energy, or the decision to undertake construction of the atomic bomb, the words of Simonnot's conversational partners often bring something new in a research domain relatively infrequently visited. The analysis of the conversations is supplemented with an explanatory commentary of juridical, technical, and political texts which trace the evolution of French nuclear policy under the Fourth and Fifth Republics.

International Relations

Kapur, Harish, and Molnar, Maklou, editors--"Le 'nouveau communisme' Etude sur l'eurocommunisme et l'Europe de l'Est" (The "New Communism." A Study of Eurocommunism and Eastern Europe). With contributions from Marco Altherr, Bruno Arcidiacono, Emile Durand, Hans Peter Gray, et al.--Geneva, University Institute for Advanced International Studies, 1978, 23 cm, 111 p (Studies and Publications of the University Institute for Advanced International Studies, 16).

"The 'New Communism'" by Molnar and his team is not solely intended as a study of the Eurocommunist phenomenon, of which many analyses have already been published, but also to place it again in the context of relations between western communist parties and socialist regimes, whether it be a question of communist parties in power or of dissidents. Emile Durand, Isabelle Junod, and Lubor Jilek examined the Polish and Czechoslovakia cases, in particular. Nevertheless it is to be regretted that besides some errors in spelling proper names the authors have not more clearly defined the problematical nature of East-West relations, and the relations between communism and socialism of which Eurocommunism is said to be the intermediary, or the stakes, by analyzing, for example, the Italian "terza via" (third way) which, according to G. Chiaromonte, aims to reunify the international workers' movement and as a result, the two Europes.

[August-Oct 79, pp 895-968]

[Excerpts Chouffignal, Georges--"Les syndicats italiens et la politique" (The Italian Union and Politics)--Grenoble, University Press of Grenoble, 1978, 70 cm, 301 p.

The eruption in force of the unions in Italian political life in the autumn of 1969 also abruptly forced upon Italy the attention of observers whose competence was not always at the level of their ambition. It is the great merit of Chouffignal to present, at last, to the French reader a serious work whose clarity is in no way the result of excessive simplification. In this respect the usefulness of the book's historical part seems essential for it makes it possible to understand events put back into context: the evolution of the worker's movement since 1945. The explosion of 1969 is in fact explainable only if it is related, as Chouffignal does, not only to social, economic, and political distortions of the period of the Italian "miracle" but also to the very history of unionism. Chouffignal has thus correctly emphasized the importance of such facts as the passage of national contract negotiation to separate negotiation which, from the 1960 decade,

has placed the enterprise at the forefront of union concerns, or further, in those same years the emergence of new managers. This enables the author to throw into question many accepted ideas and in particular to raise, in a manner much more dialectic and many-faceted, the basic spontaneity and its relationship with the institution of unionism. The better part of the work is out of context, that which is devoted to the 1968-1969 to 1971-1972 period, that is the period when there were instituted new organizational forms and new objectives of the workers' movement emerged. Some errors in detail do not diminish the value of the work in this regard (It is G. Agnelli and not U. Agnelli who is president of CONFINDUSTRIA [General Confederation of Italian Industry], the Italian Chamber of Deputies comprises 630 members, not 580, and RINASCITA is the ideological periodical of the Italian Communist Party and not of the CGIL [Italian General Confederation of Labor], and so forth). The last part which deals with the present is less convincing. Manifestly the author has put out a bit hastily a work which originally dealt with the 1960 decade and the beginning of the 1970 decade. His analysis of the present crisis is very brusque. The present difficulties of Italian unionism are not adequately explained as a function, on the one hand, of the responses by Italian capitalism to the great social victories of the "hot autumn" and, on the other hand, the new political situation marked by the entry of the communists into the majority coalition. But perhaps Couffignal intends to make this the subject of another work.

Geledan, Alain, editor--"Les Syndicats" (The Unions)--Paris, Hatier, 1978, 18 cm, 79 p (Profil dossier 514)

Introduction to unions based upon documents. The CGT [General Confederation of Labor], CFTD [French Democratic Confederation of Labor], CGT-FD [General Confederation of Labor-Workers Force], and CGC [General Confederation of Managerial Personnel] each have a chapter, but not the CFTC [French Confederation of Christian Workers] nor the FEN [National Education Federation] even though they are numerically greater than the Managerial Confederation. The role of the unions is presented from the standpoints of strikes and militancy, the negotiation dimension receiving very little mention. Three concepts of unionism are briefly discussed: the liberal, neo-liberal, and Marxists. Last, the development of worldwide unionism is sketched without mention of the ETUC [European Trade Union Confederation] problem. Various errors unfortunately impair the text. The work by Andrew and Lignon cited on p 58 is entitled "Le militant syndicaliste d'aujourd'hui" (Militant Unionism Today) and was published Chez Denoel. The name of Goetz-Girey is misspelled (Goetz-Giray, p 86). The extract from Karl Marx comes from the first "Congress of the AIT [International Workers Association]" (p 68). The first name of LE MONDE's journalist Roy is Joanne (p 74), and so on. Last, it is strange to classify "Militer" [Militate] by Eugene Descamps among works on the CGT since it deals essentially with the CFTC and CFTD (p 78).

Rubbi, Antonio--"I partiti comunisti dell'Europa occidentale"--Milan, N. Teti, 1978, 19 cm, 275 p (Biblioteca del Calendario, 8).

A panoramic view of the various communist parties of Western Europe, each presented with its history, type of organization, electoral strength, its

links with the mass movements, and its political positions. It goes without saying that the number of pages devoted to each party is very small and the history very often too much simplified, not to say excessively orthodox. Nevertheless this little book is highly useful, for it brings together a great deal of scattered data and the other volumes to appear in the same collection, devoted to socialist and Christian Democratic parties, are awaited.

Senprun, Jorge--"Autobiographie de Federico Sanchez" (Autobiography of Federico Sanchez). Translated from the Spanish by Claude and Carmen Durand--Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1978, 24 cm, 314 p.

A work that cannot be classified, all at once, a political document, a romantic creation, a pamphlet, an autobiography--actually; one seen in the latest book by Senprun the very great literary qualities of "Grand Voyage" and "Deuxieme mort de Ramon Mercader" (The Second Death of Ramon Mercader). The former member of the Spanish Communist Party, expelled in 1964 (for having been a Euro-communist to soon) in a way settles his accounts with S. Carrillo's organization. Beside personal attacks Senprun here denounces the sacrosanct "party spirit" ("It is better to be wrong within the party than right elsewhere") in whose name the communist party, be it Soviet or Spanish, is made to function. In his opinion there has been no real break between Stalinist logic and that of the present-day Spanish Communist Party. Starting there he refers, through a series of sequences "staged" from the threat of memory, to talk of the cold war, which gives us several bits of Stalinist poetry due to Senprun himself, worthy of an anthology, and "affairs" which preceded his own (Monzon, Comorera). That is the occasion for very sharp criticism of the strategy chosen by his party on the morrow of the war. In Senprun's opinion the Spanish Communist Party has totally forgotten Marx' plan and of Lenin has retained only the aspect of "iron discipline." This is not obviously the work of an historian or political scientist (to say that the Spanish Communist Party of the 1970 decade is in all respects like that of 1949 is far too subjective) but it is a testimony which specialists will read to the greatest advantage. And if they are mindful of literary qualities they will be overwhelmed.

"Annuaire europeen" (European Year-Book), Vol CCIV, 1976, European... Published under the auspices of the Council of Europe, the Hague, M. Nijhoff, 25 cm, xvii plus 669 p, bibliography, and index.

This volume begins with four articles, of which that by M. Soares (former prime minister of Portugal) on the relations between Portugal and the EEC will be studied. The "documentary section" constitutes the main part of the volume. It gives the composition, personnel, and chronology of the activities in 1976 of the 14 organizations (table, p 78) which shape the relations among the countries of western Europe (plus Yugoslavia as far as the Conference of Ministers of Transport is concerned and Poland in its association with the ECNR [European Council for Nuclear Research]). The "bibliographic section" provides a limited selection within which articles and works in the English language predominate.

Pinto Lyra, Rubens--"La gauche en France et la construction europeene" (The Left in France and the structure of Europe). Preface by Francois Borella--Paris, General Law and Jurisprudence Publications, 1978, 22 cm, 373 p plus bibliography (Constitutional and Political Science Library, 57)

A critical study of the positions of the French left (Communist and Socialist Parties) in the face of the developing process of European integration from 1950 to 1975. Although the raw material is abundant and polemic articles very numerous, basic articles on the subject in French were seriously lacking until Pinto Lyra, a Brazilian research worker, came along to fill the void. He is not content with merely analyzing and describing the evolution of socialist and communist positions on Europe but also wonders about the fundamental motivations explaining that evolution, which enables him to lay bare the inconsistencies which persist between Marxists and social democrats camouflaged beneath the ideological discourse.

[Dec 79, pp 1108-1163]

[Excerpts] Chaoul, Melhem--"La Securite dans le golfe Arabo-Persique" (Security in the Arabian-Persian Gulf), Paris, Les Sept Epees, 1978, 22 cm, 147 p (Publications of the Foundation for Studies of National Defense, Publication 17).

The problems of the Arabian-Persian Gulf are little understood in France and it is well that a summary has come along to trace the broad outlines. After recalling that since 1798 the Gulf for 70 years was under British protection, Chaoul places the essentials of his account of the years 1968-1976, that is, the period subsequent to the announced withdrawal of Great Britain. He traces the diplomatic history of the region, taking into account various parameters: local conflicts, Iranian aims, the international context, and the petroleum stakes. The demanding reader will regret, however, not having available a more advanced analysis of the social forces in the region and, further, information (difficult to find) upon the real strength of armed forces, their recruitment, organization, and so forth, inasmuch as they are the data which, beyond the vicissitudes of events--one thinks of Iran--would enable security in the Arabian-Persian Gulf to be considered reasonably.

Levesque, Rene--"La passion du Quebec" (The Suffering of Quebec). Conversations with Jean-Robert Leselbaum--Paris, Stock, 1978, 22 cm, 301 p (The Great Leaders)

A book of conversations which the founder of the Parti Quebecois held with the journalist, J.R. Leselbaum, in 1977, brought up to date in the course of final editing of the work in 1978. Here Levesque unhesitatingly denounces the snares and injustices of the federal system, while citing his youth, his awakening to nationalism, his entry into politics, his break with the Liberal Party on the question of sovereignty, and last, the establishment of the Parti Quebecois and its accession to power. The concluding section presents the speech delivered by Levesque to the French National Assembly on 2 November 1977. It is followed by appendices on the history, language, culture, politics, and economy of Quebec.

Chevenement, Jean-Pierre--"Etre socialiste aujourd'hui" (Being a Socialist Today). In collaboration with Pierre Luc Seguy--Paris, Gana, 1979, 21 cm, 171 p (Ideas and Men)

In being a "socialist today" Chevenement does not lay claim to being a "Marxist" but--according to his own words--he agrees that others will so regard him, for he is above all "frankly and violently anti-anti-Marxist, firmly opposed to all that intellectual movement in whose opinion the only existing reality is what they make of it." To illustrate his position he notes his own course and relies upon his local experience, his words, in the final analysis, showing how theory and practice must be absolutely linked in order to build "a democratic socialism which can neither be recaptured by capitalism nor corrupted by the bureaucracy."

Kutschera, Chris--"Le mouvement national kurde" (The Kurdish National Movement)--Paris, Flammarion, 1979, 22 cm, 393 p plus bibliography and index (Living History).

This study is based upon a considerable primary documentation (archives, and in addition, personal conversation and observations of the author) and because of this it merits some respect. However, lacking any genuine discussion of problems, the author has succeeded in presenting nothing other than a compilation of facts, sometimes confusing, and rendered still more difficult to use because of the "Frenchification" of proper names. The study is an honest journalistic undertaking rather than the "summation" of the Kurdish movement expected by the public and somewhat improperly advertised by the publisher.

Duhamel, Oliver and Weber, Henri--"Changer le PCF Debat sur le gallocommunisme" (Change the Communist Party? Discussions of French Communism), with collaboration of Christine Buci-Glucksmann, Annie Kriegel, Georges Labica, Georges Lavau, et al.--Paris, University Press of France, 1979, 23 cm, 283 p

Why did the union of the left break apart? That is the underlying question which is the unifying thread of this book in which two teachers, one close to the Socialist Party and the other of the Revolutionary Communist League, interrogate political scientists, journalists, and party members. The answer is complex even though it can be summed up in a word, "gallocommunist," which rather well defines the two-fold origin of the French Communist Party, in so many respects so different from the Eurocommunism of its neighbors. French, by virtue of being heir to centralization, Jacobinism, and workerism; communist because linked to the international communist movement whose recent successes should, in A. Kriegel's opinion, provide ample compensation for the relative national set-back. Can the communist party change? What does that question mean when all analyses that it endures only by virtue of its capability of changing which knows how to filter, channel, and direct those genuine new energies which are feminism, regionalism, and the irruption of the young of many classes. Let us point out two strong points of the work: the sharp focus of G. Lavau who takes advantage of the occasion to recall the drifts which were the subject of his well known analysis of the "tribunitial function"

of the French Communist Party, and the numerous comparisons with the Italian Communist Party whose history, environment, and fate are in the end situated poles apart from those of its French cousin.

Burles, Jean--"Le Parti communiste dans la société française" (The Communist Party in French Society)--Paris, Editions sociales, 1979, 19 cm, 176 p

The result of a series of conferences at the central school of the French Communist Party, this is a book on what the party thinks of itself. A pedagogic treatment, without extravagance or useless polemics, concerned with the origins of the revolutionary party, the currents of the workers' movement. French capitalist society, and the strategy and function of the communist party. But here one finds again the limitations of most of the works written about the French Communist Party by its leaders, and which have already been noted in this periodical in connection with the history of reformation published within the same collection by the Maurice Thorey Institute (see our issue of June 1979, p 484). Thus Burles, speaking of studies of the French Communist Party conducted by certain political scientists, writes on pp 108 and 113: "Why, then, does one strive to describe the French Communist Party, as one does with other objects of study, in accordance with the criteria which apply to other sciences, notably the political? For example, why does one want its relation to society to 'functional' practice?...it is not the subjectivity of specialists 'in study of the French Communist Party' which decides its place in the real French world no more than the party's own subjectivity or wishes can decide the place of the other parties." Certainly, but why should one not apply to the French Communist Party the same analytical criteria used in political science to describe the functioning of other political subjects? And if it is not the "subjectivity" of non-communist specialists which decide the place of the French Communist Party in the real French world, how does the subjectivity of the party, when applied to itself, come to be no longer subjective? So long as one is limited to calling ideology what others think of you and science what is thought of them the ideological struggle will perhaps go forward but scientific verity will surely gain nothing.

Arrabal--"Lettre aux militants communistes espagnols. Songe et mensonge de l'Euro-communisme" (Letter to Spanish Communist Party Members. The Dream and the Delusion of Eurocommunism) French translation by Dominique Sevrain--Paris, C. Bourgois, 1978, 18 cm, 176 p

A virulent pamphlet in opposition to the Spanish Communist Party and its leaders but at the same time warm tribute to the members of that party. In this indictment Arrabal calls upon all his talents as a polemicist but perhaps not upon all his objectivity.

11706

CSO: 3100

SELECTED TITLES OF UNPUBLISHED WORKS IN THE POLITICAL SCIENCES

Paris REVUE FRANÇAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE in French 3 Jun 79 pp 555-588

[Excerpts] As in previous years theoretical and methodological works are still not numerous. On the other hand a large number of students are attracted to the problems related to the current events of French politics, for example, the fate of the union of the left and the parties which formed it.

Among the richest sections are still found public opinion and information as well as international relations.

This listing continues to depend entirely upon information furnished to us by our correspondents, whom we thank once again. However, we regret that the information given is sometimes incomplete, particularly as to the number of pages in theses and dissertations; it nevertheless constitutes useful information for the reader, especially if he wishes to procure a copy of the document cited. We also regret that the phraseology of the titles is sometimes tainted by a measure of obscurity not permitting clear perception of the subject treated. In such cases we hope that the reader of the work itself will have his task made easier than that of the reader of the title alone.

Francoise Feuillet, Elizabeth Gayon, Jean Meyriat

Multigraphed Study Courses

11. Adam, Gerard--"Le syndicalisme ouvrier en France" (Worker Unionism in France)--Paris, Multigraph Service of the National Foundation for the Political Sciences, 1978--3 sections, 275 + viii p--(Course-Institute for Political Studies of Paris; 1977-1978)

University Works

The following abbreviations are used:

Mem DEA	Dissertation for diploma in extended studies
Mem DES	Dissertation for diploma in advanced studies
Mem DESS	Dissertation for diploma in specialized advanced studies
Mem ETHESS	Dissertation of the School of Advanced Studies in Social Sciences (Paris)

Mem IEP	Dissertation of an institute for political studies
Mem IHEAL	Dissertation for the diploma of the Institute for Advanced Studies of Latin America (Paris II)
Mem Maîtrise	Dissertation for master's degree
These (Lettres, Droit Sc. Pol., Sc. econ.)	Thesis for doctorate in letters, in law, in political science, in economic science
These 3 ^e cycle	Thesis for doctorate in research
These Univ.	Thesis for university doctorate

The address for most cases in the bibliography being the same, we have not given them (S.I.).

I. General and Theoretical Studies

12. Aromatario, Patricia and Muller-Brandeck, Gisela--"A propos du terrorism" (On Terrorism)--123 sheets, multigraphed--Mem IEP: Grenoble, 1978--Directors: M. Cornillot and R. Lemery

22. Thiam, Cheikh Tidiane--"Les Etats et la violence: guerres de liberation nationale et conflits armés internes" (Governments and Violence: Wars of National Liberation and Internal Armed Conflicts)--Mem DEA: Political science; Paris I (Pantheon-Sorbonne), 1978--Director: M. Morle

II. Political Thought

32. Bovain, Alain--"Les debat sur la nature du pouvoir en URSS" (The Debate on the Nature of Power in the USSR)--Mem DEA: Political science; Paris I (Pantheon-Sorbonne), 1978, Director: P. Birnbaum

40. Desrameaux, Gerard--"La pensee politique de Francois Mitterand" (The Political Thoughts of Francois Mitterand)--Thesis, Political Science; Paris II (University of Law, Economics, and Social Sciences of Paris), 1978--Director: R.-G. Schwartzberg

43. Gall, Anne--"Analyse des discours de la gauche non-communiste" (Analyses of the Speeches of the Non-Communist Left)--40 p--Mem DESS: Information Sciences; Paris I (Pantheon-Sorbonne), 1978--Director: J.M. Cotteret

III. Biographies

56. Blaquet, Rosy--"L'image politique de Michel Debre--118 p + appendices--Mem DEA: Political studies; Paris II (University of Law, Economics, and Social Sciences of Paris), 1978--Director: R.-G. Schwartzberg

70. Malinzel, Denis--"Une certaine idee de la politique, Georges Pompidou" (Georges Pompidou. A Certain Concept of Politics)--79 typewritten pages--Mem IEP: Aix-en-Provence, 1978--Director: M. Laligant

IV. French Institutions

87. Mathe, Herve--"Fonction logistique et defense. Considerations sur la defense Francaise abordees sous l'angle de la problematique logistique" (Logistics and Defense. Considerations in the Defense of France From the Standpoint of the Logistics Problem)--321 sheets, multigraphed + appendices--Mem EHES: Political science; Paris, 1978--Director: J. Vernant

V. Administrative Studies

100. Flogaitis, Spyridon--"La notion de decentralization in France, in Allemagne, et en Italie" (The Concept of Decentralization in France, Germany, and Italy)--Thesis. Law; Paris II (University of Law, Economics, and Social Sciences of Paris), 1978--Director: J. Rivero

VI. Opinion and Information

130. Dufetel-Garcia, M.E.--"La reecriture du debat Barre-Mitterand dans le compte rendu de douze quotidiens parisiens" (The Editing of the Barre-Mitterand Debate in the Accounts of Twelve Paris Daily Newspapers)--90 p, typewritten--Dissertation: Press; Paris II, (French Press Institute), 1978--Director: M. Mouillaud

142. Kigin, James--"L'image des Etats-Unis a travers les communications de masse en France" (The Image of the United States as Seen Through the Mass Media in France)--189 p, typewritten--Mem DES: Modern Letters; European University Center: Nancy II, 1977--Director: L. Versini

150. Meyer, Andre--"Le retrait de la France de l'OTAN dans l'opinion publique allemande" (The French Withdrawal From NATO as Viewed by German Public Opinion)--Mem DEA: Political Science; Strasbourg II, 1978--Director: F.G. Dreyfus

VII. Political Forces and Behavior in France

164. Azoulai, Laurent--"Relations entre le Parti socialiste francais et Israel: de la signature du programme commun de la gauche aux rencontres Sadate-Begin" (Relations Between the French Socialist Party and Israel From the Signing of the Joint Program of the Left to the Begin-Sadat Meetings)--58 p, typewritten--Mem IEP: Strasbourg, 1978--Director: J.-P. Bled

165. Racot, Paul--"Les dirigeants du Parti socialiste. Essai d'analyse de la nature de classe d'un parti politique a travers l'etude de ses cercles dirigeants" (The Leaders of the Socialist Party. An Attempt to Analyze the Class Character of a Political Party Through Study of its Leadership Circles)--2 vols, 461 + 100 p--Thesis: Political Science; Lyon II, 1978--Director: P. Rongere (since completion of this review of unpublished works this one has been published by the Lyon University Press)

166. Barta, Abdelhamid--"L'evolution du Parti communiste francais de 1968 a 1978" (Evolution of the French Communist Party From 1968 to 1978)--Mem DEA: Political studies, Paris II (University of Law, Economics, and Social Sciences of Paris), 1978--Director: R.-G. Schwartzberg

167. Bao, E., Boel, Sde, and Giraud, P.--"La querelle PC-PS au travers 'l'Humanite' (June 77-October 77). Un style--Un regard--Un language" (The Dispute Between the Communist and Socialist Parties As Seen Through the Pages of l'HUMANITE (June 77-October 77). One Style--One View--One Language)--128 p., typewritten + 40 p. of appendices--Mem IEP, Toulouse, 1978--Director: G.D. Carbonell
169. Baudoin, Jean--"Le PCF et le socialisme aux couleurs de la France" (The French Communist Party and Socialism With the Flag of France)--670 p., multigraphed--Thesis: Political science; Rennes, 1978--Jury: Meurs, Barillon, Braud, Dupuy, Meny, Tarrow.
175. Chatelet, Francois--"Le Parti socialiste et la defense nationale" (The Socialist Party and National Defense)--220 p., multigraphed--Mem DEA: Political Studies; Rennes, 1978--Director: Y. Meny
177. Deladice, Sylvie and Mechadier-Mondineu, Caroline--"Trois mois de communication politique au sein du Parti communiste francais" (Three Months of Political Communication Within the French Communist Party)--73 p--Mem DESS: Information sciences; Paris I (Panthion-Sorbonne), 1978--Director: J.M. Cotteret
180. Faven, Alain--"Le PCF et la participation au pouvoir" (The French Communist Party and Participation in the Government)--76 p., typewritten--Mem IEP: Grenoble; 1978--Director: C. Leleu and A. Jourdan
182. Guilmatin, Antoine--"Le Parti des forces nouvelles (PFN). Un visage de la nouvelle droite (novembre 1974-mars 1978)" (The New Forces Party. A Face of the New Right (November 1974-March 1978))--Mem DEA: Political studies; Paris II (University of Law, Economics, and Social Sciences of Paris), 1978--Director: R.-G. Schwartzberg
184. Guen, Herve and Laudot, Matthieu--"Le Parti communiste francais et l'union de la gauche du 22-9-1977 au 13-3-1978" (The French Communist Party and the Union of the Left (from 22 September 1977 to 13 March 1978))--169 sheets, multigraphed--Mem IEP: Grenoble; 1978--Director: P. Brousse and J. Machu
187. Lerebi, Alain--"La droite et la gauche" (The Right and the Left)--228 p., typewritten--Mem DEA: Political Structures and Systems; Paris X (Paris-Nanterre) 1978--Director: M. Robin
192. Marquet, Philippe--"Etude comparee de l'UDR et du RPR" (Comparison Study of the Union of Democrats for the Republic and the Rally for the Republic)--Mem DEA: Political Studies; Paris II (University of Law, Economics, and Social Sciences of Paris) 1978--Director: R.-G. Schwartzberg
206. Schiepan, Philippe--"A propos du Parti communiste francais: l'individu dans le PCF" (Observations on the French Communist Party: The Individual Within the PCF [French Communist Party])--91-6 sheets, multigraphed--Mem IEP: Grenoble; 1978--Directors: A. Uzan, F. Artru

210. Vasseur, Jean-Louis--"Quelques aspects de la démarche du PCF à l'égard des intellectuels de 1956 à 1966" (Some Aspects of the French Communist Party's Steps Regarding Intellectuals From 1956 to 1966)--100 p--Mem DEA: Political science; Paris I, (Pantheon-Sorbonne) 1978--Director: M. Grawitz

212. Vennat, Marinette--"Les syndicats face à l'union de la gauche" (The Unions Facing the Union of the Left)--75 p, typewritten--Mem DEA: Comparative Politics; Clermont I, 1978--Director: P. Pavre

215. Wallon-Leducq, Christian--"Le Parti communiste français est le mouvement communiste international depuis 1943" (The French Communist Party Has Been the International Communist Movement Since 1943)--920 pp, including 400 p of appendices--Thesis: Political science; Lille II, 1978--Director: M. Lesage

VIII. Political Forces and Behavior in Foreign Countries

227. Ducic, Bogdan--"La Ligue des communistes de Yougoslavie" (The Yugoslav League of Communists)--Thesis: Political science; Paris I, (Pantheon-Sorbonne) 1978--Director: M. Duverger

242. Willot, Benoît--"Les forces communistes dans les expériences de multipartisme en Afrique" (Communist Forces Within the Multi-party Experiences in Africa)--104 p--Mem DEA: Political science; Paris I, (Pantheon-Sorbonne) 1978--Director: E. Joue

IX. French and Foreign Electoral Studies

A. International Relations

272. Barrière, Gabriel--"La doctrine Carter concernant l'OTAN et ses conséquences pour les pays européens" (The Carter Doctrine With Respect to NATO and Its Consequences for the Countries of Europe)--92 p--Mem DEA: Political Science; Paris I, (Pantheon-Sorbonne), 1978--Director: P. Dabrieux

279. Bureau, Jean-François--"Commerce international des équipements nucléaires et politiques de non-prolifération" (International Trade in Nuclear Apparatus and Non-proliferation Policies)--81 p--Mem DEA: Political science; Paris I, (Pantheon-Sorbonne), 1977--Director: P. Dabrieux

281. Cayave, Pierre--"L'uranium et la politique extérieure de la France" (Uranium and French Foreign Policy)--Master's dissertation: History; Paris I, (Pantheon-Sorbonne), 1978--Director: J.-M. Durasselle

285. Nieper, Dominique--"La France et les ventes d'armes" (France and Weapons Sales)--103 sheets, multigraphed--Mem DEA: International and European Cooperation; Bordeaux (Faculty of Law), 1978--Director: J.-L. Martres

294. Rabanel, Luc--"La coexistence pacifique et la stratégie des parties communistes français, soviétique, et chinoise: l'exemple africain, 1958-1961" (Peaceful Coexistence and the Strategy of the French, Soviet, and Chinese Communist Parties: The Stokes in Africa, 1958-1961)--(III-459 sheets, multigraphed--Thesis IV cycle: Political studies; IEP, Paris, 1978--Director: G. Lavy

302. Friedberg, Jacques--"La coopération militaire franco-africain" (French-African Military Cooperation)--97 p--Mem DEA: Political science; Paris I, (Pantheon-Sorbonne), 1978--Director: P. Dabozies

322. Kadri, Mohammed--"L'URSS et le conflit israelo-arabe" (The USSR and the Israeli-Arab Conflict)--95 p--Mem DEA: Political science; Paris I, (Pantheon-Sorbonne), 1978--Director: M. Lesage

335. Peyre, Fabrice--"De la politique étrangère de la Norvège" (On Norwegian Foreign Policy)--V-126 sheets, multigraphed--Mem DEA: International and European Cooperation; Bordeaux (Faculty of Law), 1977--Director: J.-L. Martres

338. Saint-Girons, Anne--"L'URSS et le Tiers-Monde" (The USSR and the Third World)--Thesis: Political science; Paris I, (Pantheon-Sorbonne), 1978--Director: P.-F. Gonidec

XI. International Organization

355. Miraccioli, Bernard--"La France et l'OTAN de 1958 à 1978" (France and NATO From 1958-1978)--71 + xvi p, typewritten--Mem IEP; Aix-en-Provence, 1978--Director: A. Martel

357. Rouquette, Jean-Louis--"Le retrait de la France de l'OTAN et ses conséquences sur la défense nationale" (France's Withdrawal From NATO and its Consequences for National Defense)--127 sheets, multigraphed--Mem IEP; Bordeaux I, 1978--Directors: J.-C. Gautron and P. Vialatte

XII. African Countries

375. Gaiditi, Mourredine--"L'Islam, facteur de légitimation et de perpétuation du pouvoir Maroc-Libye" (Islam, a Factor in Legitimation and Perpetuation of the Moroccan and Libyan Governments)--241 p--Mem DEA: Political science; Paris I, (Pantheon-Sorbonne), 1978--Director: M. Duverger

XIII. Foreign Countries (Other Than African)

401. Traig, Terry--"Le nationalisme québécois et l'idée indépendantiste" (Quebec Nationalism and the Independence Concept)--140 p, typewritten--Master's dissertation: History; Lille III, 1978--Director: Y.-M. Hilaire

Subjects of Doctoral Thesis Filed

I. General and Theoretical Studies

VI. Political Forces and Behavior in France

483. Barraud, Philippe--"Le programme électro-nucléaire français: nouvel enjeu politique?" (The French Nuclear Electro Power Program: New Political Stake?)--Thesis: Political science; Bordeaux I--Subject filed in September 1978--Director: J. Lagrove

484. Pages-Maristany, Michel--"Le role des intellectuels dans le changement politique: l'exemple francais contemporain" (The Role of Intellectuals in Political Change: the Contemporary French Example)--Thesis: Political science; Nancy II--Subject filed in January 1978--Director: F. Morella

488. Waldack, Michele--"L'extreme gauche en France depuis mai 1968: les principaux themes politiques et leur evolution" (The Extreme left in France Since May 1968; Principal political Themes and Their Evolution)--Thesis: Political science; Lyon II--Subject filed in March 1978--Director: F. Demichel

497. Linhares Lima, Francisco--"Les logiques du nucleaire: le cas brésilien" (The Logical Arguments for Nuclear Energy: the Brazilian Case)--Thesis: International Politics; Paris XI, (Paris-Sud)--Subject filed in November 1978--Director C. Zorgbibe

11,706
CSO: 1100

BRIEFS

PCP-PCI DISCUSS ISSUES--On 7-8 February PCI Central Committee Secretariat member Mario Mirardi and PCI foreign section aide Vittorio Orilia visited Lisbon, where they were received at Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) headquarters by PCP Secretary General Alvaro Cunhal at a meeting attended also by PCP Political Commission and Secretariat member Sergio Vilarigues and Central Committee member and International Section chief Albano Nunes. At this meeting an exchange of opinions took place on the political situation in Portugal and Italy and on aspects of the international situation. [Text] [LD 191401 Lisbon AVANTE! in Portuguese 14 Feb 80 p 3 LD]

CSO: 3101

FLEMISH SOCIALISTS TO DISCUSS FUTURE POLITICAL COURSE

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 9 Jan 80 pp 22-23

[Commentary: "Flemish Socialism, an Imaginary Illness?": passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics.]

[Text] A general council of the Flemish socialists will meet at the end of next week, in order to try to recover from a hangover behind closed doors. This indisposition occurred as a result of the missile question and is having remarkably long after-effects. A number of people, branches and federations in the party cannot get over the fact that the struggle of President Karel van Miert (38 years old) and his parliamentary party leader Louis Tobback against active Belgian participation in the nuclear arms race ultimately ended up in a vague compromise in which not much socialist unanimity remained. As a matter of fact, the Belgian position is that in the month of May our country could reconsider the deployment of nuclear missiles on Belgian territory if at that time there were to be clear evidence of a desire for disarmament on the Soviet side. But since the latest events in Afghanistan, and the Western reaction to them, such a thaw or kind of prelude to SALT III may as well be forgotten. Without difficulty, our ministers of defense and of foreign affairs will be able to let their NATO colleagues know in the spring that all is well with those missiles. Meanwhile, the sorrow of the Flemish socialists continues to surprise many people, because it nearly looks like an imaginary illness. The missile case may be the best the BSP (Belgian Socialist Party) has ever pleaded. It did not escape the population that the arguments used by Louis Tobback and Karel van Miert in the matter were irrefutable. Moreover, the case was brought before the political bar completely without ambiguity, it was handled in a completely correct manner, and it was honorably lost. The Flemish socialists very simply did not achieve unanimity within their own leadership, they did not find enough support among their Walloon supporters and, moreover, were extraordinarily pushed into a classic illness by a skillful CVP (Social Christian Party) -- which succeeded in neutralizing its ACV (Confederation of Christian Trade Unions) opponents internally. Indeed, during the last hours of legislation making this NATO matter was transformed into a matter of life or death for the government. And everyone -- including the radical pacifists within the BSP itself -- after all, could recognize that this would be an unhealthy choice. Under the present circumstances, a government crisis

would have been too high a price to pay for a Belgian rejection of the missiles -- a rejection which, in the broader context of NATO, could not be essentially significant to the disarmament problem as a whole anyway.

Guardianship

Yet, some BSP branches and related organizations, such as the Youth, have bitterly asked that the BSP withdraw from the government because of the /cruise missiles/. Others claimed they could not understand why Karel van Miert had not resigned as president. Let us examine this and figure out whether this would have been sensible. Politically speaking, a resignation by Van Miert could not have been directed against the government as such. The fact is that it is impossible for party presidents to give up their portfolio as an act of reprisal against the administration. They can only recall their ministers, but in this case such a decision would have entailed great risks. As a matter of fact, it is known that Minister Claes specifically was absolutely no opponent of the cruise missiles, so that cutting off the BSP could have caused an open crisis of confidence between the party and its mandataries in the government. Here also, the material stakes were just a little too small, and the consensus within the BSP too small, to make such a possible result acceptable. There is no doubt that it was a bitter and unpleasant moment for Karel van Miert when he had to abstain from the election in a thoroughly divided central committee. But he followed the only correct course of action. As the political cards within his party and within the coalition stood, he did not even have the right to run away somehow or other after the resolution of the NATO debate. There is absolutely no disgrace in a controversial issue to be defeated in a party committee or parliamentary debate, as long as it was defended with conviction and with full understanding. This is what happened here and the BSP conducted itself in a sound socialist manner in this matter.

And yet, the after-effects proved to be so severe that, at the request of the "rank and file," a party council has been called, where a thorough discussion of the condition of the party may well take place. Indeed, there is strong suspicion that the missile malaise has deeper roots. A whole party line, a way of working and even an ideology are at stake here. As a matter of fact, Karel van Miert's renewal attempts are far from completed and not even generally accepted within the movement. For that matter, it is more than obvious that a number of important differences of opinion and of style exist between the young president and his strongest minister, Willy Claes. It was the latter who, in 1977, after a great deal of brooding, called Karel van Miert to the presidency. That was a rather unexpected move, even for Van Miert himself. At the time, when he received the nocturnal telephone call in which Claes suggested that he become co-president of the then still unitary party, he first thought it was a drunken joke. But a few days later, on Monday 27 June, he was already embraced by his colleague Andre Coops and put in the elevator going to the fourth floor of the building in the Keizerslaan. Since then, with characteristic directive stubbornness, Willy Claes has been unable to resist the tendency to advise the young president somewhat too strongly in numerous matters and if

necessary to contradict him. It is normal that Van Miert has gradually and as an extra-parliamentary politician begun to react against this mild guardianship, however friendly the way in which it is done. Now he even wants to test his position at the biennial working congress of 8 and 9 March. The leaders will have to be re-elected there, including the president, and the party statutes will have to be reviewed according to the recommendations of the Van Acker study group. At this congress, Karel van Miert is planning to request a motion of confidence for his approach and his leadership. What have these consisted of up to now?

It is evident that a Van Miert clan, tied to its own sphere of activities, exists among the Flemish socialists. They are the tireless advocates of party modernization. They want to lower the threshold over which new members must step to join the movement. They want to make the party more cordial by occasionally organizing a festival of the rose. They do not check as closely whether, during his early years, a member of the BSP did go to state schools or whether he has a sufficient number of stamps from the cooperative bakery in his pocket. In political practice they are actually collaborating smoothly with a number of CVP politicians from the CVP expansion unknown stable. They consider discussion groups and participation within the party very normal, even though this leads to a more turbulent and less settled party life. They do not shrink from a certain intellectualization of Flemish socialism, even if this does occasionally cause a short-circuit with the other rank and file of the "real" workers. They have not yet forgotten Collard's call for a progressive front. They like to have contact with the Dutch PvdA (Labor Party) of Max Van den Berg. They stand wholeheartedly behind the newspaper DE MORGEN, which does not make their existence less worrisome, but which did manage to maintain a normal freedom of thought and writing. They profess a rather center oriented socio-economic doctrine as applied by Willy Claes. They have learned to make use of an organized, strengthened and refreshed study service, the Flemish /Karel Vanderveelde Institute/, which provides preparatory work in preparing parliamentary bills. In short, the young Turks of the BSP are having a shot at socialism according to the northern model.

Van Miert had to pursue this renewal in a crisis period, during which the people's skepticism against the business of politics as such is constantly increasing. He also had to propagate his good intentions in a Flemish landscape, where interest in socialism and in politics based on scientific insight is rather small. And he has scarcely enough media and information channels at his disposal to make his Flemish party, which has been autonomous since October 1978, well known. Thus, his break with the strong Walloon brother -- which many members of the BSP considered shocking -- and his option to go live and work /alone in the world/ with Flemish socialism, were not easily accepted. After all, the party bureau with its 16 voting members does not only include the younger members, such as Jack Vandenbroucke, Louis Vanvelthoven or Louis Tobback. There are also more moderate individuals, such as Erik Roel, Wim Geldoff, Frank Van Acker and Hugo Adriaenssens. In such cases, when the bureau must vote on important questions, such as the

missiles for example, there is evidence of two lines of thought: that of the president and another of Claes.

Rejections

What else could Van Miert do besides illustrating his socialism with concrete /theses/? One may recall his attacks -- flanked by parliamentary party leader Louis Tobback -- against the foreign policy of Henri Simonet, especially during the period when once again we sent paratroopers to Zaïre to help Mobutu, his crusty watchfulness over the purchasing policy of Defense Minister Vanden Boeynants (Hawk - HELIP (Hawk European Light Improvement Program - tanks - cruise missiles), and his distaste for the Eurosystem doings. In a deadlocked domestic situation, including the community level, Van Miert apparently wants to keep the socialist ideas alive by reference to internationally oriented examples. This tactic has one disadvantage: it is always a question of problems and dimensions where he cannot gain victory. Consequently, his opponents have an easy time portraying him as the president who runs into one /rejection/ after another. And Van Miert's response that this does /not/ necessarily mean that he is /wrong/ is often ignored. This is a time for /winners/ and not for /losers/ in the showplace state. However, Van Miert is stuck with the problem that, according to the law of numbers, he can never win without giving up his conviction and thus also his credibility.

The party would do well during its upcoming negotiations to try to figure out what is most important: the maintenance of that intellectually restless FvA line which will need years yet before it becomes applicable in political practice, or the quick scoring of visible but by their very nature rather shallow successes. The latter can only be achieved in the political center as long as the Flanders remain what they still are at the present. Whoever understands this well will be able to run around within the BSP not like a caged militant with time hanging heavily on his hands, but like someone who will simply have to wait until a time when Flemish socialism is able to thrive better than it does today.

226

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GOVERNMENT TO DEBATE PURCHASE OF ARMY TANKS

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 7 Jan 80 pp 28-29

[Article by Frank de Moor: "In America Those Tanks Are Still Cheaper by Half": passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] In many ways, the dossier concerning the replacement of about 1,000 armored troop carriers for the army will remain an illustration of a certain purchasing policy of our Department of Defense. The documents in the office of the successor to Vanden Boeynants and his party colleague Jose Dommereyns (PSC [Christian Social Party]) and before Minister of Economic Affairs Willy Claes (RSP [Belgian Socialist Party]), and which during the next few weeks will form the basis of the final tank contract, teach us that there is a need for watchfulness.

As has become well known since then, on 21 December 1979 the Council of Ministers gave Minister of Defense /Jose Dommereyns/ (PSC) permission to conclude a definitive contract with MBF, /Belgian Mechanical Fabrication/ (ASCO [expansion unknown], Cockerill and Brussels Lambert), with which the Ministries of Defense and Economic Affairs have -- since the Council of Ministers meeting of 24 July and excluding all other candidates -- been negotiating for the [partial] manufacturing in Belgium of 514 armored tracked Infantry vehicles of the AIFV [Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicle] type, and 525 of the M113 A1 type.

It was only following the meeting of the cabinet on Friday 20 July, and after a row, but for the then minister of defense very embarrassing, meeting on the following Monday, that the government decided after all -- on Tuesday, 24 July -- to send a letter of intent to MBF in which it was for the first time officially acknowledged that the company really did win over the other candidates. The Americans of the /Food Machinery Corporation/ (FMC) and their Belgian licensee (ASCO) had been waiting for more than 2 years for this. Everybody knows by now that the contract was not just handed to them.

The government's letter of intent -- to which experienced law firms attach nearly the legal force of a contract -- was dated 2 August and clearly stipulated that, on penalty of nullification, RNF would have to meet a number of economic conditions prior to 31 October 1979. Thus, the period of time during which this was to take place could and was extended to 31 December 1979. This means that over a period of barely 5 months time and clearly under pressure from the Ministries of Defense and of Economic Affairs, RNF (ASCO, Cockerill and Brussels Lambert) had to clarify its final tank proposal to such an extent that, at least from a political-economic point of view, there was little room for objection to a RNF purchase. This was taken care of by, among other things, additional negotiations with the Brussels lawyer /Javier Magnee/ (RNF) and /Roger Boas/ (ASCO), /Roger Welfers/ (Cockerill) and /Andre Waterkeyn/ (Brussels Lambert).

This time, Minister of Economic Affairs /Willy Claes/ (RSP) could hardly afford to put his signature on a dossier which would be hard to justify on purely technical economic grounds. Hence, the letter of intent of 2 August, which was longer and more restrictive than usual and which set very specific conditions which had to be met. Today, these binding conditions form the basis of a contract which the Ministry of Defense and RNF will sign soon.

Before talking more specifically about these "confidential" conditions, it should be recalled that what is involved here is a government order, the purchase price of which was determined in September 1977 at approximately /14 billion francs/ and that this government expenditure, in accordance with the principle of socio-economic compensations, will for the most part benefit the Belgian economy.

As a matter of vital parts of the American FME tracked vehicles, such as the Diesel engine (GM (General Motors)), the gear box (Allison), the firing platform (Cadillac Gage) and the gun (Oerlikon) cannot possibly be manufactured in Belgium, /Belgian Mechanical Fabrication/ meanwhile had to commit itself to 70 percent of the AIFV and M113 tracked vehicles being manufactured in Belgium. RNF promised 73.3 percent and, after thorough examination, the Ministry of Economic Affairs kept a little less than 70 percent of this.

What's More

and to prove that the new American FME vehicles would be at least 70 percent manufactured in Belgium. RNF had to produce a series of subcontracts with the companies, a list of which received detailed criticism in this newspaper, in October for example. The result of this was that, after a thorough investigation of the companies involved, the Ministry of Economic Affairs accepted about half a billion francs less in subcontracts than RNF claimed were necessary easily to meet the conditions laid down in the letter of intent of 2 August. Ultimately, the following RNF subcontracts were accepted /ASCO/ (Evere) 2.2 billion francs, /COREMI/ [expansion unknown] (Grâce-Hollogne) 400 million, /Cockerill/ (Charleroi) 331 million, /Menschel/ (Wilrijk) 284 million, /Watteuw/ (Brugge) 33 million, /LET/ [expansion

unknown (Deinze) 17 million, /OIF/ expansion unknown (Ghent) 18 million, /Chasseon/ (Vorst) 12 million, /Lessens/ (Rotsoken) 6.5 million, /Henricot/ (Court St. Etienne) 6 million, /Doyen/ (Brussels) 6 million, /Vulcan/ (Brussels) 0.5 million and /Outret/ (Liege) 0.5 million.

Ultimately then, these are the most important companies in Belgium which will participate directly in the manufacturing of the AIFV and the M113 AFV tracked vehicles for the armored infantry.

We have pointed out exhaustively before -- and this is now being confirmed -- that Roger Roas' engineering companies (ASCO, SOHEMI and Flexycca [expansion unknown]) together with BNF, in which ASCO is a majority participant, are taking charge of the lion's share of this tank contract and that Flemish industry does not get to pull in anything. In this project, Flemish industry missed its opportunity and cannot even grumble about it.

Not only the geographic location of ASCO in the neighborhood of Zaventem, but also the fact that among others, the Ministry of Economic Affairs in maximizing the elements coming out of the Flanders, ensure that directly or indirectly the Flanders' participation in the BNF order will be 50 percent, Wallonia 42 percent and Brussels 8 percent. As a matter of fact, it is not only a matter of the direct subcontracts, on the order of 3.9 billion francs, which we mentioned above. In order to achieve a product which is 70 percent Belgian, the plants, costs, financial liabilities and profits are also taken into account, which in Belgium (Brussels and Wallonia) amounts to 4 billion francs to the account of BNF.

Because this calculation is based, among other things, on the formal promise by BNF (made on 12 December) that an industrial complex will be built in South-Luxemburg for the production of the bodies of the vehicles and for the management of the Liege program and because, as was contended earlier, those 4 billion francs would go practically completely to Brussels and Wallonia, a few consolation prizes were provided for the Flanders. Following is a quote from the memorandum from the Ministry of Economic Affairs to the Council of Ministers meeting of 21 December:

"Therefore, BNF has decided to expand its subcontracting in the Flanders and to set up warehouses for replacement parts next to the vehicle assembly line in Wilrijk ... This, it should be recalled, refers to the /German/ Genachel company.

closer to here

In addition to the warehouses for parts -- which are apparently so important for the Flanders, but in fact are the result of commitments which the Americans of FFI have to Genachel and which, according to the license, were taken over by ASCO -- it was promised that the Flanders (/Blaton?) will be able to build part of the BNF buildings in South-Luxemburg, will be able to supply part of the machinery and that the special welding apparatus will be bought from the Antwerp division of /Air Liquide/, which actually belongs

to a French group. In short, the purchases of the American armored personnel carriers from /Belgian Mechanical Fabrication/ is a truly /Belgian/ purchase and if the announced distribution among the regions were to be digressed from, BMF would have to pay a proportionate fine. BMF will also have to pay a fine if a few American or Swiss companies fail to carry out their promises, whereby at the request of BMF, that part of the tanks which cannot be manufactured in Belgium (30 percent) is to be compensated through orders placed in Belgium.

In short, during the last few months the Ministry of Economic Affairs has finally tried to impose so many specific conditions and possibilities of control and sanctions, that /formally/ the file has come to look much better than many skeptics dared to suggest. All the more so as the shareholders of BMF (ASCO, Cockerill, Brussels Lambert) had to guarantee the execution of the program in proportion to their share in BMF.

Those who, in this context, know:

- that ASCO, in accordance with its licensing agreement with the American FMC, must at all times retain 51 percent of BMF;
- that ASCO's partners must be approved by FMC;
- that both the American Department of State and FMC itself could reject any BMF export contract;
- that ASCO may never surrender its license;
- that, apart from the \$750,000 it already paid to FMC on 14 September 1977, ASCO will have to pay FMC another \$3 million immediately following the signing of this tank contract with the Belgian state, and
- that then, before there can be any question of /royalties/ to FMC for the manufacturing of AIFV and M113 units, a number of extra percentages must first be paid to FMC, may rightly continue to ask themselves why the Belgian state must pay BMF so many billions of francs the manufacturing in Belgium of armored personnel carriers which could be purchased directly in the United States at less than half the price.

ref. 3

SCO: 1111

TFSC FISCAL 1980 BUDGET UNDER DISCUSSION

Nicosia OLAY in Turkish 7 Jan 80 pp 12-16

[Text] Last Thursday at 1100 hours, 3 January 1980, the Cagatay government's 1980 draft budget was taken under consideration by the Finance, Budget and Planning Committee. Since Prime Minister Mustafa Cagatay and his ministers were unable to obtain the 1 billion TL they had wished to obtain from their official visit to Ankara it was necessary to cut back their budget, however, when debate arose among the ministers, Finance Minister Hakki Atun avoided the storm by showing 643 million TL supplemental aid as income for the expenditures which could not otherwise be covered by the 50 million TL promised by Turkey for the TFSC defense and investment expenditures, thus achieving a numerical balance. However, there is no question of Turkey's supplying such supplemental aid.

The overall figures of the budget which was prepared with an inflated income entry are as follows:

From local sources, 1,947,203,609 TL; assistance from Turkey, 500 million TL; domestic borrowing 75 million TL; from the UN High Commission on Refugees, 69,055,000 TL in expected income. Furthermore it is indicated that 643,117,641 TL in income will be obtained from Turkey in the form of foreign assistance and loans.

Current expenditures are 1,741,971,038 TL; investments are 606,720,816 TL; transfers are 886,183,396 TL.

Growth Rate

The increase in the total budget in comparison with that for 1979 amounts to 823.4 million TL, or 34.14 percent, which rather than combating inflation chooses to add to it. This increase has consumption rather than production as its objective. It is 359.2 million TL in personnel expenditures and 182.8 million TL in current expenditures. Investment expenditures showed an increase of only 188.9 million TL. At any rate, since the investments called for in the 1979 budget were not realized, the figures proposed for investment in the 1980 budget show the true growth rate.

Meeting closed to the Press

The Secretary General of the Democratic People's Party (DHP), Ismet Kotak, and DHP Deputy Feridun Adahan proposed that the budget discussions be open to the press in their entirety, but the National Unity Party (UBP) deputies refused. Approval was given only to make the general discussion open to the press.

The party representatives on the Finance, Budget and Planning Committee are as follows:

Chairman, Ozel Tahsin (UBP), Deputy Chairman Feridun Adahan;

from the UBP, Dr Semai Kasim, Mehmet Bayram, Mehmet Ozturk, Raif Denktas and Mustafa Hacı Ahmetoglu;

from the TKP, Alpay Durduran and Burhan Nalbantoglu;

from the DHP, Ismet Kotak;

from the HP Alper Orhon.

Finance Minister Atun made the first speech and gave the following information regarding the budget:

"Honored chairman, honored committee members, in the 1980 budget, current expenditures constitute 53.85 percent, transfers 27.39 percent, and investments 18.76 percent.

Within the transfer category 41.1 million TL are monetary, 627.8 million TL are social and 56.1 million TL are economic. The 59.3 million TL indebtedness is made up of 2.0 million TL in payments for nationalized enterprises, 20.3 million TL in aid to local establishments, and 69.6 million TL in assistance from the UN Commission on Refugees.

"In the 1980 budget, appropriations are called for to develop agriculture and livestock production, and for irrigation projects as necessary to the achievement of objectives in accordance with the plan.

"Agriculture, which occupies the largest place in our gross national product is central in importance to our economy. At the same time a major share of our exports is made up of agricultural products. Of these agricultural exports, a large portion are citrus fruits. In the 1980 budget, 322.9 million TL in investments are earmarked for the agricultural sector. Apart from this, 12.7 million TL are called for in transfer expenditures to maintain, increase and encourage production and to add to the institutions which are to exploit agricultural products.

"With respect to the second sector, industry, attention will be paid to bringing the manufacturing industry to a state in which it can make a balanced

contribution to national development, effectively utilize indigenous raw materials, provide better employment opportunities, locate foreign markets for industrial goods and reduce our balance of payments deficit. A 11-million TL appropriation is called for in the 1980 budget for the organized industrial region intended to attract new industrial units into the most suitable investment fields, for advertising industrial goods and for the free port.

"Cooperatives are demonstrating a widespread and continued organization in the TFSG.

"Furthermore they are assuming an important place in the manufacturing, marketing and trade sectors.

"An appropriation is called for in the 1980 budget for the purpose of strengthening the Gocsen cooperatives.

"Keeping in sight the present and potential possibilities in tourism, appropriations have been called for in the 1980 budget to encourage tourism which will bring in foreign exchange and to provide subsidies to this type of tourism, to rebate interest payments on such investments to advertise and seek out markets in this field. A concentrated publicity effort is called for in 1980 in this area to bring demand up to the level of existing capacity, to give emphasis to group tourism.

"An appropriation of 81.8 million TL has been called for in the infrastructure and communications and transportation sector. Construction of the northern coastal road, access roads for a group of villages, asphalt surfacing of village streets and restoration of eroded road beds for blacktop roads covered in the plan, the development of telecommunications networks and the purchase of equipment necessary to these ends are provided for in the budget.

"Honored chairman, honored committee members. Our essential goal will be to provide opportunities for medical care in conformance with the principles of social justice and to insure that the public is afforded sufficient health service benefits. In the 1980 budget, appropriations amounting to 101.4 million TL are allotted for health and social services. Appropriations are provided in conformance with the plan for the campaign against malaria, thalassemia and other contagious diseases, to add to the mental health center, for oxygen manufacturing project and for the training of health personnel.

"The essential aim in education is to provide all citizens with a common fundamental education in conformance with the general objectives of national development and in realizing the long-range objectives of national development to train the country's manpower qualitatively and quantitatively.

"An appropriation of 422.5 million TL is called for in the 1980 budget for educational services.

"An appropriation of 25 million TL for the Institute of Technology is called for in the 1980 budget to train manpower in the professional and technical field. Moreover appropriations are provided for in the budget investment expenditures for new additional construction and purchase of technical equipment for the schools.

"With regard to relocation, rehabilitation and housing, the 1980 budget provides for an appropriation to commence implementation of a coordinated program of property laws and social housing laws.

"Together with the broad social opportunities provided for in our budget from the standpoint of the social state, 81.0 million TL has been set aside in the 1980 budget for payments under social insurance.

"Apart from the above, an appropriation of 155.8 million TL is called for in the 1980 budget for cost-of-living adjustments for civil service personnel.

"Issues vital to the economy, such as, control of the money supply, inflation, management of foreign exchange, selective guidance of investments and banking audits will be disposed of in the necessary manner by new administrative and legal measures.

Financing, Income Revenues

"A realistic approach has been taken in the 1980 budget proposal to estimating the revenues which will be collected from local revenue sources. It is estimated that a total of 1,947,200,000 TL will be obtained in local revenues

"In the 1980 budget 2,022,200,000 TL in total revenues, including domestic borrowing are composed of 585.4 million TL direct taxes, 851.0 indirect taxes, 310.8 million TL budget revenues other than taxes, 75.0 million TL from sale of treasury properties.

"It is clear that great developments have taken place over the years in the collection of revenue. In 1974, total local revenues were 48.1 million TL; in 1975, 132.5 million TL; in 1976, 534.5 million TL; in 1977, 661.1 million TL, in 1978, 874.4 million TL, in 1979, approximately 1.15 billion TL, and it is estimated they will reach 2,022,200,000 TL in 1980. However, in spite of all this development, from the standpoint of the TFSC economic structure, foreign assistance and supplementary financing are still going to be necessary for some time more to insure national development. The amount of gross national product, the revenues which can be collected and the payment of obligations still required by existing laws and the efforts at national economic development are facts. The aim is the achievement of a certain economic level and a self-sufficient TFSC.

"I present the 1980 budget proposal and with the valued contribution of the honored chairman and committee members hope that it will prove auspicious and fortunate."

EDITORIAL WARNS OF PENDING UNREST IN TCSC

Nicosia HALKIN SESI in Turkish 21 Jan 80 p 3

Editorial by Resad Kazim: "Towards an Explosion"

[Text] In such critical political times as these, it is not our goal or intention to provoke or cause any person, group, class or sector to disobey the law; such a thing would not enter our mind; we are not one to condone any sort of illegal action or anything resembling it.

However, there are things happening such that unless they see a reaction from broad sectors of the public in our country, they are going to reach the point of violence, exceed the bounds of irresponsibility and turn into a "bad deal" for most people.

What is called equality, what is called justice, what is called the social legal state, indeed everything that is good and beautiful -- they are not working at all and privileged classes are being created everywhere, at every level.

While the sectors which cannot find milk, oil, meat to eat are each becoming the symbol of poverty on the one hand, on the other -- may God give abundantly that all may partake -- a class has been created which has so much money, it does not know where to spend it.

Groups that squander money on pleasure have sprung up. Those who acquire opportunity, authority and influence bend everything to their own advantage.

Some preach one thing and practice another. And when this is the case, what can be expected but signs of impending explosion? What does this sort of discriminatory behavior do but force certain sectors into it?

If a person is forced into it against his will, if he can find no way to make a living, if he suffers a thousand and one hardships, what else can he think, what else can he do?

Perhaps, today, he does nothing, can do nothing. Perhaps his conscience will not allow it. But no one knows what will happen tomorrow. The helpless man is like the caged lion or wolf, and if he is forced to act with their instincts, then what can he do?

It is impossible to consider these things and not see the glimmerings of a social explosion on the horizon.

Indeed, the best and wisest route is not to force people into this and no aspect of it should be condoned under any circumstances, but our concern over this matter and the views expressed must be taken in the sense of a warning.

It is not that any sector intends to have such a reaction, but people must not be pushed too far; what the person cornered and pushed into a cage will do is not always predictable. Nerves are already taut over the extraordinary injustice and other events; a lot of people are already under extreme nervous tension.

So keeping this up is not a smart thing to do. People are already jittery, and if you keep teasing them with your games, if you are thinking about raising your own salary and tell the public employee and the retiree that "there is no money" while you open new accounts, then you must expect reactions from the beleaguered individuals and sectors.

And if you go around making more speeches about equality and justice and so on and so forth, then no one will even turn around to look at you.

Surely there must be a limit to injustice, these kinds of actions must stop somewhere, they must not go any further.

But these kinds of incidents among us have gone beyond beyond, it is pitch dark, but those who still refuse to take off their rose-colored glasses are virtually inviting a reaction, and the worst of it is, they don't even notice.

Is not this social blindness and ignorance the focal point of all our social torpor anyhow?

8349

CSO: 4907

[1 MAKHI' URGES MOBILIZATION TO COUNTER CAGLAYANGIL'S 'CHALLENGE']

NC160714 Nicosia : MAKHI in Greek 16 Feb 80 p 1 N

[Editorial: "There is the Way"]

[Excerpts] The Turkish provocations are continuing with undiminishing intensity. Turkey's president of the senate, Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil, who is illegally visiting the Cyprus territory held by the Attila hordes, addressed the illegal Turkish Cypriot "parliament" and said: "We are not here merely out of duty but on a mission, and our mission is to make Cyprus our motherland.... The Turkish Armed Forces have never been pushed out by the pen from a place where they entered by bayonets...."

These words by the president of the Turkish senate constitute the best and most official proof that the sole responsibility for the Cyprus problem is borne by Turkey, which has expansionist aims on our island. Moreover, Ihsan Caglayangil's words are a strike against the United Nations and the Western allies.

Finally Caglayangil warns the Greeks (in Athens and Nicosia) that they will achieve a fair Cyprus solution only through war. The president of the Turkish senate clearly tells us that "the Turkish Armed Forces have never been pushed out by words from a place where they have entered by bayonet." Therefore, it is up to us either to condone Attila in Cyprus and the partitioning of our island or to struggle to push him out.

Now it is up to Hellenism to speak up. The nation is the only one competent to answer Caglayangil's challenge. What we have to say is that there must be national mobilization, vigilance, readiness and resoluteness. When all this is achieved Turkey will become moderate. But if the neosultans of Ankara fail to do so, the Greeks can force them into it by creating a new Bizani, Sarandapero, Giannitaa, Elli and Limnos (all names of battlefields during the 1912 Greek-Turkish war). In this way the 1974 shame will be wiped out.

EDITORIAL NOTES SMUGGLING GOES UNCHECKED IN TPSC

Nicosia CLAY in Turkish 21 Jan 80 pp 15, 34

[Editorial by A. Ginnell]

[Text] Smuggling is a problem for developed nations. This problem stems from inadequate development and enforcement of the war on smuggling.

Smuggling is one of the problems chipping away at less developed nations. Whether it is smuggling into the country or out of the country, it is a merciless disease requiring speedy treatment. This much is certain.

This is the case at all of Turkey's borders. And smugglers surround the boundaries of northern Cyprus.

First of all, it is necessary that those engaged in the war on smuggling believe that they will win the war.

Turkey is surrounded on three sides by water; to the west, it is bounded by its neighbors Greece and Bulgaria and to the east and southeast, by its neighbors Iran, Iraq and Syria. The Soviet Union, not least by dint of its administration, presents the hardest obstacle to overcome to smuggling from Turkey and to Turkey. But what is one to do about Bulgaria and Greece, who head the nations desiring the destruction of Turkey's economic structure, and though they do not show it openly, hoping for just such a collapse to consume Turkey.

Among our southeastern neighbors, Iran, Syria and Iraq come at the head of the hard-core Turkish smuggling centers. Syria especially is a springboard for goods smuggled to Turkey.

Bulgaria, in spite of its show of friendship, condones the arms smuggling to Turkey. As we see, Turkey is a nation harassed by the smuggling of its close neighbors. The necessary diagnosis in this matter has recently been made, now the treatment and remedies are being sought. It is difficult to say at present whether results will come soon.

Let us move on to the status of the war on smuggling in northern Cyprus. Alas, as we said above, for the absolute prevention of smuggling, it is first of all necessary that those fighting that war believe in what they are doing.

There is no one unaware of the current smuggling of livestock, butchered meat, cooking oil, potatoes, cereal grains, legumes, Turkish liras and coins from Cyprus (northern) to the Greek Cypriot sector.

It is also a fact that hundreds of persons arrested for smuggling have been tried (875 cases, to be exact). According to the claims, those who engage in smuggling in massive quantities have not even been arrested (!), and the claim is now gaining strength that those who have been tried in the courts are not the big smugglers.

We would direct your attention to the fact that armed clashes with smugglers have occurred recently.

If we take as a point of departure the fact that insufficiency at the economic level is the cause of smuggling, then in the war on smuggling, governments must first of all bring the economic order to a level not conducive to smuggling.

Is this being done in the TFSC [Turkish federated state of Cyprus]? We do not believe anyone can answer this question.

Various measures may be under consideration. But if we take into account the fact that the Greek Cypriot administration allows a tax return to the Greek Cypriots engaged in smuggling to northern Cyprus, it makes it clear that the Greek Cypriot administration runs the smuggling and gives it direction. In that case, it is necessary that the administration in northern Cyprus take measures accordingly.

There is no adequate control mechanism in the TFSC for the prevention of smuggling. There is no price control mechanism. These are the reasons why smuggling will continue to chip away at the economy of the federated Turkish administration in northern Cyprus. So let the officials and authorities seize the opportunity to wake up from the deep sleep they have managed to reach so far.

M349

CSO: 4907

BRIEFS

DIPLOMATS AT DENKTAS' RECEPTION--The government spokesman was asked yesterday about a report in APOYEVMATINI newspaper that "the U.S., British and West German ambassadors as well as a small number of other Western ambassadors attended Denktas' reception on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the pseudostate." In reply, the spokesman stated that the Foreign Ministry is looking into the matter. The government spokesman also added that so far the U.S. Embassy and the British High Commission have categorically denied that the ambassadors or members of their staffs attended the reception or any other event related to the "anniversary." In addition, a British High Commission spokesman has said that the High Commission had neither been invited nor was there any question of attending if invited. In the meantime, according to our information, Soviet Ambassador Astavin, in his capacity as dean of the diplomatic corps, sent letters to all foreign embassies informing them that the Cyprus Government opposed any form of attendance by members of the diplomatic missions at activities marking the fifth anniversary of the so-called "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus." The Soviet ambassador also informed the embassies that neither he nor any member of his embassy staff would attend. [Text] [NC200805 Nicosia ELEVTHIER] KYPROS in Greek 20 Feb 80 p 8 NC]

CSO: 4908

FOLKETING DEBATES THREE ALTERNATIVES TO 1981-85 DEFENSE PLAN

Frankfurt/Main: FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 13 Jan 86 p 2

[Article by W.A. "Danish Military Worries About Defense Capability of the Country; Government Against an Increase in Defense Expenditures"]

[Text] Stockholm, 24 Jan--Denmark would put its credibility as a NATO member in jeopardy if it did not increase defense spending and thereby failing to put a stop to a threatening shrinkage of its armed forces. This warning was the reaction of military leaders and bourgeois opposition politicians to the determination of Prime Minister Jorgensen's Social Democratic government to limit defense expenditures up to 1985 to their present volume and at best to allow the three branches of the military some sort of annual compensation for inflation. What is officially described as a "zero solution" and motivated with the economic difficulties of the country is foremost in a defense plan for the first half of the 1980's which has now been submitted to the Folketing in Copenhagen.

The Danish Defense Ministry had worked out three so-called variants for this and submitted them for selection: the zero solution, a real growth in annual defense spending of one and one-half or of three percent, as had been recommended by NATO as early as 1977. However, despite the critical world-political development the Social Democratic parliamentary group declared itself in favor of the zero solution, although, according to present calculations, even a three percent real growth in defense expenditures would nevertheless result in an eight to nine percent decrease in strength for the peacetime army. In addition, the 1980 defense budget in the amount of 7 billion crowns had already been reduced by 100 million crowns.

During his first visit to Denmark in mid-January the supreme commander of the NATO forces in Europe, General Rogers, also made no bones about his concern about the danger of insufficient military protection for the strategically important Baltic approaches. He also let it be understood to his hosts in Copenhagen that the three percent increase in spending agreed on by the Western defense community was to be regarded as a minimum. However, Rogers found consent only in the bourgeois opposition parties. Conservative delegate Thomsen, chairman of the defense committee, said with a

stance of the Social Democrats and the unpolitically pacifist Radical Left-ists that the criticism by the Supreme Commander of NATO was completely justified, because Denmark gives the impression of no longer wanting to fulfill its alliance obligations.

The NATO Commander of the Baltic Approaches (COMBALTAP) Danish Lieutenant-General Fogger even took his own defense staff to task and accused it of having "developed a tendency toward purely administrative and non-operational ways of thinking." Should the country be satisfied with a new solution, it would furthermore, according to Fogger, run the risk that in case of emergency its NATO allies would not even come to its aid.

At present the Danish army numbers about 19,000, the air force not quite 7,000 and the navy about 3,400 men. Wartime strength including reserves is put at 78,000 by the Defense Ministry. However, the actual concern in all three branches of the military is for the level of armaments technology.

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PRESS DISCUSSES VANCE VISIT, WESTERN ALLIANCE

0422158 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German to East and West Germany
1605 GMT 22 Feb 80 DW

[Press review of Secretary of State Vance's German tour, 1980]

[Text] MEUT OSNABRUECKER ZEITUNG writes: The U.S. Secretary of State is returning practically empty-handed to Washington. The campaign for effective European support for the American intention to reach the Soviet Union in order to lesson Soviet little appreciation. The impression that of the American produced no significant changes aside from a clarification of contradictory standpoints. Washington can rely only in a limited way on the allies on the old continent. The continuous differences between the Americans and the Europeans contain the danger that the alliance could experience a breach that will be hard to heal. The West Europeans could soon find themselves in a situation that can be mastered only with American help.

LEEDRUCKER NACHRICHTEN deals with the results of the Paris talks of the U.S. Secretary of State: The French capital was no doubt the most difficult phase of the visit. France believes as before that economic sanctions and boycott of the Olympic games are not suitable for prompting the Soviets to withdraw from Afghanistan and for facilitating a return to normal international relations, including the process of detente. On the other hand, however, it is certain that Francois Poncelet has once again assured his American guest of France loyalty to the Alliance.

BERLINER MORGENPOST maintains: Due to lack of information it is impossible to tell what the basis is for the analysis of the power conditions in the Kremlin or of Soviet intentions which leads to French criticism that through gentle persuasion and good conduct perhaps the USSR could be made to give in. The suggestion made by the nine Foreign Ministers of the European Community in Rome with regard to Afghanistan's neutrality is quite in line with French policy. This suggestion offers the Kremlin a way out without losing face, French commentators say. These commentators are not irritated by the fact that the Soviet Union is obviously not interested in the finely woven way out and that it continues to send more troops to Afghanistan.

NEUE RUHR-ZEITUNG notes with a view to Vance's stopover in Bonn: no criticism of latter's course, which was probably mainly dominated by considerations of election tactics, helps the Federal Republic to ignore the realization that stressing Western unity is the commandment of the hour. Even if some

REPRESENTING ANOTHER OF THOSE WHO ARE NOT AT ALL SURE OF THE "absolute agreement" on the abandonment of the boycott in other words.

REINHOLD MITTER also pointed to this connection with the statements of the (German) Brandt. The press office says that indeed the SPD chairman stated "immediately that Brandt's statement was surprising. The former Chancellor said that America's President cannot believe the Europeans of making a decision to allow American visitors to Germany's Olympics. The election will be made here and not rather most determine themselves the direction to show they want to march—in solidarity, but most of all with a view to their own interests. It sounds good, but it has two hitches: First, the economic interests of the Europeans do not permit them to decouple themselves from American military, and second, the elected politicians here, and most of all the federal Chancellor, are really dancing on eggs in order to evade a decision. The up dance of the federal government, however, is not at all funny anymore. It will not produce anything in the case where the world believes from facing reality in self-delusion. Moscow will not release information, says REINHOLD MITTER.

THE (in)DIFFERENCE makes the following comment: The Europeans are approaching the problems with carefolliness because they are not in the least interested in identifying the Afghan crisis to Berlin. SPD Chief Brandt yesterday seemed that to be somewhat more forward, although he was still, representation of interests matter. This means not immediately will treason because of this, but it is the legitimate concern, and even the duty, of the Europeans to look after their interests, too, which are not identical in detail with those of the United States.

REINHOLD MITTER also maintains: Especially the political forces which could pressure Berlin to the abandonment of detente in Europe are looking with some despair on the shambles that have been caused. It is no coincidence that the Chairman Brandt advocates the view with special emphasis that nothing is wrong. This is also the policy line of the Federal Government. It does not seem to let go of the little bit of hope that things will yet change some day, making it possible to dodge the boycott. It must be feared, however, that this hope is delusional.

REINHOLD MITTER writes: If Brandt says that the Americans are not acting in all detail, then this is attributable to the clear opinion that the SPD does not share much of an Olympic boycott. To this extent yesterday's statement by the GARY News is not only explosive matter directed at Washington, but it has also made it clear that the SPD does not identify itself with the marching march stated out by FDP Chief Hans-Dietrich Genscher: "Military rise in the Olympic issue. If Brandt ironically speaks of pro-military rise in the Olympic issue, it means Genscher. Against the background of this conflict between the coalition parties it becomes clear that more and more Brandt has not publicly committed himself on the subject of the boycott. Even if he wanted to, he could not do anything else but play our time because he is sitting on a powder keg, says REINHOLD MITTER.

PAPER VIEWS CARTER'S MEASURES ON AFGHANISTAN

DW 21 (as received) Munich SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 22 Feb 80 p. 4 DW

[Commentary signed Schr.: "Carter Compels West To Move"]

[Text] The Soviet leadership, having been confronted with the alternative of either saving the Olympic Games or consolidating its influence in Afghanistan, has unequivocally decided for the continuation of its intervention in Afghanistan. The Soviets cannot withdraw before the puppet regime in Kabul, which they have installed, can manage to stay in power of its own account, hence they were unable to accept either the deadline of 15 February or any other one. Foreign Minister Gromyko hinted in Delhi how much they shirk any commitment, even though Gromyko found an understanding interlocutor in Indira Gandhi. Obviously the Russians intend to stay in Afghanistan for an extended period. None of their satellites would be secure for them if they were not forever occupied by Soviet troops or--like Romania--encircled.

President Carter, too, can hardly have believed that he would drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan with his ultimatum. Especially with this short deadline the ultimatum could only serve the purpose of revealing Moscow's intentions, of providing the most effective, nonmilitary sanction with severity, and of putting not only the United States but also the entire West under compulsion to move. If this was Carter's objective, then he has indeed achieved it. Since the Soviets are not interested in leaving Afghanistan with proper decorum but only in staying there while at the same time saving face--which would have spelled the loss of his own for Carter--he hardly had any alternative. The Olympic boycott did not stand a chance of being more than just a "punishment."

Such a punitive action, however, makes sense only if it is supported by as many members of the community of peoples as possible. No doubt the European tour by U.S. Secretary of State Vance serves the purpose of soliciting the approval of the Europeans, if necessary with gifts and treasure. The struggle over the participation of the Third World in the Olympic boycott has hardly really started yet--a longer time limit would have been more useful to the West.

CSO: 3103

WEINSTEIN ON NATO 'CRISIS CABINET' SUGGESTION

DW/10915 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 20 Feb 80 p 10 DW

[Article by Adelbert Weinstein: "NATO Must Be Led Politically"]

[Text] The suggestion of the deputy supreme commander came in time. General Schmuedie supported the idea of a "crisis cabinet" of NATO. He considers it a body that will coordinate the foreign policy activity of the alliance, the initiatives of the alliance states, a body that will support NATO's secretary general in cases of tension and assist him with suggestions on how to overcome the crisis together. The absence of such a work group had a poor effect after Afghanistan with regard to the action of the Atlantic Pact. NATO with its nervous national reactions to the Soviet assault turned out to be a helpless political collective.

The idea that was outlined in a work formula by one of the highest military leaders of the alliance has several fathers. It reappeared in regular intervals, enlivened the Atlantic discussion, and disappeared again. The need for Atlantic coordination was always there. But the implementation always met with resistance. The governments were jealous of their full freedom of action.

Even General De Gaulle could not achieve a breakthrough against the common front of rejection. In the fall of 1958 the French state chief demanded an Atlantic directorate. He repeated his suggestion in the spring of 1959: A superior authority ought to exist in the alliance that could bring influence to bear on the political action of the partners. NATO needs a strategic concept outlining a common strategy in the Middle East, Africa and Asia.

At that time De Gaulle was far ahead of his time when he tried to engage in this foreign policy field of action. He did it, last but not least, because he wanted to prepare the alliance for a time when America might possibly feel forced to remove the center of its military strength from Europe.

The idea of the general may have been rejected also because the circle of that Atlantic leadership organ, of the directorate, was too small. De Gaulle had in mind coordination of the "big," such as America, England and France. But another advocate of similar ideas, Henry Kissinger, experienced the same. In 1964 he continued along the lines of De Gaulle's plan. The later security commissioner and future secretary of state in a series of speeches at the

"Council of Foreign Relations," that if the Atlantic Alliance did not want to lose its vitality, it needed a common foreign policy. An alliance cannot do without a certain degree of agreement. Differences of opinion cannot be ruled out in a community of sovereign states, but the complete absence of agreement in tension situations prevents a real strategic reaction by NATO. Therefore, he believes that the time has come for "creating a political body on the highest level where the policy of the border states of the North Atlantic Pact will be coordinated."

Kissinger did not prevail. The political move of General Schmuëcke may experience the same fate although the reasons for setting up such a body are obvious. Our strongest partner, the United States, deals with strategic problems only when they appear as dangerous elements on the political horizon. Problems that will come up in 5 years and even events that can take place next year are generally considered by Washington as nonexistent. Iran, Afghanistan and maybe soon also Saudi Arabia then come on a surprise for the leading power of the alliance, and together with it the alliance also appears to be surprised by the change.

When reality has disproved firm Atlantic ideas, the partners point a finger at America as the guilty party. That reduces NATO unity every time, a unity that is fragile anyway. Because of the national narrowmindedness of its partner states, the alliance is indeed baffled every time by supranational events. For years the smaller partners have observed with mistrust the American action vis-a-vis the other nuclear giant--the Soviet Union. Every agreement of the nuclear giants was examined from the point of view of whether some "detachment" from Europe was being prepared and whether America was turning toward the Soviet Union as an accomplice. Only the introduction of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) helped to overcome that jealousy. The non-nuclear partners now learn in time in the NPG about every "nuclear innovation" being initiated by America.

[DW210919] Surely the alliance would have been spared a lot had it had an institution for the coordination of foreign policy questions similar to the Nuclear Planning Group. But as matters stand the individual partners not only call in question the validity of the strategy now pursued by Carter, they are even about to shake the security doctrine of NATO as a whole. In NATO the question is not posed any longer as to how great the unity and cohesion of the alliance ought to be in its reply to the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. On the contrary, they are proceeding according to the slogan of what degree of unity is just about necessary lest any of the bureaucracies (kanzleien) lose their Atlantic face.

Now, there are not findings that were possible only after Afghanistan. There have always been European attempts to talk to pieces, and thus influence negatively, any American plans which were not to the liking of Paris, Bonn, London or Rome. As long as the United States was militarily strong while the Europeans were economically weak, Washington succeeded time and again in saving the unity of the alliance. The Europeans, to be sure, rarely submitted any usable alternative proposals. Yet, all they could do in most cases was to slow up the U.S. initiatives; they were unable to prevent them.

This Atlantic state is post history. The Americans still are strong militarily, to be sure, but by far not as strong anymore as they were. The extraordinary military power of the Soviet Union is casting its shadow on NATO's national governments. The sun of Soviet power also shows more clearly the structural weaknesses of the NATO alliance. Rotating around the core of the four relatively well-armed partners, the United States, the Federal Republic, France and Great Britain, are weak and very weak allies. Formerly the dynamics of the United States moved the alliance even when the small and smallest partners followed the Atlantic doctrine only with a grumble. This has been different since Vietnam. Iran and its taking of hostages has dealt a blow to the prestige of the United States in the NATO alliance as well. For this reason it was impossible to find a joint ad hoc solution in the case of Afghanistan.

Two elements of the strategy had a particularly impeding effect. The first: a sort of Atlantic phlegm. After 30 years of "peace" the military danger from the East does not appear to exist to many partners. The hard clamp of the alliance, the compulsion of joint defense caused by the Soviet threat has become brittle since policies have been aimed at the relaxation of tensions, at detente.

The linkage of the military doctrine of security through arms with the political concept of a flexible strategy through detente did not do the alliance any good.

The other element influencing alliance policy is called the Atlantic renunciation of responsibility in a worldwide framework, especially the three nations on which the United States nearly exclusively relies in its foreign policy show little interest in extra-European affairs. Since the end of colonialization France and Great Britain have shifted foreign policy emphasis to the European continent. Only few ties with the old colonized countries have remained. They want to trade with them and somewhat influence them culturally--but they do not want to wage war for them.

Exceptions substantiate the rule: France has intervened in Africa several times. But otherwise neither Paris nor London have the military means for coming to the aid of the United States, for example, in the Persian Gulf. Besides, the great partner is being regarded as the "guarantee for security" by all of us not only in NATO but also in world events. The Germans are no exception in this respect. Bonn insists more and more stubbornly on an *autopolitik* of its own. Yet, like a foregone conclusion, this policy is to proceed under the protection of the U.S. security umbrella.

In view of this strategic situation it is not surprising that Atlantic advocates urge a reform of the alliance. Henry Kissinger said years ago that an alliance that no longer knows what to do with the old ideas is bound to fall apart. If NATO--according to Kissinger--is no longer propelled by the idea of producing security against the Soviet Union, it must invent a new political idea. Headway is possible only with an Atlantic foreign policy which is more than just the sum total of national interests.

The Executive Committee which Kissinger suggested be set up for that purpose differs only little from the institution visualized by Schmeckle. The professional diplomats in the alliance and the gradually fossilizing administration of NATO, by the way, need not worry that they would be bypassed. "The NATO ambassadors might step in as substitutes in the conference" (Kissinger). It would be the primary task of the executive institution to examine how far the sphere of interest of the Atlantic idea of influence would have to go.

ISO: 1101

COMMENTATOR CHIDES BONN FOR NOT STATING POSITIONS

DW211320 Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 21 Feb 80 p 1 DW

[Editorial by Dolf Sternberger: "The Government Becomes Vague"]

[Text] At the moment the Federal Government is not making a good impression. To be more specific, it does not make any impression at all, because it cannot be heard as such, as the government. The last time we heard something binding from it in foreign policy respects was about a month ago, on the occasion of the government statement in the Bundestag. Since then quite a few individual utterances have been noted in matters of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the U.S. reprisals and threats, utterances made by various Federal ministers and party people from the environment of the Federal Government, and there has been some whispering about opinions and actions of the chancellor, yet none of that may be taken as the voice of the Federal Government, nothing was absolutely committing and reliable.

We are living in a pluralist system. The manifoldness of free opinions, the vivacity of public discussion make up the honor of the constitutional state. But the government cannot be of a pluralist nature, it may not speak with several voices. It goes without saying that discussions also take place in the cabinet and that its members also come to terms with the groups in parliament which support the government.

All this, however, is not quite binding and is not under the commandment of public responsibility. Besides, the different utterances of various people do not always dovetail. Yet a government must find, and lead to, a unanimous view lest its authority deteriorate.

Let us take the question concerning participating in the Moscow summer Olympic games. True, ultimately it is up to the athletes and their organizations to make up their minds about it. Yet the leadership of the state must have answers to the questions and provide advice. The leadership of the American states has provided decided counsel and even imbued it with considerable emphasis. So far we have heard nothing in that respect from the leadership of the Federal Republic of Germany, nothing definite, nothing binding, nothing responsible. The Federal foreign minister says that the

Soviet Union must create the prerequisites for the participating of all nations; the Federal interior minister finds that the question concerning participation in a boycott need not be answered for the time being. The Federal defense minister, a member of the government, said on one occasion that he deems it inconceivable for a German team to march into the arena in Moscow when the American team does not.

Something similar was stated by the Federal economics minister when he was en route, when he was interviewed by reporters and when he arrived in New York. The chancellor, however, keeps quiet, and the government spokesman has nothing to tell the press in this matter.

Since there is no binding statement, one cannot attribute much importance to the personal opinion of various government members, regardless of how outspoken or careful they may be. So far no decision and no formulation has been made. On the contrary, the leadership seems to have expressed a rather temporizing attitude.

The German, the German-French and maybe the West European inclination to develop their own policies in line with their own interests has so far consisted in subdued nagging vis-a-vis Washington rather than in outlining their own positive ideas. The formula on procedures with regard to the distribution of roles within the Western groupings that are generally in solidarity was probably their own idea. This idea has something like a sly excuse to it. There are spectacular and unobtrusive roles in this drama, and it looks as if we have slated for ourselves an unobtrusive role--following the old slogan of soldiers "clean shaven in the second line." That was used among soldiers to evade an unpleasant command. In big politics, however, it is unworthy.

If a party functionary utters such nagging, if the Federal manager of the Social Democratic Party, Egon Bahr, scratches the paint of every general solidarity pathos [as published] and shakes it--he said to a foreign party visitor that we view with "much restraint" what the Americans do individually--that may create a sound or a rattle in the concert of public opinion. This does not have the qualification of a responsible government statement--although our public seems to have widely lost the ability to differentiate between the opinion of a party and that of a government. Only the latter will be tested by the consequence of state action.

The planned action of the Federal Government is unclear at present, as if it were blurred. Statements by individual members cannot replace government statements; they can be disavowed. This state of affairs permits two interpretations. Either the cabinet has not yet found a line and the chancellor has not formulated a guideline. That would be sad. Or the chancellor and the cabinet do not want to find a line. That would be disdainful. Both are dangerous, internally as well as externally. It is time for the government to become outspoken.

PRG PAPER SEES 'TURBULENCES' IN WESTERN ALLIANCE

DW191226 Frankfurt FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 18 Feb 80 p 3 DW

[Editorial by Ulrich Mackensen: "Atlantic Turbulences"]

[Text] Actually the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan should have led to a stronger cohesion of North Atlantic alliance. Instead, discords have become visible which cannot be covered up with the cloak of verbal solidarity but which instead raise the question of where NATO ought to go from here and how future crises can be better managed.

Ample complaints are being made from here and from over there. The Europeans lament the fact that the leading power, the United States, has informed and consulted them too inadequately and too late and that it is too erratic. The Americans on their part miss extra efforts toward keeping the alliance strong militarily. The suspicion that understanding for each other's problems has decreased between the old and new continent is profound.

Even the intensive discussion in the European NATO countries on the decision on the arms gap closure was not necessarily understood in the United States. And the linkage of this decision with an offer to Moscow to open negotiations on a mitigation of the medium-range potential likewise was only half-heartedly supported by the leading Western power. After all, even by 12 December, the day on which the alliance promulgated [the arms gap closure decision] the U.S. Senate had not managed to ratify the second agreement on a limitation of strategic nuclear weapons (SALT II).

By then already a great lack of understanding on the part of many U.S. politicians had emerged for the urgent interest of the Europeans in making headway in the field of arms control as well. But they had reason to assume that the Carter administration advocated a different policy and that the President himself was interested in a halt to the arms race in a mitigation of tensions.

Then followed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It not only made it clear that Moscow continues to pursue imperialist policy wherever it does not meet

any obstacles, but also surprised the Europeans. Granted, U.S. intelligence services had noted as early as in November that the Soviets filled up some troop components with reservists and relocated them to the Afghan border. Yet Washington failed to pass these findings on to its allies despite the commitment for mutual consultation and information, as provided for in the NATO treaty.

But most of all President Carter announced in his state of the union message that the United States considers the Persian Gulf its sphere of influence and that it is prepared in an emergency to help the gulf states militarily. This doctrine also had the flaw in it that neither the gulf states had been asked about their need for help, nor had the NATO allies been informed. The implementation of that doctrine would have the consequence that the European countries would have to fill gaps that would be created by the United States' stronger engagement in the gulf area. Consultation was urgently necessary.

One can very well muster understanding for President Carter, who was exposed to strong domestic political pressure due to the events running in parallel with the taking of hostages in Iran. However, the sequence of his measures, their partial revoking, the suspected confusion of U.S. reactions made his policy more and more unpredictable for the allies. If the principle is applicable to East-West relations that one's own policy must be clear and predictable for the counterside (the West at least tries it), to avoid wrong reactions, this must be especially valid within the alliance.

It would certainly be exaggerated to speak of a serious NATO crisis, and it would be equally wrong as a consequence to set up an additional consultation body. The existing NATO instruments suffice, they need only be exploited.

Two things, therefore, are urgently necessary: The Europeans must consider how they could take over some of the military burdens of the United States, which is engaged not merely on our continent. This should not entail an extension of the NATO task, but it can force it to take over additional burdens and tasks. In the Federal Republic, for example, the defense expenditures may possibly increase by 3 percent. Washington ought to realize that some advance information could facilitate solidarity. Rash military promises to set up a "fire brigade" of 110,000 men, for example, which hardly has a chance to be implemented because of lack of personnel in the U.S. Armed Forces, do not improve the policy's credibility.

Eventually all NATO states must try to continue to include the Soviets in international treaties. Otherwise continued quarrels in the alliance could be considered by the hawks in the Soviet camp as almost an invitation to stage more foreign political adventures.

SPD MANAGER BAHR JUSTIFIES CRITICISM OF WEST

DW211618 Hamburg ARD Television Network in German 2130 GMT 30 Feb 80 DW

[Interview with SPD Federal Manager Egon Bahr by correspondent Schaaf in Bonn--recorded]

[Text] [Question] You have charged the West at large and the leading Western power in particular with having committed serious mistakes in connection with the Afghan crisis. What mistakes are these?

[Answer] I did not accuse the leading Western power of having committed mistakes in connection with Afghanistan; what I believe is that the West as a whole--and that includes us as well--must watch out lest it be plunged into a situation where the impression is conveyed as though anything could be done with arms. We have the classical, nearly classical, example of that in Iran. It is my view that the West as a whole must take care not to support any entrenched, old structures which historically deserve to perish.

[Question] Your accusations against the West not only relate to Iran and the shah but now also to Pakistan. Do you see any alternative to supporting this country, this military regime in Pakistan?

[Answer] I hope that we, that the West, can avoid experiencing in Pakistan something similar to what we have experienced in Iran.

[Question] Your critical, concerned remarks about the Middle East are aimed in an entirely different direction and testify to an entirely different mode of thinking than that of the incumbent administration in Washington. Don't you think that in this situation--the ultimatum of the United States to the Soviet Union expires today--where the solidarity of the NATO alliances is in particular demand, such utterances tend to entail great misunderstanding and smash a lot of political China?

[Answer] No, I do not believe that because first, not the slightest doubts exist with regard to the reliability of our position in the Western alliance; and second, what the United States makes of its special role and world political responsibility as the Western leadership power and superpower is one thing. But I believe that the Federal Government has made it clear that we want to continue our development policy and that we will hold to our basic

military-political approach, namely not to supply arms to any area outside that of NATO. So an almost automatic division of labor will take place with regard to Pakistan, and nobody in America actually wants anything else.

[Question] Can the Federal Republic afford as much leeway as you are demanding for yourself and for the Federal Republic right now, without challenging the Soviet Union to drive a wedge into the Western alliance?

[Answer] I believe that the story of the Soviet Union and the wedge it wants to drive is exaggerated. I believe most of all that the Soviet Union knows very well that the position of the Federal Republic within NATO is not a subject of discussions and never was, and that this matter would become clearer if we did not pretend in statements made every day that we could be tempted. Nobody can tempt us in this field, let alone the Soviet Union.

(50) 1103

OFFICIAL VIEWS ROLE OF GERMAN NAVY IN NATO

Stuttgart **MARINE-RUNDSCHAU** in English Jan 80 pp 1-5

[Article by Dr Andreas von Bülow, parliamentary state secretary, Ministry of Defence]

[Text]

Thirty years ago, on April 4th, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed by the North American countries and ten European states. Since 1955 the Federal Republic of Germany has also been a member of the North Atlantic Alliance. Founded with the will and commitment to commonly defend democracy, the freedom of the individual, and justice the Alliance has since guaranteed the security of all its members, including that of our own country, and will continue to do so. NATO membership, therefore, is and will be an inalienable part of both our foreign and security policies.

The assured capability of the Alliance to defend its members is a prerequisite to its security against any potential enemy, and it is this defence capability only that enables the Alliance to carry out the necessary policy of detente and armament control realistically and in a way harmonized among its members to render peace more secure. In the years to come the Federal Republic of Germany will continue actively and as a reliable partner to mould this political strategy together with the other NATO members in maintaining her defence capability and in showing her readiness for detente at the same time.

Security against any potential enemy and maintaining peace in freedom depend on the balance of military power between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The undisturbed balance of power between countries or systems of alliance constitutes a preferred means of international security policy which can be seen from the fact that the principle of nobody striving for superiority has been accepted by both sides.

The Bundeswehr representing Germany's military contribution to NATO serves to maintain an approximate balance of power between the East and the West.

The Federal Republic of Germany's defence efforts have the only aim of countering the threat by the Warsaw Pact together with her partners in the Alliance, since the military potential of the East, first of all, is a threat to our country. That is why

we furnish more than one half of the ground forces and about one third of the air forces to NATO's integrated forward defence in Central Europe. But without our partners in the Alliance and especially without the United States credible defence would not be possible.

This is particularly true with regard to the naval forces required for the strategy of forward defence in Central Europe.

Secure sea lines of communication are a prerequisite to NATO's bringing up reinforcements and reserves. This fact emphasises the strategic importance of the Northern Atlantic. Should the Warsaw Pact succeed in cutting off these sea lines of communication NATO's capability of lastingly defending Europe would be seriously impaired. The Warsaw Pact would then be in a position to play its own game in the European theatre.

Protecting the sea lines of communication between the North American and the European continents constitutes a task to be jointly accomplished by the Atlantic Alliance. In this context the northern flank holds a position both outstanding and sensitive within NATO's defence system. This area comprises the territories of Northern Europe with the sea areas off the Norwegian coast, the North Sea, the English Channel, and the Baltic Sea with its accesses. NATO is vitally interested in protecting the geostrategic key positions in this area as, for instance, the Danish straits and the approaches to the Baltic Sea. Their loss would enable the Warsaw Pact to cut off the sea lines of communication to the Northern Atlantic.

In his book «Voenno-morskoe floty v voynakh i v mirnoe vremya» (Naval Forces in War and Peace) the Soviet Admiral S. G. Gorshkov comes to the conclusion «that in World War II submarines were the principal weapons employed against enemy shipping and will be used as such under present conditions all the more». He continues, «The properties of the new weapons, the reconnaissance means, and atomic energy will increase the capabilities of the naval fleet. They contribute to the submarines and air forces taking the first rank».

A glance at the development of the Soviet Fleet in the last ten years shows that the Soviet Union has systematically realized Gorshkov's perceptions. Attack submarines constitute the nucleus of the Soviet naval potential which has the mission of cutting off the sea lines of communication in the Atlantic in case of war. The accomplishment of this mission is, however, hampered by the disadvantageous location of the Soviet Fleet's home bases and by the lack of naval bases in the Atlantic. The Soviet Union, therefore, equipped her submarines with nuclear propulsion at an early time in order to give them a long endurance. The Soviet surface forces, on the other hand, still lack the capability of accomplishing long-time operations in the Atlantic, if they are forced to operate at an ever-increasing distance from their home bases in the Baltic Sea and on the coasts of the Northern Waters. This is an explanation for the Soviet Union's efforts to increase her RAS (Replenishment at Sea) capabilities and to

establish naval bases in the countries of the Third World. But so far she has not satisfactorily succeeded in doing so.

A comparison of both NATO's and the Warsaw Pact's naval potentials in the Northern Atlantic and the European marginal seas shows - despite the uncertainties involved in such a numerical comparison - that NATO is still maintaining its superiority in aircraft carriers, combat aircraft, and ASW means. The changing strategic conditions do not allow of considering individual sea areas and territories at the northern flank separately. On the contrary, the Northern European territory and its sea areas must be looked upon as a strategic entity.

The regional ratio of strength existing in the marginal sea areas at the northern flank is of growing and direct significance to the integrity of NATO's territory. For us as well as for the whole of the Alliance it is highly important to counter the threat existing in the northern flank area by fully exploiting both the mobility and the flexibility inherent in naval forces more effectively than ever before and thus to create the conditions for the timely and safe arrival of reinforcements and supplies in the European theatre. Virtually, this is only

possible by reorganizing the complicated command structure in the European marginal sea area.

Within the scope of NATO's defensive strategy a way of conducting the operations must be chosen that, in accordance with the principle of forward defence, exploits all possibilities of timely and adequately depriving the potential enemy at the northern flank of the initiative before his invading friendly territory from the sea.

Our naval forces and their air arms will accomplish their missions in close co-operation with the allied navies. In the Baltic Sea and at its accesses close co-operation has been established with the Danish naval forces.

Six bordering countries of the Alliance participate in the protection of the North Sea though the British, Dutch, and Norwegian navies only have to fulfil tasks at the immediate approaches to their own coasts. Their main efforts will be in the Eastern Atlantic, in the sea off the Norwegian coast, and at the western approaches to the English Channel. That is why the German main efforts aiming at securing the sea lines of communication in the North Sea are of vital importance.

CSO: 3120

WEINSTEIN CRITICIZES WESTERN DEFENSE POLICY

DW151055 Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 15 Feb 80 p 1 DW

[Editorial by Adelbert Weinstein: "The West and the Bronze Drums"]

[Text] The legend tells about a war trick of a Laotian king: When a most powerful foreign army was nearing, the monarch had dozens of bronze drums set in the rushing monsoon rain. The drumming drops, intensified hundred-fold by the vibrating bronze drums, created a roaring noise. The enemy believed to be in danger himself and fled from the country.

The defense policy of the West seems to be following such a pattern. Shrewd political action, military tricks, strategic strategemical maneuvers--these are some elements of Atlantic security policy. The reaction to Afghanistan demonstrates that the alliance is a helpless strategic collective. The Kremlin is offensive, NATO, however, does not form a defensive unit.

Leadership is necessary in the alliance. The difference in power indicates who will be the leading power. America is the strongest NATO partner. But under Carter the United States has demonstrated leadership weakness for too long a time. The alliance survived the interregnum because it had created in three decades political mechanisms in the secretariat general and military mechanisms in the integrated supreme command. An administration that creates order and a military administration cannot be substitutes for political dash. Moreover, coalitions are clumsy. When the American President made his strategic turn, the alliance was unable to follow. If the Americans complain now about their partner, they ought to admit that Washington's temporizing attitude was mainly responsible for the Atlantic phlegm.

But that is just one side of the general strategic situation. NATO is militarily weak. The Soviet Union has been stormily rearming for almost a decade. NATO just did what was absolutely necessary. There is no such thing as a balance of military strength. It will be difficult to reestablish it. Our American partner is determined to catch up, but so far he can just set up bronze drums. The strategic effect of all American plans will take time. Even the beginnings of the American defense conception are not convincing.

There are two schools that naturally advocate contradicting standpoints. One school maintains that the situation in the world has changed so much that the United States must increase the numerical strength of its troops. The thesis has been contestable in the past that America could wage "real war" (in Europe) and simultaneously take "warlike actions" in the bordering areas (Asia, the Middle East, Africa) but now one must say that such ideas are wrong. The development of the army must be demanded together with an enlargement of the navy and an extension of the air force. The other school believes that the volume of the armed forces and the volume of naval and aviation arms systems suffice. But it demands a considerable improvement of quality. The secretary of defense belongs to the advocates of that strategy.

It is most likely that the secretary will prevail. America will then have excellently equipped troops. But as before it will not have enough troops. Aside from the fact that the modernization process will last until 1987, such planning indicates absence of understanding for the requirements of strategy. Today America cannot take immediate action in the Persian Gulf, nor can it send strategic reserves to Europe. There is a lack of air force transport capacity because one has been saving money in this field. There is not even sufficient operative convoy protection for naval operations in case of tension. For the concentration in the Indian Ocean aircraft carriers had to be removed from other waters.

Trying to replace quantity with quality in this field would mean planning with disregard for realities. Moreover the striving for improved quality is handicapped by another shortcoming. It can be overcome only in years: The American Army is not in a position to master "more technology." A Pentagon study points out with concern that the personnel of field units has reached its intellectual and technical limits in handling modern arms. One is asking oneself whether the \$60 billion that is supposed to be spent on the perfection of equipment and arms systems will be "mastered" by the troops. This kind of modernization was said to go beyond the "intelligence level" of the soldiers.

What applies to conventional arms also applies to nuclear-strategic arms systems: The risk is increasing that technology makes it almost impossible to use the systems in the field, so that just a few will be able to master the arms. Technology is supposed to serve the soldiers. In American planning the soldiers serve the technology. A similar development can be seen in all NATO states. One wants to replace man with technology. The result is demonstrated by Afghanistan or Iran, Angola or Vietnam: Political helplessness of industrial giants.

CSO: 3103

WEINSTEIN VIEWS FRG DESTROYERS' TRIP TO INDIAN OCEAN

DW191147 Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 19 Feb 80 p 1 DW

[Article signed ein.: "Flying One's Flag"]

[Text] Flying one's flag is something different than gunboat policy. The Federal Government seems to fail to see the difference, or the chancellor may just pretend to. The voyage of two German destroyers to the Indian Ocean is involved. The "Lustjens" and the "Bayern" are supposed to take off in late April for a series of visits. The route will lead them to an operations area that has become a zone of strategic crises. A great American fleet unit has been concentrated between Diego Garcia and the Persian Gulf. Washington considers that naval maneuver a demonstration against the Soviet attack on Afghanistan.

The Soviets understand this language of the Americans only too well. And since Moscow understands it so well, the Federal Republic seems inclined to keep out of everything. The inclination exists in Bonn to stop the "great tour" of the Federal Navy units. So there is fear of Moscow? Or just wise restraint? Both things can serve as explanations. But where is the Atlantic solidarity? The French have already dispatched 18 large and small ships very close to the American unit. They are sending a Corvette now, and together with the naval bases on Reunion in the Indian Ocean, they have almost 10,000 men in action. Their "sapphire group" is supposed to demonstrate that Paris is not leaving the save-guarding the oil supply lines only to the Americans. It is also supposed to show that the French Navy assesses the strategic naval situation exactly like the American Navy. That has nothing to do with gunboat policy. The Russians threaten and use guns in Afghanistan. Our destroyers would not make a provocation if they carried out this voyage which has been planned for a long time. They would be carrying out an Atlantic mission.

Bonn demonstrated the same sensitive restraint when it objected to holding the NATO maneuver Hilex. It was said that one did not consider it opportune to have these maneuvers now which would look like practical crisis management. Renouncing an examination of the cooperation of political and military authorities creates for the alliance a setback of months with regard to the coordination of important tasks. Certainly, the weak do not rattle the sabre. But he must not appear to be cowardly either.

SKDL CHAIRMAN: SOCIALISM MUST PRESERVE DEMOCRACY, RIGHTS

Helsinki SUOMEN KIVALEHTI in Finnish 19 Oct 79 p 21

[Article: "Ele Alenius: Faith in Socialism Suffers Damage"]

[Text] The socialist forces must pay serious attention to the fact that the residents of the capitalist welfare states hold democracy and their freedoms and rights in great esteem. At the same time, a certain weariness prevails in respect to politics.

Those words were spoken by Ele Alenius at a conference of socialist theoreticians held in early October 1979 in Cavtat, Yugoslavia. The following is a condensation of his speech.

Political behavior has become complex in welfare societies where social policies have created a definite basic level of economic security because the sense of values that people hold has become more complex. Thus, although great difficulties and extensive unemployment are currently being experienced in the capitalist world economy, yet many other matters lead to the fact that a large part of the population does not consider socialism to be a preferable alternative.

The importance of the various types of values and, above all, the overall extent of this system of values, is a matter that is frequently overlooked by socialist forces. The manner of thinking is frequently too static. The people are seen as members of a certain social class, with the assumption that the class interests determine also the behavior of individuals. However, that is not the case. People are not faceless parts of a social class. In order to take into consideration the overall extent of the system of values it is necessary that, while it is considered important to analyze the crises of capitalism and to point out the inability of capitalism to use the achievements of modern science and technology for the good of all mankind, that it not be denied that the socialist world and the communist movement have their own crises. It is impossible otherwise to increase faith in socialism among thinking people. It must be noted that this faith has suffered damage and a great disturbance of values is taking place at this time.

That has been brought about by the struggle among the social systems has a very powerful effect on the world today. People are aware of this, and for that reason ordinary people currently find it difficult to have faith in anything that involves politics and ideology. A certain weariness prevails presently in regard to politics. At the same time there is a need for more effective criticism of both socialism and capitalism.

In my opinion it is quite essential that these phenomena are profoundly recognized. At the same time it is important to note that there are certain basic values that are highly valued in modern civilized society. The honoring of democracy is one of them. Problems involving the rights and freedoms of people are even more important. I have already referred to the counter-reaction in respect to propaganda, and I would like to emphasize particularly, along with the traditionally important freedoms of opinion, religion, and other matters, the right and freedom to the truth.

The socialist forces must give serious attention to the fact that the ecological problems of the world are becoming all the more pressing to the knowledgeable segment of the population. How socialism will relate to the ecology problem will depend to a large extent whether these people truly consider socialism to be a higher form of society than capitalism.

When one considers the various types of crises, the ecological dangers, and the preparedness race it is small wonder that ordinary people have difficulty deciding where to place their faith. In fact, it can be said that the most prevalent crisis today is the crisis of the ordinary man.

For these reasons I am of the opinion that the one great task of the subjective forces of socialism lies in regaining the faith of people in the procedures and noble objectives of socialism.

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CSO: 3107

NEW BOOK'S AUTHORS DEBATE STATE'S ROLE IN EASING JOBLESSNESS

Helsinki SUOMEN KUVALEHTI in Finnish 19 Oct 79 p 82-83

[Article: "Optimistic Paivio Hetemaki and skeptical Eero Tuomainen ponder answer to question 'How Now?'"]

[Text] Paivio Hetemaki, veteran of Finnish economics and of Finland's labor market policy, and Eero Tuomainen, director of the economic planning center, have co-authored a book of discussions strikingly appropriate for these times.

It searches for approaches to Finland's unemployment and economic problems. Soon to be released by the Tammi publisher, the title of the book is "How Now Finland?" As an excerpt from it, a discussion between the authors follows.

Eero Tuomainen: It has been jokingly proposed, but sometimes even quite seriously, that unemployment ought to be prohibited by law. The constitution ought not be debased with just ordinary laws.

Paivio Hetemaki: The question of full employment as a legislative responsibility has actually been under discussion. It began in the original language of Article 6 where the form of government is defined which stated "a citizen's labor enjoys the special protection of the Republic." This is primarily a rhetorical statement. If I remember correctly, it came about because the bourgeoisie were demanding the use of honorary titles although the government was to be republican in form, and the social democrats in turn, as a countermeasure, demanded this protective measure for labor.

Tuomainen: The form of government came into being under conditions in which labor's position was weak, the working conditions were miserable and protective measures were therefore sought for the forestalling, limiting, and controlling of exploitation. At that time such concepts as economic growth, full employment, and employment responsibility were not yet in use and the legislation that was being drafted was therefore given a protective nature in order to prevent, limit, and control the exploitation of labor. Consequently, more recent legislation in respect to employment responsibility is more explicit.

Hetemaki: It is true that the expansion of Article 6, the establishing of the Labor Ministry, and the enactment of the employment law are the result of new thinking. The 1972 revision provides, in addition to the protective feature, that "It is the responsibility of the state to provide, when needed, the opportunity for citizens of Finland to be employed, unless otherwise specified by law." The employability law states that "the state must, by use of general economic measures, seek to promote high and consistent employment." The meaning of employment does not depend on laws, but rather, on desire, ability, and solidarity.

Tuomainen: The general economic measures anticipated in the law have already been tested and they will be put into effect in the next few years. The efforts to equalize the labor market by means of special measures are therefore well taken and justified. It appears, however, that the garnering of solidarity by means of honorary degrees and by the establishing of new honor societies is no longer feasible.

Hetemaki: I am of the opinion that if we manage the economic policy properly, then the demand for labor will increase. I do not argue that we can rid ourselves entirely of the unemployment problem in 6 months, or even in a year, but that it need not extend to the mid-1980's as some have predicted before results can be attained. I will refer again to the situation as it existed in 1968 when Finland had 125,000 unemployed. Within a year that was reduced to 41,000, which is proof that results can be produced quite rapidly if the proper measures are taken. The prime objective should be to increase the demand for labor because the welfare of the entire Finnish nation depends on increased employment.

Tuomainen: Apparently you are strongly convinced that our labor market leaders and other leaders in various groups are open-minded, strong-willed, and enlightened enough that, when they decide to do so, they can handle the unemployment problem. You frequently point out that the matter was satisfactorily managed in the 1968 situation. I am not aware whether the present leaders have enough resolve, initiative, and knowledge for that, but it is quite possible that the situation now is very different from what it was in 1968. Those in the field may not be adequately aware of the needs of the situation, or perhaps the old methods are not adequate for the present situation. If economic progress is slow in Finland despite rapid technological progress, how then can we generally answer the question of unemployment in Finland? Are there measures any other than those few provided by income policy, foreign exchange policy, and perhaps by taxation policy?

Hetemaki: My optimistic impression of the intelligence and positive desires of the trade union leaders is based of course on my experience in the labor market field. It is my impression also that in recent years the trade union movement has shown a great deal of forbearance in its demands. For example, the income policy decision was recently modified to provide wage increases that were already adopted to go into effect at some later date. To me that was a tremendous expression of trade union knowledgeability of the needs of the situation. But of course elements other than labor market organizations

will be needed. The administration must also participate, and it has recently, particularly in the shaping of government income. And that must be continued into the future. The solutions are so complex and involve so many matters that they will require public approval as well. It is my opinion that, in order to attain decisive results in the elimination of unemployment, preparations be made well in advance for joint discussions among the employers, the trade unions, and the administration. The publicizing of these preparatory negotiations ought not be in the first order of priorities. It would be necessary at the outset to determine the extent of the unemployment and how far it will extend into the 1980's unless special measures are undertaken. After these matters have been jointly ascertained it will then be possible to undertake the work. This procedure promotes prior consideration of the measures best suited to the resolving of the basic problem.

Referring back to my own experience, I recall that we began the negotiations for the 1968 stabilization agreement without fanfare already in 1967. We had already arrived at the conclusion that something had to be done, otherwise disaster lay ahead. These negotiations lasted about 3 months, during which time it became apparent to both sides that a broad overall solution had to be reached. It must be remembered that at that point the union leaders agreed to an increase of 16 pennies / .16 markka/ per hour although a devaluation of 24 percent had gone into effect. In addition, it was agreed to forego a certain increase brought about by an increase in the cost of living index that would have become effective in the autumn. To me, that was such a demonstration of forbearance and of lack of prejudice that it made me optimistic about the logical attitude of the trade unions in this matter. But the trade union movement must be made assured of the measures required by the situation. The results then turned out favorable for all. The new agreement was then concluded in good time and with relative ease.

Tuomainen: I too believe in the necessity of discussion. It is essential in order to arrive at decisions that are in accord with the policy demanded by the situation. However, I see the basic problem to be that of attaining full employment in a situation in which the increase in productivity remains brisk but in which production increases fairly slowly. Under these conditions it is necessary to think which are the flexible factors and what the process of adjustment is that leads to proper results. But I do not believe in any rapid solution. It is perplexing that the interests of the people making the decisions are tied to limited small groups. As examples of this I can quote Heikki Haavisto and his responsibility in the MTK [agricultural] field and Jorma Reini and his responsibility in the technical field. If these leaders are striving to be effective organization politicians, they are pursuing their own ends in such a way that they will find themselves in conflict with others. How is it possible to reach decisions leading to full employment if others should cling equally as unyieldingly to their own points of view as the gentlemen mentioned do to their own?

BRIEFS

CORSICA WORRIES PCP--The leaders of the PCP have sent some emissaries to Corsica to draw up a report on developments on the island, said developments being a source of concern. [Text] [Paris LE POINT in French 11 Feb 60 p 31]

MARCHAIS PREFERS GROMYKO--Georges Marchais admits that, of all the Soviet leaders, he has a distinct preference for Minister of Foreign Affairs Gromyko. [Text] [Paris LE POINT in French 11 Feb 60 p 31]

CSO: 3100

PRIME MINISTER'S CHANCES FOR THE PRESIDENCY DISCUSSED

Athens TA NEA in Greek 19 Jan 80 p 11

[Article by Kostas Papaioannou: "If He Does Not Get the Vote, Then What?"]

[Text] The recent debate in the Chamber of Deputies may not have made anyone more informed about the national issues, but it surely constituted a significant milestone for all: The commencement of a process which has thus been officially inaugurated and which will have as its first terminus the selection of a president of the Republic in the spring, and as its second and final one the coming electoral confrontation. (The chance that the elections may precede the choosing of the supreme chief, although not impossible of course, is considered quite unlikely at the present time).

We are talking about the clash between the administration and the official opposition, which was bound to take the harsh form which is now expected sometime this winter, since the preconditions exist for a major change in our circumstances: PASOK is knocking at the door of power, and for the first time:

A socialist movement is very near to taking over (with itself in complete control) the governing of the country.

The Right, in the form which it took following the change in government, is very close to changing places with the official opposition--a socialist movement.

And for the first time as well, all political developments are being decided by the choice made by one person: Konstandinos Karamanlis, who must decide and ("sometime in March," according to the judgments of his people) announce:

Whether he will run for president of the Republic, whereupon the strength of the New Democracy Party (ND) (which has deteriorated already, according to all the evidence) naturally will fall even more, whatever solution may be given to the "problem of the succession."

Whether he will retire from political life, whereupon the above considerations are even more valid.

Whether he will remain as leader of the ND, waging also the coming electoral battle--undoubtedly the most difficult of his life, after that of 1963, perhaps.

Although this subject has been written about a thousand times recently, it perhaps can stand yet another treatment, from the purely practical standpoint:

What chances does the current premier have to be elected president of the Republic?

At present, the strength of the parties in the Chamber of Deputies has shaped up as follows:

New Democracy Party	175
(including P. Kanellopoulos)	
PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement)	93
KKE	11
EDIK (Democratic Center Union)	5
KODISO (Party of Democratic Socialism)	4
EP (Worker Struggle)	4
EDA	1
KKE-Interior	1
Independents	6
(G. Mavros, S. Papathanassis, G. Sergakis, K. Gondikas, A. Pnevmatikos, and G. Papaeythymiou)	

All the parties have formally left open the issue of the presidency--at least up to the time when the candidate nominated by the governing faction is announced.

If we assume that Karamanlis will be the candidate for president, then without the votes of PASOK and the KKE (104), he will not be chosen on the first or second ballots (200 votes are needed), even if all those who voted "yes" to the EEC (196) vote for him--something which is rather unlikely. For example, the opposition of Mr Zigdis is already well-known, while the KODISO is demanding promises right now before it decides what it will do. The third balloting is left, in which 180 votes are required. And these will be hard to collect, if one takes into account some defections from the ND which can occur, since the balloting is secret.

But the problem does not lie there: After the third balloting, if the candidate for president does not collect 180 votes then the Chamber of Deputies is dissolved and elections are proclaimed, in which of course

Karamanlis can take part. And some people are maintaining that in this third balloting, Karamanlis will collect 180 votes precisely because everyone from his party, and also a number of other delegates (independent or appointed) will not want an electoral confrontation, for understandable reasons. (There is of course also the reverse opinion: That under these conditions, resorting to the ballot-boxes will save many deputies of the ND, who fear that in the absence of Karamanlis "everything is very difficult").

However, the essence of the problem lies elsewhere: Will the present premier want to get involved in the whirlwind of the third balloting? That is, be made president by only 60 percent of the electoral body, without the approval of the official opposition and under the circumstance of a twofold (two ballots) disapproval of 2/3 of the Chamber of Deputies?

And further: Is it to the advantage of the present leader of the ND to be elected (we are talking still about the third balloting) within the more general political climate which will have developed following the two (unsuccessful) ballotings, with its flood of statements, recriminations, and so forth?

It is hard to give a "yes" answer to the above. He would not have done anything of this sort, say those who "know a little" about Karamanlis, even prior to the dictatorship--and much less will he do it now, with the prestige which he has gained internationally.

Conclusion:

If the selection of the president were to take place tomorrow--that is, under the present conditions--Mr Karamanlis would not be chosen on the first two ballots in any case, and his election on the third would be very difficult. (He would be able, for example, to collect two or three votes from independents, one or two from EDIK, perhaps two from the EP, and he would be elected if there were no defections from the ND).

However, the selection will take place in the interval from 15 April (when the Chamber of Deputies recommences its activities following the Easter recess) to 20 May, when the allowance of time expires which is provided for in the Constitution. (The selection of a new president is to be at least 1 month prior to the conclusion of the term of office of the previous one). And until then, there is still time "for many things to happen."

Mr Karamanlis ought to give:

- 1) A solution to the ND's problem of party leadership. (Of course, this issue does not concern only the governing party--rather, whatever choice Karamanlis makes will also have weight in the selection of the president, from the nature of things).

2) Promises so as to secure the votes of the other parties and the independents, who are already a considerable force.

It is on these promises (above all) that to a very great extent the question will depend of whether Mr Karamanlis:

Will be elected on the first ballot and with great ease, as the non-partisan president.

Will be elected on the third ballot, under "difficult circumstances," and with the opposition of at least two (more likely, five) parties being a given fact. (In such a case, PASOK either will nominate its own candidate, or will cast a blank ballot. Only the parties can nominate candidates--any other candidacies are rejected by the presiding body of the Chamber of Deputies).

At all events, under the present-day conditions the chances of the first case happening are small from both aspects of the situation--that is, the two large parties.

But, as we have said again, the selection will take place 3 months from now.

And one more detail. Almost simultaneous with the expiration of the term of office of K. Tsatsos, 5 years will have passed since the ratification of the Constitution. And consequently its revising, in its non-fundamental provisions, is immediately possible.

12114

SO: 4908

FOREIGN POLICY POSITIONS ANALYZED

Athens I VRAHNI in Greek 21 Jan 80 p 5

[Article by Vaseo Vasilicic]

[Text]

"In the midst of fear and suspicion
 With mind agitated and eyes frightened
 We despair and ponder what to do
 To escape the certain danger
 Which so horribly threatens us.
 And yet we are wrong: this threat is not in our path;
 False were the messages:
 (either we did not hear them or we misunderstood them)
 It was another disaster, one we never imagined,
 That violently, suddenly comes down on us
 And finding us unprepared--no time to prepare now--
 Swiftly sweeps us away."

K. P. Kavafis

We do not claim that our fears and suspicions of the danger that threatens us are similar to those described by Kavafis [who lived in Alexandria, Egypt]. But we are wrong if we believe that the greatest threat to us comes from the holy city of Qm or from Afghanistan.

1. Another sudden disaster may befall us from nearby and it should not find us unprepared. Note the high level Politburo meeting concerning the general alert in Yugoslavia and the repercussions which the possible departure of Tito will have in the Balkans.
2. We also have the "idea of March." All wings in the Chamber of Deputies must show a high sense of public responsibility. The transition moment will be critical...
3. It is not enough for the political world to condemn incidents such as the murder of police captain Petrou. It must also prevent destabilization by deed. Invisible manipulators are in action.

4. Misfortunes three times as great may befall us because the two major parties have diametrically different positions on foreign policy. This is something that has not happened in many decades. Whenever this happened in the past it brought us ruin...

5. How can we talk about national unity when this naive and narcissistic discord was reaffirmed by the speeches of opposition leaders on foreign policy?

6. This carelessness is not a good sign. The everyday nagging saps our energy. "The people know what is happening." Yet...

"Wise men can perceive what is coming in the future. Their hearing at times is disturbed while they are deep in serious study. They hear the secret thunder of coming events."

The "Soviet Encirclement"

For the opposition leader [A. Papandreu] "the turning of a cold war into a hot one," is a possibility. But such a war would destroy everything and everybody. Nobody wants it. But what is the thinking of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement [PASOK] on the way our country can best survive the economic upheaval with its democratic institutions intact?

a. Konstandinos Karamanlis has reached the conclusion that the whole of humanity has entered a period of mass insanity. Andreas Papandreu has also admitted that the world is going through a critical period, but...

b. While Karamanlis has emphasized that today there are people in conflict who not only have common interests but who are in the same ideological camp, Papandreu, although condemning the intervention in Afghanistan, has said, "What a pity for humanity that the USA took such decisive measures against the Soviet Union!..."

c. Let us not spend time arguing whether these measures are decisive or not, because if they are implemented they will not have our participation. It is a fact, however, that Papandreu (as though to atone himself for his inability to praise as a stylish act the Soviet invasion) revealed his deep resentment in his midnight speech against the western democracies. He regards as national humiliation the fact that we belong to this camp while, without even trying to keep up appearances, he said that the Soviet "intervention" in the Middle East and in Africa is not a disgrace. They do so, he said, because they want to counteract their encirclement.

d. But what "encirclement" [is he talking about]? That was Stalin's theme in the 1930's, while even Brezhnev has admitted that the Soviet encirclement existed before the [Second World] War!... The truth of the matter is that Moscow not only does not fear encirclement any longer but attempts to bring one about.

e. The fact that "communists attack communists, non-aligned attack non-aligned, whites attack whites, blacks attack blacks and so on," and the fact that "in our time the known ideologies have become bankrupt and are surrendering to obsolete nationalisms and unspeakable interests" are comprehensive truths that one would expect to hear from Papandreu who professes to be a "progressive" and who naturally should hate the "unspeakable interests." But he utters not a word. It was Karamanlis who stated these facts because he made an integral part of his political life his strong dislike of the forgers of the ideologies and because he has gained, with his policies, the trust of the non-aligned nations which often fall victim to unspeakable interests. On the other hand, Andreas Papandreu who pretends to be "non-aligned" decries in the Chamber of Deputies the fact that measures are being taken against those who destroy by fire and iron the national independence of even like-minded states.

With the Cards Laid on the Table

In the midst of the dangerous chaos prevailing in the world today our country's premier had clearly defined its foreign relations with clear understanding that "we live in the most sensitive area in the world." The foundations of our foreign policy have been broadened to the self-evident benefit of our people and of their security system, without ignoring the interrelation of foreign and domestic policy, an interrelation most Greek governments never took into account with consequences painful to all of us.

1. Even assuming that the PASOK chairman feels like a captive of the Marxist theory which considers foreign policy an instrument for the development of productive relationships, he ought to have remained faithful to his older views in favor of our induction into the West and especially into the Common Market.

2. Not only Marxists but even communist parties in the West have opted in favor of regional incorporation into the EEC whose productive capacity is acknowledged in practice even by the CEPA. While this national feat /Induction into the EEC/ is being bedeviled by a petty progressivism with the mantle of a "progressive," our people have not been fully told what kind of shrinkage our economy would have suffered had we remained outside, in the absence of an alternative solution. We will come back to this in greater detail.

3. Karamanlis' foreign policy succeeded in showing political imagination in the service of a national utilitarianism, rejecting the deeply-rooted conviction among politicians and diplomats--but also among the most sensitive strata of our population--that the bipolarity in today's world does not leave any room for initiatives and openings in the spectrum of our international relations.

4. The complex of our relations in the West, the Balkans, the Arab world and the two communist powers was based on the principle that "the worst policy is to be afraid to tell the truth to avoid displeasing someone." We showed political courage and came out ahead with our enlightening approach to even conflicting handlings of advanced strategy, because our sincerity was properly appreciated and because we laid our cards on the table.

Greediness of Power

We gained this credibility in the heightened complexity of international relations--in a period when even animosity is complex and friendship at times turns out to be too demanding to be friendly--because we convinced all sides that while we are not going to be easy prey to pressure tactics we are able to promote mutually advantageous relations.

a. Without ever forgetting that the interests of each state-member of the society of nations are at the base of the international relations, we always expressed our opposition to the greediness of power, especially where political power tends to level down the independence of another nation for the forceful takeover of strategic positions or natural resources.

b. One is surprised to hear that Papandreu appeared not to have heard Karamanlis' statement on his understanding of the balance of power and that he did not even know that we appealed three times to the Security Council on the Cypriot question. If indeed he did need the debate in the Chamber of Deputies to learn what every newspaper reader knows, then he is dangerously out of touch with Greek reality. But if his ignorance was merely a rhetorical pose, then he lowers as well as does injustice to himself because he creates a negative impression even in the mind of the most faithful listener.

c. In any event, it would be useful for him to remember that in addition to the three times Karamanlis went to the Security Council on the Cyprus question, he did not hesitate to appeal to the Human Rights Commission in 1957 charging Great Britain with the violation of rights in the tortured island.

As expected, the installation of Pershing II missiles and Cruise missiles became a controversial subject in the Chamber of Deputies. Andreas Papandreu called it "a coup de grace, an enormous blow against Moscow's leadership" and forecast that the "hardliners" will overthrow Brezhnev. For the time being, however, it was Brezhnev who sent the Red Army to Afghanistan.

Pershing and Cruise Missiles

The installation of Pershing and Cruise missiles is presented as part of the deterrent philosophy which is designed to discourage an adversary from precipitous action. However, the acceptance or rejection of this

philosophy is tied to national defense interests and the principle of national independence. In addition, it depends on our assessment of the balance and the risks to peace.

1. I am of the opinion that the deterrence which is based on the nuclear factor no longer belongs to the type of long-range duels between possible adversaries as was the case in previous confrontations. I would not question the fact that in the nuclear feuds of the superpowers the weak may be sucked in in spite of their interests. Even among the military alliances there are several views with regard to the opposing threat.
2. It is worth noting that RIZOSPASTIS, although acknowledging in its 14 December 1979 editorial that the Greek government went through a great deal of thinking and assessment of facts, nevertheless finds fault with the position the government has taken. What Papandreu said in the Chamber of Deputies is no different from the reactions of the Communist Party (KKE) on the same subject. He made a mistake claiming that the government supported the establishment of balance at the lowest level, while the installation of those missiles in Europe is a move upward rather than downward.
3. Karamanlis reminded him that in his talks in Moscow and Peking he underlined that to achieve equilibrium those who have more missiles must reduce their number and those who have less must increase their number.
4. Papandreu was the only person in the Chamber of Deputies to claim that he was learning about it for the first time while every Greek had heard about it through the mass media.

Equilibrium of Forces

The Greek assessment that the Brezhnev proposal should not be rejected outright was based from the outset on the condition that equilibrium of forces would be achieved and maintained. Although I am not sure that a journalist or even a minister of a small state can swear, from the limited knowledge he has, that such an equilibrium is verified and visible, in a last analysis the problem of whether negotiations should precede or follow the installation of the missiles is evidence of the deep suspicion that exists between the superpowers especially since the installation cannot take place for another 3 years.

- a. The rapid worsening of the international climate following the Soviet invasion [in Afghanistan] makes these suspicions even darker.
- b. The premier, speaking in the Chamber of Deputies, explained why once total disarmament is proved impossible, the only guarantee for peace is the equilibrium of forces. Greece took this position on the question of the middle-range missiles because it is well known that the Warsaw Pact Alliance has considerable superiority compared to that of the West.

c. But let us accept that this was not known to every politician nor to us journalists because even if we had special information we would not be able to prove it. Therefore, we should not be surprised that A. Papandreu did not know it since he had not read even the premier's statement on disarmament and since he did not even know that we had gone to the Security Council on Cyprus.

d. We are of the opinion that the government would not be adverse to giving him the data which lead to the conclusion that SALT II would have assured a relative equilibrium in the sector of strategic nuclear weapons. The fateful developments in Afghanistan have provoked the presidential suggestion that Congress postpone its ratification. It may even be completely cancelled...

e. In any event, with regard to conventional weapons, the most reliable Centers for Strategic Studies note great disparity to the disadvantage of the West. The following figures are noteworthy:

	NATO	Warsaw Pact
Armored Divisions	14	30
Motorized Divisions	20	57
Tanks	11,300	27,900
Artillery Pieces (all types)	6,200	14,000
Air Force (tactical)	3,313	5,700
Men	1,176,000	1,331,000

f. To offset this disparity, NATO has installed approximately 7,000 short-range nuclear warheads in Europe and all are for use on the battlefield. In other words, they are tactical, not strategic weapons.

g. But it is precisely in this sector that the Soviet Union has embarked in the last 2 years in the development of nuclear weapons designed to upset this equilibrium.

New Weapons

The new weapons which the Soviet Union has been producing and installing for the last 2 years include the missile SS-20 (which replaces the old SS-4 and SS-5) and the "Backfire" bomber. The Soviet Union has already installed in the European sector 60 SS-20 and 40 Backfire bombers and is expected to have in this area in the next decade (1985): 175-200 SS-20 and 70-100 Backfire bombers.

1. A comparison between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the sector of long-range battlefield weapons gives the following figures:

Warsaw Pact (USSR)

- a. Old missiles (1,900-4,000-kilometer range): 450
- b. Old bombers (2,800-3,100-kilometer range): 350
- c. New missiles (up to 4,400-kilometer range with multiple independently targeted warheads): 60
- d. New bombers (4,200-kilometer range): 40

NATO (European Members)

2. Compared to the above, the West today does not have any comparable long-range missile. It has only the following to fight off the corresponding Soviet weapons:

- a. Valkyrie bombers (up to 2,000-kilometer range): 56
- b. F-111 bombers (up to 1,800-kilometer range): 170

3. With the modernization program approved on 12 December 1979, NATO's European arsenal will include by 1984:

- a. Pershing II missiles (1,800-kilometer range): 108
- b. Cruise missiles (2,500-kilometer range): 444

4. Premier Karmannalis in his speech to the Chamber of Deputies presented the history-backed argument that superiority in weapons inevitably leads to the temptation of whoever is superior in flaunting his influence.

5. We could say that what has happened today in Asia could happen tomorrow in Europe unless the equilibrium of forces is restored.

6. Without a genuine will to have an equilibrium of forces, the correct theory that disarmament cannot result from the supercession of armaments loses its meaning. When the equilibrium is thrown overboard, the discussions on disarmament inevitably can last 30 years.

7. Premier Karmannalis' speech to the Chamber was a key statement with regard to our national course. Our analysis will be completed next Monday, built around the theme: What national disaster would we have faced had we followed a different policy?

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NATIONAL DEFENSE MINISTER ATTACKS MAJOR OPPOSITION PARTY

Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 21 Jan 80 p 14

[Text] The proceedings of the Third Regional Congress of the New Democracy Party has come to a close, with a proclamation by Minister of National Defense Ev. Averof, who stressed that this congress constitutes a significant demonstration of the democratic structure and the democratic procedures which the New Democracy Party follows, in contrast to other parties which despite their pronouncements do not seem to believe in these procedures. "I will not discuss," he said, "certain obstreperous shouters about democracy who have unmistakably demonstrated to us that they have taken deeply to heart the totalitarian systems. We have settled with these and have exposed them. But in the interests of the country, of democracy, and of truth, I will refer to another party. I mean PASOK [Panhellenic Socialist Movement]. Its democratic and party procedures are everywhere a monologue. A monologue accompanied by a masterly search for a compromise position, which is changing continuously. It changes from the supernationalistic 'scuttle the Khora,' to the statement that 'PASOK is a Marxist party without question.' The exact opposite was proclaimed a few months ago in Iraklion, Crete--namely, that PASOK is a party which believes in the functioning of all small and medium-sized businesses, in accordance with the rules of the free-market economy."

Continuing on, Mr Averof referred to the congress of PASOK in February 1979, which he said was not a real congress but a session of its Central Committee, because most of its members were appointed by this body.

"The resolution of the Central Committee," continued Averof, "which was forwarded to and adopted by the congress, is full of slogans which urge class warfare. The hour has come, says the resolution, 'for a new period filled with agitations for strikes.' Institutional changes which are made in the Chamber of Deputies are not enough for it--rather, it wants also the 'intervention of the people.' What is this popular intervention? What else but the marches, the agitations for strikes, the extra-institutional intrusions by arrogant minorities?

"This is PASOK's version of democracy, at a time indeed of dangerous economic crisis, a time of crisis which is touching all countries, even the richest ones, a time when the international political situation is becoming blurred. And it cannot be disputed that PASOK's policy, its actions, are impairing both the country's economic life and the security of the people.

"We ourselves place in opposition to this incomprehensible and dangerous PASOK," stressed Averof, "a genuinely democratic party. A party which is not in favor of class warfare, but in favor of the cooperation of the classes. A party which does not believe that, in terms of our nation's real situation, there are classes which are sociologically divided from one another."

Averof then stressed that only if the classes cooperate in a constructive way can they all prosper.

Furthermore, he charged Papandreu with cultivating an anti-Western attitude through flagrant inaccuracies. The truth is that only the democratic West stood out against the dictatorship, and that the resistance fighters, such as Papandreu himself, took refuge in the Western countries and received both political and material aid from them.

Papandreu has found extenuating circumstances for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, observed Mr Averof. "But what would he say if something happened in Yugoslavia and in Romania? Irresponsibility and fickleness are nowadays dangerous to the fortunes of the country.

"But, fortunately, those who have rallied within the "New Democracy" party are vigilant.

"- Because we are the party of order.

"- Because we are the party which took charge of a Greece which was isolated internationally and on a course of national calamities, a party which built up a Greece which is now advancing and is an organic and equal-standing member of the European Community.

"- Because we are the party which, standing outside the alignments of the two extremes, represents in substance the inclinations of almost all reasonable Greeks.

"And this is also a factor which should be noted well, since it has not been realized sufficiently.

"Under our capable leader, Konstandinos Karamanlis, under our leader of international repute, under the banners of the New Democracy, this party has united almost the entire political community, aside from the two extremes.

"There is a significant force on the extreme Left in fact, with which Karamanlis has never made common cause, as have many other supernaturalists today.

"There is an atrophied extreme Right in which the unrepentant junta element has a hand. An extreme Right which, even though it is powerless because of the electoral system, is helping PASOK and is thus cutting off the branch on which most of us Greeks are sitting.

"The true Greece exists entirely between these two extremes. The old Venizelosism and anti-Venizelosism have been done away with and have merged in the 'New Democracy.'"

Following this, Averof referred to the base murder of the policeman Petrou and the gendarme Stamoulis. He advised each congress member to read the manifesto which was tossed out at the scene of the crime. "He will see there," he said, "that it is overflowing with a negative attitude toward everybody, that it is teeming with brutal violence, that it springs from the passion of hatred.

"He will see that it calls for massive and violent mobilizations and other things similar to what are called for by various red brigades.

"Thus, it is necessary for us to reply to these things, both as to their method and as to the persons involved.

"As for the method. Violent mobilizations lead to a deterioration in the life of the people, and for this reason we are opposed to them."

Continuing on, Mr Averof underscored the deep economic crisis which mankind is passing through, and along with it Greece as well. "Whatever the difficulties may be," he stressed, "I firmly believe that we will gradually overcome them. The course of a country's economic affairs is a complex process. It is affected quite directly by many factors which often elude our control. It is affected by fluctuations in prices, by the social and political crises in other countries, by the strikes, by the level of the harvests, by the psychological reactions of the majority of the people, by natural disasters, by the decisions of governments, and by other factors.

"But I firmly believe that our fragile little ship will sail past the stormy promontory, and I believe further that as long as major events abroad do not upset the existing conditions, we will overcome the crisis. With Konstandinos Karamanlis as our leader, and with our firm rallying around him, we will continue to deal with the problems of the country in the best possible way. And we are certain that soon we will steer our ship into a calm and easy-sailing port."

BRIEFS

FINANCING POLICY--There was further analysis this week of the monetary position. Financing of the economy during 1980 will be Dracmae 210,000,000,000 higher than in 1979 when the increase over 1978 financing had been Drs 215,000,000,000. With 1979 inflation, according to certain estimates, approaching 25%, it becomes obvious that total 1980 financing of the Greek economy will, in effect, be less than in 1979. The lion's share of 1980 available funds will be used to finance the public sector, on the basis of the hard-worn cliché of its supposedly "inflexible" needs. Thus, the public sector is to absorb Drs 113,000,000,000 more than it did in 1979 when the increase over 1978 had been Drs 104,000,000,000. The private sector will be receiving in 1980 only Drs 90,000,000,000 more than it did in 1979 when the increase over 1978 had been Drs 111,000,000,000. It does not require a mathematician or a fiscal expert to see from the figures quoted above that wages and salaries of the nonproductive civil service and of the overstuffed, underproductive public utility corporations and state enterprises will be depriving the country's productive classes of an even larger slice of the capital needed for them to generate taxable wealth. This cannot but rebound on public revenue in the near future. At some stage, the alternative will have to be faced. Either so-called "inflexible" expenditure will have to be axed or the mint will be called upon to print more banknotes because, any attempt to extort more taxes from the current earnings of the private sector or any more special levies on its capital have shown that the stage has been attained when a fall, not an increase, in real revenue results, as taxable income shrinks. [Text] [Athens HELLENES EXPRESS in English 10 Jan 80 p 1]

BAUXITE EXPORTS--Bauxite export licenses are being issued for 1980 as follows: 650,000 tons to EEC; 650,000 tons to USSR (hard currency); 900,000 tons to Rumania (barter clearing); 50,000 tons to Czechoslovakia (barter clearing); 50,000 tons to Bulgaria (barter clearing); 50,000 tons to Eastern Germany (barter clearing); and 45,000 tons to Poland (barter clearing). [Text] [Athens HELLENES EXPRESS in English 10 Jan 80 p 6]

TOURIST TRAFFIC--If no major world upheaval occurs this year, tourist traffic to Greece is expected to repeat the satisfactory 1979 growth

rate. This conclusion is being drawn from the trend of bookings recorded for 1980 during the closing weeks of 1979. Visitors to Greece from Yugoslavia numbered 450,000 during the first 10 months of 1979. The total by 31st December 1979, is almost sure to have touched 600,000. A high proportion of these visitors cross the border by car several times a year for shopping purposes at Thessaloniki and return home after a very brief stay. [Text] [Athens HELLENEWS EXPRESS in English 10 Jan 80 p 6]

CSO: 4920

SOVIET AMBASSADOR INTERVIEWED ON TRADE RELATIONS WITH ITALY

Rome IL SETTIMANALE in Italian 28 Dec 79 pp 107-110

[Interview with Nikita Ryzhov, Soviet ambassador to Italy, by Giancarlo Panarella: "A Hundred Thousand Italians Are Working for Us"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] In an exclusive interview with IL SETTIMANALE, Nikita Ryzhov, Soviet ambassador to Italy, sets forth the problems and prospects of economic collaboration between his country and Italy. He also addresses the 10-year program ending next year, and new areas of cooperation.

In the context of the prospects for economic collaboration between Italy and the Soviet Union, IL SETTIMANALE's interview with the Soviet ambassador to Italy, Nikita S. Ryzhov, has a particular relevance. Ambassador Ryzhov is an authoritative spokesman for the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, a collaborator with Kosygin at the time when new economic and productive directions were taken, and minister of light industry; he has a degree in engineering and has outstanding managerial experience from having directed important industrial complexes. He has been in Italy for 14 years.

[Question] Mr Ambassador, agreements on economic, commercial, industrial, and scientific cooperation have been essential means of increasing exchanges between our countries. What have been and continue to be their essential features?

[Answer] I think it would be a good contractual base, which would lead to prolific long-term development in the relations between our two countries. I would like to emphasize that the trade and navigation treaty signed by the USSR and Italy on 11 December 1948 still retains its full value as a basic document in regulating the trade relations between our countries. In particular, the treaty provides reciprocal most-favored-nation status. It has laid the legal bases and opened the way for the development of Soviet-Italian economic relations.

The economic documents signed in the following years between the USSR and Italy have made our business cooperation mutually convenient, long-lasting, sizeable and foresightful.

Speaking to the voters of the Bauman district in Moscow on 2 March 1979, Leonid Brezhnev said that economic relations between the countries of Europe are tending to become more stable and that the USSR had recently concluded a number of long-term economic agreements with a series of Western countries. In this context, Leonid Brezhnev emphasized that "such agreements are like the East and West's making joint investments in a sphere of vital importance and common interest, which is maintaining and consolidating international peace."

The various forms of advantageous reciprocal cooperation--commerce, productive collaboration, contacts in the technical-scientific field and other areas--are helping create the material fabric that will strengthen peaceful relations in Europe. At the same time, the development of economic cooperation between countries with different social systems depends mostly on how expeditiously detente is carried forward. In our opinion, the new arms race spiral that the NATO countries intend to launch may have a negative influence on the development of mutually advantageous cooperation between European countries.

[Question] What are the most relevant changes?

[Answer] Since the commercial and navigation treaty was signed, our countries' economic potential has increased considerably, which has favored both the growth of Soviet-Italian trade and the development of cooperation in the various industrial sectors, not to mention exchange in the technical-scientific field and other areas: all that makes our economic achievements all the richer and more varied. However, foreign trade continues to be the fundamental relationship between our economies. The results of cooperation in the fields of industry, science, and technology are manifested, in the final analysis, in the channels of foreign trade.

The Soviet orders placed in Italy favor the accelerated development of individual sectors of the Soviet economy and at the same time keep Italian business productive plant occupied and help solve the employment problem that has recently been getting worse on the peninsula. According to our calculations, Soviet orders assure the employment of about a hundred thousand blue- and white-collar Italian workers full-time for at least a year.

Exports from the Soviet Union also play an important part in the Italian economy because they meet an important part of industry's needs in energy and raw materials.

Emphasis should be placed on the particular value to the Italian economy of Soviet supplies of products in the energy sector; these have been increasing noticeably now that the energy crisis has worsened.

[Question] What is the twilight zone of cooperation?

[Answer] Unfortunately the development of economic collaboration between our countries also has negative aspects.

A serious obstacle to the distribution of some Soviet-made items on the Italian market, especially from the mechanical industry, is the fact that quantitative limitations are still in effect in Italy.

It should be emphasized that when the long-term trade agreement was signed on 15 January 1970, Italy expressed its intention of eliminating quantitative limitations on commercial imports from the USSR before it expired, i.e. by 1 January 1975.

But this intention has so far not been carried out.

Among the exports from the USSR to Italy in recent years, about 40 kinds of goods accounting for about 20 percent of the total of Soviet shipments have been reduced by the Italian import licensing office.

Given the great difficulty of meeting Italian needs in hydrocarbons, their importation from the socialist countries was liberalized beginning on 3 August 1979. But licensing was extended to goods that have been traditionally exported from the USSR to Italy or that seem to have good prospects (cast iron, iron alloys, steel, aluminum, ball bearings, cotton fabrics, some kinds of machines, equipment, and certain other goods).

The protectionist provisions adopted in Italy along with the other EEC countries at the beginning of 1978 to limit imports of ferrous metals, textile products, and clothing are having a negative effect on the corresponding Soviet goods. Following the introduction of these restrictions, the Soviet concern Promsyrioimport, which is the major buyer of metallurgical products in Italy, was unable to supply the Italian market with rolled steel and with gas and water pipes in 1978.

Beyond that, I think a good outcome of the negotiations between CEMA [Council for Economic Mutual Assistance] and the EEC would exert a positive influence on the future development of Soviet-Italian economic collaboration.

[Question] Since the recent agreements were signed, there has been talk of a "new frontier" in collaboration, of "new openings." Some of them could be "joint ventures," especially toward third countries. What are the other possible forms?

[Answer] The development of new forms of business relations between our countries should be enhanced by the new long-term program for increasing the economic, technical, and industrial collaboration between the USSR and Italy up to 1990, which is scheduled to be signed next year.

One of the main areas of collaboration between the USSR and Italy is industry. I think that the forms of agreement in the field of industry could be:

- collaboration in the construction of industrial complexes in the USSR and Italy, and especially in the modernization and development of existing plants;
- collaboration in the construction of industrial plants in the USSR and Italy on the basis of compensation;
- the development of industrial cooperation between Soviet and Italian organizations and companies, including "joint ventures," to meet the requirements of the USSR and Italy and to trade with third countries;
- performance of services connected with industrial production, such as planning industrial complexes, scientific research, and the like.

I think efforts should be made to increase and extend collaboration especially in such fields as agriculture, transportation, etc. that are of interest to our countries.

[Question] Do the "new openings" also take into consideration new or different financial arrangements?

[Answer] Of course, the extension of trade also involves the extension of credit.

It should be noted that in recent years, when contracts for compensation were signed, only the reciprocal granting of credits was provided for. The Soviet Union follows this policy in its relations with other countries.

[Question] If the reciprocal cooperation mechanism increases in quality, will more room have to be made for the importation of Soviet industrial products into Italy?

[Answer] The increasing quality of our mutual collaboration presupposes an increase in the role of finished products, beginning with machinery and equipment, in Soviet exports to Italy.

[Question] Despite our country's being in third place in trade volume with the Soviet Union, there have been complaints in some quarters that not enough is known about economic opportunities in the Soviet Union, especially for small and medium Italian businessmen?

[Answer] Soviet statistical data show that the development of trade between our countries has slowed in recent years. One of the factors is the decreased competitiveness of various Italian goods and, especially, worsening conditions of supply. This concerns, for example, some kinds of machines and equipment and light-industry products, beginning with footwear and including lemons and wine.

I want to emphasize particularly that in the choice of trading partner, Soviet foreign-trading companies and others do not distinguish between small, medium, and large businesses. As a rule, they consider the partner's trustworthiness, the prices of his goods, and their quality.

We think it is important for Italian economic representatives to acquaint themselves soon with the USSR's 5-year and annual economic development plans so that they can make a positive contribution to economic collaboration between our countries. For a better Italian economic and political orientation as regards prospects for Soviet economic development, we are having sent to the ministers, businesses and public sectors concerned our tentative plans and the plans already approved by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. But it is also important that the appropriate Italian authorities also inform at an early date the appropriate Soviet sectors and particularly the Soviet representative to Italy concerning the plans approved by the Italian parliament for the development of your country's economy and the individual sectors. An early mutual awareness of the facts concerning plans for developing the economies of the USSR and Italy on the part of the sectors and enterprises concerned will contribute to the future development of mutually advantageous collaboration between our countries.

[Question] The Soviet market, if I may say so, presents difficulties to businesses, particularly in terms of the time and effort needed to open it up to new products. Does the creation of small- and medium business consortiums seem to you to be a sufficient measure? What other promotional measures do you think are indispensable? How can there be more coordination between Italian exports and Soviet development programs?

[Answer] We find interesting the declaration made on 12 September 1979 by Luigi Deserti, president of the Italian Foreign Trade Institute, concerning the necessity of establishing in this country strong societies for foreign trade based on the united forces of the banks, regional financial societies, and consortiums of small and medium businesses. We think these societies could not only promote exports but also operate in the field of exports.

I would like to urge Italian society to show more spirit of initiative and enterprise in the promotion of their products on the Soviet market and in acquiring Soviet-made goods. There are a lot of aspects to this work. It includes such aspects as active participation in expositions in the USSR, advertising, improving the conditions of supply, etc. In this context, I would like to recall that Italy has not held national expositions in the USSR since 1968. In general, Italian societies should spread knowledge of their products on the Soviet market in order to increase exports to the Soviet Union.

We think that Italian businesses hoping to participate actively in the development in economic collaboration between our countries should contact the trade representative of the USSR, the Italian Society for Soviet Participation and the Joint Italian-Soviet Chamber of Commerce (CCIS).

The CCIS, which was founded in 1964 in Milan and has about 350 members at present, has had a representative in Moscow since 1972. It is working actively to bring to the attention of Italian businesses and Soviet agencies for foreign trade what the markets of both countries are, and it is contributing to the extension of Soviet-Italian trade.

It should be remembered that our foreign-trade agencies are closely tied to various sectors of our economy participating in foreign trade. In addition to the management of these agencies, industry representatives also participate. Therefore it is necessary to make contact with the appropriate agencies for foreign trade in the USSR.

[Question] Despite difficulties, economic interdependence appears to be growing. Besides ways of doing things, are there also new areas of industrial and commercial collaboration between the two countries? I am thinking in particular of programs for developing Siberia.

[Answer] There are presently negotiations going on between Soviet agencies and Italian businesses concerning the possibility of collaborating on a series of large, new plants in various sectors of the industry in Siberia, among other places.

The practical realization of this collaboration will be possible only if and when the technical and commercial conditions proposed by Italy are competitive and advantageous in comparison to those of other countries.

8782

CSD: 3104

PRI'S COMPAGNA INTERVIEW ON PROBLEMS OF THE SOUTH

Rome IL SETTIMANALE in Italian 10 Jan 80 pp 82-84

[Interview with former Public Works Minister Francesco Compagna by Felice Fiore]

[Text] In talking to the new chairman of the Inter-parliamentary Commission for the South, we took up the topics of the debate now in progress on Southern policy for the Eighties. Regarding the theses of the PCI [Italian Communist Party], he told us: "That would be the same thing as giving macaroni with ragu to a newborn." A Republican deputy in four legislatures, a former public works minister, 58, from Naples, a full professor of political geography and economics, Francesco Compagna is one of the most seasoned students of Southern problems. His ideas, in addition to those presented in NORD E SUD, will now also help him in his new job as chairman of the Interparliamentary Commission on Problems of the South. IL SETTIMANALE interviewed him in his new office.

Question: Some time ago you said that the idea of industrializing the South has gotten hung up. Why?

Answer: There is geographic redistribution of the industrial areas now under way according to which industries with simpler technology are switching to countries with the lowest labor costs, such as those of the Third World and Eastern Europe, while countries with a more advanced technology tend to take the place of the former in the traditional areas of European industrialization. The South is being skipped in this process because it is not in fact involved in this redistribution.

Question: Because of what factors?

Answer: Because Italy's South has labor costs equal to those of the Ruhr and economic-social conditions which do not correspond to that.

Question: But do you think that what has been done here in the meantime is or is not significant?

Answer: Undoubtedly, yes. In spite of everything and although, in recent years, we went through a period which we might call a period of "industrial counterrevolution," characterized by the kind of action that hindered the process of development, such as bitter labor union conflicts, the South did make progress also from the industrial viewpoint.

Question: What can we deduce from that?

Answer: That our Southern policy did not fail in attaining its goals, even within the limitations of an unfavorable situation.

Question: What are the most appreciable results?

Answer: We are now getting some of the answers which we have been looking for and awaiting for some time. We have been knocking on doors for a long time and now some of the Southern business operators are beginning to open their doors.

Question: I believe that this concerns an old idea of yours which was brought up several years ago.

Answer: Precisely. I always maintained that the Southern business operator was not interested, not because he was against industrial initiatives, but because he was distracted by easier opportunities to make money from construction activities which existed during the Fifties and Sixties. When these possibilities declined, the Southern entrepreneur turned to manufacturing activities which however, to a great extent and for well-known reasons, were forced to go into the "hidden economy."

Question: Nevertheless, the statistics supplied in the latest report by Censis show that these involved not only activities in the hidden economy.

Answer: This phenomenon is on the decline at this time, fortunately. One of the most important points in the Censis report is that it evidences the "fastest-growing" parts of the South, such as Caserta, Teramo, and Bari. A few years ago, for example, the area of Caserta, located between Rome and Naples, was considered an ideal area for industrial development based on medium-sized enterprises, branches of other companies from the North.

Many other local initiatives sprang up around them. But in this case likewise, the brakes deriving from the "industrial counterrevolution" prevented any further developments here.

Question: Should we now plan future action on the basis of the model of the industries that sprang up in these "fastest-growing" areas?

Answer: Exactly. We must approach this with a "medium-sized enterprise" orientation, applicable both to industrialization and urban development. In other words, medium-sized industry and medium-sized cities. So far, our industrial system, especially in the South, has been characterized either by gigantic outfits or by tiny outfits. What we have to work toward is medium-sized industry, regardless of whether it is the fruit of business support and contributions from the North, or the result of selection and promotion of small industry in the South.

Question: In your opinion, is this now the best way to go in order to take further steps forward?

Answer: This is one way, not an easy one, but it leads forward. I must say however that we must also go into a serious examination and objective verification of the entire Southern policy pursued so far, without allowing ourselves to be taken over by the numerous commonplaces usually encountered in any polemic.

Question: Which ones, for example?

Answer: When people talk about "cathedrals in the desert?" what are they referring to? There have undoubtedly been some forced measures in terms of industrialization, when people wanted to conceal the unsound character of industrial investments, which were designed to compensate for the slowdown in sound and productive investments.

Question: The hundreds of billions spent by SIR certainly were not sound investments.

Answer: They must be condemned, just as we must condemn the successive decisions made for Gioia Tauro. But the steel mill complex at Taranto, indicated as emblematic of the policy of "cathedrals in the desert," should not be condemned. When it was designed and programmed, it was a very sound investment and this still holds true. Let us not forget that Taranto and its hinterland is one of the areas that can boast of an average income comparable to that in many cities of the North.

Question: In its polemic against the Southern policy, the PCI indicates that the so-called "pork barrel projects" constitute another example of useless waste of funds. Is this also a "commonplace?"

Answer: On that score, I agree with what Mannino said in his interview given to IL SETTIMANALE. The South needed everything and those projects were absolutely not wasted. To whatever sector they were directed, they could not fail to produce effective benefits.

Question: The communists say that there have been cases of patronage.

Answer: This brings us to another commonplace. People are forgetting as a matter of fact that patronage is the other side of unemployment and of pressing and unsatisfied needs. Let us give work to the South and patronage, as in the North, will involve only transfers and promotions. As far as big financing transactions are concerned, we must remember that the Fund for the South, although it had administered thousands of billions, was never involved in scandals such as those that embroiled other agencies responsible for managing public money and accused of having gotten financial allocations on the basis of decisions that were not always properly considered. But when Gabriele Pescatore, who is now president of the Fund, found himself having to deal with one of the requests from the SIR, he turned to the Council of State.

Question: After 30 years, however, people are again beginning to think about special action and projects and the instrument involved, that is to say, the Fund. What is your opinion?

Answer: I see the Fund transformed into a single agency, organized on three levels. One level would be the planning level, available to the regions, for sector or special projects; another one would be available to the federal government, for major and complex actions; the third level finally should be concerned with relations with European regional policy.

Question: This would thus not be a simple change of name from Fund to Agency but rather a substantial change.

Answer: It will be transformed radically, regaining also that autonomy which was contained in its original blueprint, the one prepared by Donato Manichella. The Fund must have ideas, a capacity to submit proposals, even before it does its planning.

Question: You hold a view that is the exact opposite of the thesis of the PCI which wants to give all powers in the matter of special action to the regions.

Answer: This is as if we wanted to give macaroni with ragu to a newborn, without waiting for the child's stomach to be ready to digest this kind of food. The regions must do what they are capable of doing, regardless of whether that is little or much, and they have to stop asking for ever more powers and controls. Let us first of all make them strong and then I will be the first to ask that their doses and the quality of their food be increased. We must stop accepting and supporting their headlong rush.

Question: How do you think the Southern policy will fit into the country's general policies?

Answer: If Southern compatibility continues to be mistreated, the results which may be achieved will be neutralized. The Pandolfi document, for example, was seriously Southern-oriented. It was based on a recovery of the conditions necessary for reviving investment and employment. That is the philosophy we must return to.

Question: What effect will the latest oil price rise, adopted by the OPEC, have on investments and employment?

Answer: The Caracas decisions should persuade us to examine our problems with greater realism. Let us take the sliding scale: Should we really not touch it? Such as it stands now, it is antisouthern. Do we want to sterilize it at least regarding the effects of petroleum price increases?

Question: In your view, what role will the ministry and the Inter-parliamentary Commission, whose chairman you are, play? Some people have been asking that it be abolished.

Answer: They are useful if they play in center-field but they will be no good at all if they are kept out in left field. They must in other words have the task of proceeding to the formation and development of political decisions and they must not be forced to absorb the blows from the various forces, such as the labor unions and the regions, which often oppose them. In particular, regarding the commission chaired by me, it must not be confined to having to tackle the false problem of: Fund, yes; Fund, no. Personally, as I told you, I am in favor of the agency with three levels, in other words, I am in favor of updating it in terms of continuity. But the Commission should derive and not presuppose that solution from a carefully considered recognition of all of the conditions involved in the development of the South.

Question: This will call for a long and in-depth effort.

Answer: We are already at work. I have assigned to some Commission members the task of looking into the following topics: Water, energy, scientific research, soil conservation, and credit. In doing so, I do not want to achieve any purpose other than to be able to propose, not resolutions or agenda, but indications and suggestions to be circulated both in Parliament and outside among the interested subjects. On the other hand, classical Southernism from Fortunato to Nitri and Salvemini, was sustained by a sense of reality, enriched by Giovanni Amendola, at first, and by Ugo La Malfa, later, with the addition of the other fundamental element: The sense of the state. And this is a tradition that must be restored.

5038

CSO: 3104

HARSH CRITICISM OF DC BY CATHOLIC JOURNAL

Rome L'UNITA in Italian 1 Feb 80 p 2

[Article: "Jesuits in the DC: Punish the Scandals; Reinvigorate the Party"]

[Text] In the imminent congress, it must "clarify its basic choices."

Rome--A harsh criticism of the DC [Christian Democratic Party], aimed at "a certain habit of the party," at "a certain lack of ideals," at "scandals and dishonest procedures," is the point of departure for a commentary that CIVILTA CATTOLICA [CATHOLIC CIVILIZATION], the authoritative periodical of the Jesuits, devotes to the most general theme regarding relations between the party and the Catholic world.

The DC, says the editorial, characterizes itself as a "party of Christian inspiration": but today, after Vatican Council II, "the meaning of this denomination must be understood differently from in the past...After the Council such a party can no longer present itself as the 'party of the Catholics' but 'a party of Catholics'...who are operating in the political field, as an aconfessional party and for political purposes that are heedful of the benefit of the political community." But precisely in the light of this criterion, the Jesuit periodical wonders if the DC is truly a party of "Christian inspiration" understood as such. And it recalls that according to some scholars, it has ceased to be this, having rather changed into a "lay party" as a consequence of having altered its "popular" characteristics, to become the expression "of the moderate and conservative classes."

The Jesuit periodical then comments: "We cannot help but regretfully mention the displeasure and the disillusionment provoked among the very sensitive electorate by a certain political habit of the DC, that in many cases appears more preoccupied with personal, material interests, the current trend, and the winning and preservation of power than with the good of the country; a certain lack of ideals and of perspectives which...

support the charge that the DC is essentially a party in 'pursuit of power'; and especially scandals and dishonest procedures."

As a consequence of these considerations, CIVILTA CATTOLICA indicates the tasks that should be taken up by the imminent XIV Congress of the DC. On this occasion, it should "clarify its basic choices and resume the work of re-establishing itself," if it wants to earn the characterization of a party "of Christian inspiration, a reformer party, a party of the people," one that has the approval of Catholics, but not as a "given fact," no longer "automatic and acritical."

9255

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UNIONS PREDICT DRAMATIC INCREASE IN UNEMPLOYMENT

Rome IL SETTIMANALE in Italian 24 Jan 80 pp 6-9

[Article by Amedeo Lanucara: "The 'Dunkirk' of the Labor Unions"]

[Text] We interviewed the officials of the three federations. Their forecasts are catastrophic: 600,000 unemployed over the next several months, with the government powerless to do anything about it. Lamm, Carniti, and Benvenuto responded to the strikes but the attack is blind and disordered. In the meantime, the CGIL [Italian General Confederation of Labor] is again under the thumb of the PCI [Italian Communist Party]. So, here we are at the "Dunkirk" of the labor unions. The country is on its knees, unemployment is knocking on the door, wages are gobbled up by inflation, strikes are becoming more and more unpopular, and the administration is extremely weak and absenteeist. The days of wine and roses are over, the times when any demand seemed permitted even though it may have been incompatible with real resources; when any reference to the busy ant was branded as an antiprogressive provocation. Be sure, then, that you do not want "everything right away" as part of a mad race toward dissipation; be sure you do not chirp like an insolent cicada. The sociologists, perhaps with reason, will debate on the fact that the demands of the workers during the decade of 1968-1978 could not be held down after centuries of violent consumer restrictions and unfulfilled hopes. But this is not why there is a decline in the historical responsibility (and lack of foresight) of the leading class, guided by the instincts of the masses, instead of making sure that there would be growth. Pierre Carniti, 43, from Cremona, secretary-general of the CISL [Italian Confederation of Labor Unions], for a long time was the charismatic leader of the metalworkers, a Catholic populist with a touch of heresy in the DC [Christian Democratic Party].

Question: What has been your most immediate concern, among many others?

Answer: Another 600,000 unemployed over the next several months, perhaps also by March.

Question: Was this figure given to you by Cossiga?

Answer: No, we passed it on to Cossiga. The administration has no statistics, no figures, no proposals.

Question: What did Cossiga reply?

Answer: Nothing. He took some notes. And he told us that, in 1980, we might be short 25 out of the 103 billion [as published] tons of crude which we absolutely need for the Italian economy.

Question: What did you reply to that?

Answer: We presented a study of our own: A ban on using cars on Sunday would have an effect of 1 percent on fuel consumption; a driving ban in the old downtown sections would cut consumption by 0.20 percent.

Question: And what did the administration say to that?

Answer: Nothing, nothing at all. It is not our fault that this administration does not exist and does not work.

Question: What do you expect for the period after Cossiga?

Answer: An administration of national unity which will manage to respond to this dramatic crisis in an adequate fashion.

Question: Does that not mean playing into the hands of the PCI?

Answer: We are not interested in the formula through which unity is achieved. We only want to make sure that there is unity.

Question: This is a less rough way of turning to collateralism.

Answer: So long as we have the CISL, there will be no collateralism.

This is a matter of pride which is denied by the facts. But since the labor union has been under the control of the parties and their currents, it has never before been so divided into "proconsular provinces" of the various political leaders.

Melino Pillitteri, secretary-general of the CISL in Lombardy in contrast to Pierre Carniti, clearly disagreed on the typical formula of the

Italian labor union movement which in his opinion can be summarized in the slogan "The party is the prince and the labor union is his vassal." The credibility crisis of the labor unions, he added, is due to the "progressive decline in autonomy which so to speak is a part of the strategy of the historical compromise." And here is the corollary to that: The practice of formal and inconclusive consultations with the administration has taken hold, "consultations designed to reduce the labor unions to a consultative body and, worse than that, a body sharing in the joint management of the do-nothing system."

Here is Pillitteri's conclusion: "The labor unions had better stick to their own business. They should do that in the factories, in the territories, throughout the country, by means of an action that is always in keeping with its decisions and the demands of the workers, without any delegation of authority to the political framework and without supporting one party or another."

Giorgia Benvenuto, secretary-general of the UIL (Italian Labor Union) (See the interview published in these pages) likewise has no doubts: "Neocollateralism does exist and has a specific birthdate: The summer of 1976 at the time of the Andreotti administration, when the PCI abstained. The UIL immediately underscored the risk that the labor unions might become the supporter of a certain political setup."

No different are the fears of the CISL minority (headed by Deputy Secretary-General Franco Marini) and many factory delegates (or labor union activists) who for years have been fighting, believing in the myth of unity and labor union autonomy, and today feel that they have somehow been betrayed.

Map of Division

Let us look at the various factions which the labor unions have been broken up into. The CGIL today seems to be the federation that is most permeated by collateralism also because secretary-general Luciano Lama, an orthodox Berlinguer man, makes no mystery of his rigid party discipline. His is the most consistent group which dominates the key post in the organization, entrusted to Rinaldo Ossola.

Here are some other factions.

(a) The Trentin-Garavini group, supported by Pio Gallo, leader of the metal workers, and strong fringe groups of the chemical industry workers and the textile industry workers, subscribe to Ingrao-style workerism which does not intend either to promote the entry of the PCI into the administration, nor to work for the survival of the system. This group however was pushed to the sidelines after the violent anti-worker speech by Giorgio Amendola.

(b) The leader of the socialists in the CGIL is Agostino Marianetti, the political offspring of Claudio Signorile, the forceful supporter of the communists in the administration. And here is the logical consequence: The CGIL is today guided by the Lama-Marianetti alliance, with the socialists who accept a subordinate role with respect to the communists.

(c) Marianetti, however, must be on guard on the left against a group that is attracted more by Trentin rather than by Lama, headed by Masucci, of the textile workers, and Vigevano of the chemical industry workers; and on the right he must guard against the faithful followers of Craxi who have mounted a counteroffensive, rallying around the three deputy secretaries-generals, Bellocchio (Milan Chamber), Mezzanotte (farm laborers), and Giorgi (construction workers). Some leaders of the labor union locals--such as Carlo Marchesi--worried about the internal lacerations within the PSI (Italian Socialist Party)--might try the difficult job of patching things up, along the pattern of De Michelis.

At least three viewpoints have for some time been coexisting in the CISL (and that is no mystery to anybody); with varying success, Carniti is trying to lead those three viewpoints toward unity: The "78ers," who are above all strong in the FIM and in the industrial triangle, with the appendix of Mestre-Venice; the minority of Marini-Sartori, who feels tied to the DC, with an eye to Donat Cattin; a small socialist fringe, which itself is split up among the various party currents.

In the UIL, the leadership of Giorgio Benvenuto, a socialist with a strong margin for independence, was never under discussion, although Mattina (metal workers) and Mucciarelli (construction workers) feel rather close to Signorile. The significance of the Republicans is increasingly modest. And the social democratic current is on the rise.

Automatic Membership Card Issue

In this context, does it make any sense to talk about labor union autonomy? And are the workers ready to follow an organization that is racked by political warfare? Do not the errors of the past, combined with present difficulties, irremediably cloud the image of the labor union?

The cry of alarm comes from a source that is beyond suspicion. Rinaldo Scheda, an orthodox communist, federation secretary of the CGIL, is in charge of organization. "The CGIL membership during the year which has just ended," he said, "numbered 4,450,493, with an increase of 21,531 persons organized, as compared to 1978. It is true the slight increase is due to the thousands of new members of the federation among the retirees but it is also true that, during a year that was difficult in political and general economic terms, a year that was contradictory in the labor union field, the CGIL demonstrated that it was able to preserve its links also with the active workers, except for very minor changes in some categories and in some regions."

But is this not somewhat of a ritual way of seeing things? Is it possible to use tougher and more truthful language? "Labor union membership recruiting," Scheda maintains, "is increasingly losing the political significance which distinguished it for decades. In recent years, the renewal of membership cards and the recruiting drive for new members represented a worthwhile means for checking on the degree, the dimensions of consensus, the participation of the workers in the life of every organization. Well, we are dealing here with a bureaucratic adulteration of the membership drive because of the way in which the workers join the unions."

In what sense? To a great extent membership renewal is now an automatic thing, a purely administrative matter, because the cost of the annual membership card is included in the labor union dues which the company takes out of the pay envelope of those workers who indicated the organization to which they belong. The workers reports his membership in a particular union to the enterprise only once because in many cases the membership is renewed during successive years in a tacit manner. As a matter of fact, without any explicit notification to the contrary, the company "continues to withhold the amount involved down through the years, without interruption."

Here are the consequences of this. "The labor union dues are in danger from being converted from a conscious act of support by the worker, towards his own union, into a kind of payment for the service which the labor union organization provides, while the annual membership card issue operation in fact becomes a purely formal thing because it is not validated by a specific, explicit moment which would enable every organized worker to express his own true confirmation of support." So much for all of that so-called democracy in the factories.

Scheda's remarks appeared to be technical but in substance they were political. Shelving standardized membership procedures, without mentioning them by name, as employed throughout many years of battles by the metal workers and the so-called "more advanced worker categories," he rather heavily turns to an ideological characterization, in other words, a political characterization, of both the old militant and the new recruit. In practice he accepts the integralist line of Amendola which, deep down, is expressed like this: Unity works well when the PCI goes along but it does not work well if there is a risk that it might reduce its capacity for hegemonic expansion over the entire working class. Or if problems are created for the official party line.

Today, the PCI points to the privileged relationship with the entrepreneurs and the world of high finance, to get backup support from them in view of the latest push to the Palace which is now disintegrating. Communist Party headquarters therefore cannot accept the remarks by FIGET [Federation of Those Employed in Metallurgical Industries] secretary-general Pio Galli, an Ingrao-style communist, who is against a radical

revision of shifts, both afternoon and night-time, aimed at maximum utilization of plant facilities in the northern areas. According to Galli, such a line would undermine the possibility of extending the production base and employment in the South which after all was the objective of the restrictions on the utilization of plant facilities in the North, established by contract."

The PCI cannot accept this approach because otherwise it would expose itself to the ouster of Giorgio Benvenuto in terms of realism and responsibility; nor can it come up with a drastic excommunication because of the good standing which the advocates of maximalism have among a large segment of the CISL. It was not just for nothing that Franco Bertinoglio, secretary-general of FIM, in something like a well-prepared counterpoint to Pio Galli rather harshly criticized the dialog between the United Federation and Confindustria [General Confederation of Italian Industry]. "The objective of the confrontation," he says, "must be an exchange of opinions. It would be a mistake to adopt the logic of understandings and protocols already experimented with and that would have the kinds of consequences which we are only too familiar with." In this way, he added, we would "directly arrive at forms of summation which break the bond between the labor union apparatus and the worker rank and file, creating waste of tremendous scope and, by the way, not producing any concrete results in terms of productivity."

The bitter debates inside the labor union will get worse if the debate is extended to the international context. At Genoa, the brutal Soviet invasion of Afghanistan for the first time in 10 years broke up the Federation's united front. The CGIL was on one side and the CISL-UIL were on the other side, as during the Fifties, and they came out with two different manifestos. The former (CGIL), is rather bland, without any condemnations or dissent regarding Moscow; it was confined to "feeling that direct military interference in domestic political and military conflicts in Afghanistan constitutes an open violation of the most elementary principles of independence"; this was stated without specifying who engaged in this kind of "interference"; the Soviet Union is not mentioned a single time. The manifesto of the CISL-UIL on the other hand is much harsher and detailed; it preemptorily demands "the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops."

So, this brings us to the crucial point in this entire affair, that is to say, the change within the international frame of reference. No longer do we have peaceful coexistence which allows some room for ambiguous or undefined maneuvers; instead, we have a tough clash over the entire worldwide chessboard, with the danger of terrifying wars, recently denounced by Sandro Pertini and by John Paul II. Or the danger--looking at it more optimistically--of violent local clashes which demand specific and loyal choices in terms of the camp involved.

In this scenario we come to the almost inevitable return to the collateralism of the labor unions, the general strike of Tuesday, the 15th, the virtual abortion of self-regulation with regard to the right to strike. We can also understand the confusion among Confindustria which is no longer "Carlist," rather quarrelsome and not inclined to follow the labor union because it believes that the parties have been switched around and that perhaps the time has come to cut loose from the labor union. We now understand why the time seems to be ripe for a government blitz, even if it is only a government in its death throes against the sliding scale.

Here is a question for Pierre Carniti: "Would the return to the cold war not weaken the policy of the PCI, which is aimed at getting into the government, to the point where it would consider that policy outdated and dangerous?" Reply: "This danger must as a matter of fact not be underestimated. But are there any serious alternatives to national unity at this time?" This is an answer that came with Byzantine fatalism.

IL SETTIMANALE also wanted to take the pulse of Luciano Lama, 59, from Romagna, secretary-general of the CGIL.

Question: Does not the frontal attack upon the weak Cossiga administration and the preemptory demand for a cabinet with the communists, raised above all by the Lama-Marianetti axis of the CGIL in fact signify a return to collateralism, to the labor union acting as a mere transmission belt?

Answer: The country is in such bad shape that it urgently needs a point at which all of the forces can get together. Unity is needed in the light of things the way they are, not as a result of individual ideological positions.

Question: According to many people, this entire big mess will prevent the atmosphere of dissent, which is quite well known throughout the country, from finding a constitutional opening through which it can be channeled; you are going to get a vast pool in which the fish of terrorism will find it all the more easy to swim.

Answer: Under normal conditions, you need a force which would organize and guarantee dissent. But this is an extraordinary moment right now. Unity must prevail over any other consideration.

Conclusion

Although everybody was convinced that the process of the country's break-up will be speeded up instead of terminated, the so-called national unity administration therefore seems just around the corner--without two fundamental guarantees: Autonomy for the labor unions and the irreversible choice of sides by the PCI. What can we say? When the gods would destroy, they first strike mad. Unless. . .

Benvenuto Rejects Political Servitude

Giorgio Benvenuto, 41, from Rome, secretary-general of the UIL, is a socialist who is quite independent-minded. IL SETTIMANALE asked him whether Luciano Lama's rigid communist party membership might not already have put an end to any autonomist (and therefore unity-oriented) approach by the labor union, pushing the entire movement back toward the Fifties.

Answer: The problem of a possible return to collateralism by the labor union with respect to the party dates back to a specific time, that is, the summer of 1976, as the time of the Andreotti cabinet when the PCI abstained. The UIL immediately underscored the risk that the labor union might be turned into a supporter of a certain political framework. Labor union unity is built on the basis of content, on the basis of things to be done, not on formulas for cabinets.

Question: But the so-called "line of the EUR [Universal Exposition of Rome]," in other words, the moderate change in direction by the united federation, involved just one single motive: The communists had joined the majority. Their departure immediately caused the labor union to become rigid. Until the general strike of Tuesday, the 15th. With the more or less tacit understanding that a national unity administration would suffice to put the muzzle back on you.

Answer: No, look here. we have never been muzzled, although we must engage in self-criticism. At the time of the "EUR change" we did not know how to react with sufficient force to those who interpreted it as a necessary step in bringing the PCI into the majority (Editor's note: An obvious allusion to the PCI and Lama). We would have reacted forcefully to this reading.

Question: Now, what are you going to do?

Answer: The danger of neocollateralism does exist and there is no use denying it. The UIL however therefore believes that a clarification is unavoidable.

Question: On what issue?

Answer: Above all, the labor unions must autonomously work out its own proposal. The "EUR line" is outdated because the energy crisis at that time had not reached its present dramatic scope. It is necessary to spell out the way in which one must manage an economic planning policy and the places in which it must be implemented.

Question: Those are fine words. But the strike of Tuesday, the 15th, was judged by everybody in the light of the anti-Cossiga feelings, to demand a new cabinet, including the PCI.

Answer: This again is a false interpretation. We went on strike to demand a serious program that would enable us to get out of the crisis--not to get an administration which the labor unions would be prepared to grant a truce. On the other hand, terrorism and inflation do not give quarter to anybody. You do not kid around with such problems.

Question: You forgot one little detail. Who is supposed to support the "serious program?"

Answer: The solidarity of the political forces. A solidarity based on programs, not on formulas. A solidarity which, in this field, must have the support of the labor unions, in an autonomous fashion. Without any Messianic beliefs as to who is supposed to be inside and who is not.

Question: In practical terms, are you rejecting a cabinet without the communists, as Signorile would have it, or are you in favor of some secondary assumption, as Craxi would have it? You seem to be leaning in the latter direction. Or am I mistaken?

Answer: Well, try to understand me. We are labor unionists, not politicians. Our job is to defend the workers, not to form cabinets. I therefore repeat that we cannot be interested in formulas but rather in the content.

Question: What kind of "content" do you want then?

Answer: First of all, defense of the purchasing power of the workers. For us, austerity does not mean tightening our belts; if you reduce consumption, you would also be reducing the production machinery and hence employment. For us, austerity means getting down to work and increasing productivity.

Question: And what are the practical consequences of that?

Answer: No more aprioristic taboos. If you have to reduce mobility, well, then we reduce it. If you have to distribute the working hours in a different way, by putting in new shifts and by again debating the short workweek, well, let us see what can be done; if we want to revoke the ban on special benefits, well, let us discuss it. If we want to fight against absenteeism in an even more determined fashion, then let us do so. The only unacceptable point is this: That these problems can or cannot be handled depending upon which parties are or are not in the cabinet.

Question: Does Confindustria appear to be amenable on that score?

Answer: I am afraid that during his term as president, Carli moved Confindustria toward a slow twilight, reducing its negotiating capacity. He did not achieve a single agreement with us, without the mediation of

Labor Minister Vincenzo Scotti. Carli seems to me to be moving toward a rather strange mission of ideological restoration which does not look down upon aspects of qualunquism, so long as concrete solutions are applied.

Question: This is a very harsh judgment.

Answer: I find it difficult to understand what Carli wants in view of the fact that he says one thing on one day and the exact opposite on the next day. He says he wants to discuss mobility; but when we say that we are ready to talk, he comes out with the issue of productivity. So, we take up productivity and, right away, he brings up the energy crisis. We follow him on the energy crisis with saintly patience and he promptly jumps to the sliding scale. He does not seem to know what he wants.

Question: Perhaps this is due to his inability to settle the conflict between the manufacturers.

Answer: Probably. But there is nothing worse than a conversation partner who never knows how to respond. Perhaps they are just waiting for the outcome of the contest for the new president in Confindustria. But in the meantime, the problems are only getting worse.

Question: Or they mention inflation in an effort to reduce company debts and to speed up exports.

Answer: I hope not. This savage inflation would not benefit anybody.

Question: Why does the labor union not start to play its own role and accept the sterilization of this contingency?

Answer: Inflation, as I said before, is combated by increasing productivity, not by sacrificing the purchasing power of the workers. And you also fight against it by reviewing your public spending. But where is the cabinet that is capable of getting to the bottom of such a whirlpool?

5058
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POST-TITO PERIOD AS SEEN BY MILITARY EXPERTS

Rome IL SETTIMANALE in Italian 24 Jan 80 pp 25-27

[Article by Stefano Brusadelli: "Brezhnev Was the Name of Tito's Heir"]

[Text] The future of Yugoslavia is full of unknowns. The most disquieting unknowns are those tied to the various forms of nationalism and to the economic crisis. And in the background looms the shadow of the USSR. We discussed the situation with six experts. Here are the conclusions.

The Western World wishes him something approaching immortality. But the years pass inexorably and Josip Broz Tito is approaching the age of 88 and his health is no longer what it used to be. He has circulatory disorders in the right leg and the American heart surgeon De Bakey even came to his bedside in his mountain home in Slovenia. The old marshal continues to discuss the most urgent matters with his ministers and makes sure that he is photographed with a smile, along with his doctors; but people in Belgrade realize that Yugoslavia runs the risk of shortly being without its great founding father. At best, he could divest himself of all of his positions and jobs, putting into the hands of others the guidance of a country which for 30 years has been accomplishing the twin and extremely delicate mission of being the international guide of the nonaligned countries and a neutral cushion between the Warsaw Pact and the Mediterranean Basin. This is a possibility which sends shivers up and down the spines in the West because, without Tito's charisma, either of these tasks might become too difficult for Yugoslavia. The nation's integrity itself might collapse along with its political integrity. Result: A new strategic map of Europe with the Soviet armored forces just within gun range of Trieste and the Mediterranean which would become increasingly more Russian. Is this a scenario out of political fiction? Everything depends on the resolution of two unknowns--one of them political and the other one economic.

Night in One

Yugoslavia (22 million inhabitants in an area a little smaller than Italy) is a united nation only on the map. It is made up six republics (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Slovenia, and Serbia), and

two autonomous regions, Vojvodina and Kosovo. It is a melting pot of different races and cultures; within its national boundaries coexist five nationalities, three religions, and two alphabets. A complicated federal system was assembled to hold all of this together: After Tito's death, supreme government power, the office of the president of the republic, will be passed on to an already existing body made up of eight members representing the republics and the two federated regions. In turn, without dividing it with the others, the members of the presidential body will exercise the power which Tito holds today. And a collegial body of 24 members as of now is guiding the League of Communists which, since 1956, has been replacing the Yugoslav Communist Party.

In 1976, Tito told a Western journalist that "It is useless to think what will happen after me because the post-Tito period has already begun." Indeed, most of the powers have already been transferred from the hands of the marshal to the federal organization provided for in the 1974 Constitution and today Tito's part in the management of domestic affairs can be considered negligible. As far as the policy of the men who will contend for future leadership is concerned, there should not be any surprises: These men include Stane Dolanc, the former secretary of the League of Communists, currently a member of the presidential body; Vladimir Bakarić, likewise a member of the presidential group, an old comrade in arms of Tito; Milos Minić, in charge of foreign policy; and Nikola Ljubicić, in charge of the armed forces. The system, designed to prevent any breakups among the nationalities, is in motion and the Yugoslavs say that they are not worried about the future. But there remains one question: So far, just one word from Tito has been enough to silence the troublemakers in the federal republics and to resolve controversies between the central administration and the peripheral administrations. What will happen without Tito? A hint of what could happen was seen last year when the austerity plan proposed by the government was drily nipped in the bud by all of the six republics which were little inclined to accept any sacrifices in the name of national prosperity.

Inflation Makes Moscow Happy.

In 1980, Yugoslavia will face the worst crisis of postwar years. Inflation topped the 20 percent annual level and the deficit in the balance of trade came to \$2.5 billion in 1979. Tito presented the year 1980 to the nation as "a difficult year which will require self-denial, hinting that there would be devaluation of the dinar. The Yugoslav economic miracle (which, since the end of the war, made it possible to increase the national product coming from industry from 30 to 60 percent and which raised the per capita income from \$150 to \$2,000) has been slowed down by three factors: (1) The establishment of the EEC has placed Yugoslav exports to the Community Area on a level of inferiority with respect to those of the member countries, further penalizing an economy which imports much more than it exports. In 1979, the volume of imports was just about double the volume of exports; (2) Administration decentralization under the

system of federalism triggered a mad race for government spending because no local government wants to fall behind in the construction of public works projects; (3) The Yugoslavs consume much more than they produce and their consumption level went up much faster than their income, with inflationary effects which they will try to correct in 1980 by adopting a very severe austerity plan. Under these conditions it will be very difficult for Yugoslavia during the Eighties to get along without generous foreign economic aid. If the United States, who so far has invested enormous capital in the country, should withdraw, the Soviet Union would step in immediately. And economic dependence will inevitably be followed by political obedience to Moscow.

Nonaligned Until When?

The incorporation of Yugoslavia into the orbit of the Warsaw Pact would trigger an international crisis considerably more serious than the Afghan one. Is it worth the trouble for Moscow to return to the worst years of the Cold War by triggering a new wave of anticommunism in the West? Probably yes, for one reason above all: After the "absorption" of Yugoslavia, the movement of the nonaligned countries, which today is teetering between Tito's neutralism and Castro's pro-Sovietism, would in the end line up with the Cuban positions. We had evidence of that in Havana in September when only Tito's personal prestige and his impassioned concluding address on equidistance between the two blocs prevented the line of the "natural alliance" of the nonaligned with the Soviet Union from prevailing.

IL SETTIMANALE talked about the time after Tito and its repercussions on the Italian and European situation with some experts: The former secretary-general of the Foreign Ministry, Ambassador Roberto Gaja; Manlio Cecovini, the mayor of Trieste and a liberal deputy in the European Parliament; Luciano Pellicani, a socialist political scientist; Albert Li Gobbi, a general and expert on military problems; Domenico Fisichella, a political scientist; and Marcello Gilmozzi, managing editor of IL POPOLO and expert on foreign policy.

Gaja: Let Us Stop Right There, for Heaven's Sake, Right Away

Question: What will happen after Tito is no longer in power?

Gaja: In spite of the complexity of the Yugoslav federal system, I believe that the constitutional measures currently provided for regarding succession can "hold things together" if there are no strong thrusts of an external character. Only in that case could we see the development of those alarmist assumptions which were outlined by recent writers in the field of political fiction.

Question: What will the Soviet Union do?

Gaja: It is difficult to think that the USSR would be interested in pushing a political attack in Central Asia and the Balkans at the same time. That does not mean that--in the light of the type, intensity, and effectiveness of Western reactions in response to the Iranian and Afghan crises--certain deductions might be made which could be decisive regarding Soviet conduct in other sectors closer to us.

Cecovini: In My Opinion, Nothing Will Change

Question: Let us try to visualize the situation after Tito.

Cecovini: There will be no big shakeup. Succession has been perfectly organized and the post-Tito era has already begun. Today, Tito is still a representative personality but he does very little in political terms. Political matters have already been transferred to strong hands who have no intention of yielding them to foreign powers, least of all the Soviet Union. Anybody who knows the Yugoslavs well will realize that they have a tremendous amount of national pride and that they feel that they are a part of Western Europe, rather than Eastern Europe. When I said in one of my speeches that the land of the Slavs begins at the gates of Trieste, I got lots of critical and bitter reactions from my Yugoslav friends. Certainly, we might have problems after Tito's death but in a police state, such as Yugoslavia, the government will be able to resolve those problems easily.

Question: And what about the economic crisis?

Cecovini: Yugoslavia needs foreign support but I do not doubt that such support will be offered to it by the United States. The Yugoslavs will probably try to play both sides of the street in an effort to draw Moscow into this situation likewise although the ultimate outcome is already certain, partly also because Belgrade has every reason to lean toward the United States, rather than toward the Soviet Union.

Pellicani: The Italian Communist Party Would be Isolated

Question: What will Yugoslavia be like after Tito?

Pellicani: I want to set up three assumptions. The first is the most remote: The Soviet Army invades Yugoslavia. In that case, nobody knows how the whole thing will end because the Yugoslav armed forces are very aggressive and have for many years been training to face an invasion with the help of guerrilla tactics. The second one is less remote: Yugoslavia manages to maintain its independence and political autonomy by brilliantly resolving the crisis after Tito. The third one is the most realistic:

Without the charismatic figure of Tito, Yugoslavia fails to maintain the cohesion of the various nationalities and a crisis breaks out which the USSR will certainly exploit in order gradually to extend its protectorate over the country, until it has incorporated it into the area of its satellites.

Question: How will the Italian political system react in this case?

Pellicani: Italy's political class will finally realize that international problems are of central and not just marginal importance and will stop thinking that the only thing that counts is what happens within Italy's borders. This new situation would above all be bad for the PCI [Italian Communist Party] because it would be isolated from the other parties. With the Russians at the border, the years of the Cold War would inevitably return, the understanding with the PCI would become suspect, and the axis of Italian politics would shift toward the center-right.

LI Gobbi: Three Days or Just a Few Hours?

Question: What will change in the strategic balance if Tito dies?

LI Gobbi: Regardless of what the political situation in Yugoslavia happens to be after Tito, Italy will have to transform its entire military defense system. It should have done so some time ago but it was evidently presumed so far that Tito would never die. Here is the change: With Tito, we are sure that Yugoslavia will not allow the Soviet Union to establish military bases on its territory. Without Tito, we no longer have the same certainty, regardless--I repeat--of what the future political situation in Yugoslavia may be like.

Question: What does that mean in practical terms?

LI Gobbi: It means that we must urgently step up the strength and especially the efficiency of our forces along the Eastern border. Although most of Italy's armed forces are stationed along the border with Yugoslavia today, it would only take 2 or 3 days to smash the defensive system. In other words, the time which, according to general staff estimates, is needed by Soviet armored forces to cross Yugoslav territory even though they may encounter armed resistance. After Tito's death, we will have to prepare for the eventuality of a sudden attack against which we are presently absolutely powerless.

Fischella: Italy, a Province of Moscow

Question: Let us try to visualize that Yugoslavia joins the Moscow orbit. What would happen in Italy?

Fischella: There is no single straight answer to that. You can visualize various scenarios. I would simply like to recall the two scenarios that seem most important to me. If Yugoslavia should be drawn into the Soviet area during a political phase in which the Italian communists are already within a government coalition, then one must consider the probability that Italy, also because of the existence of this international factor, might be transformed into a kind of "people's democracy." Viceversa, if Yugoslavia should be drawn into the Moscow power system during a period in which the Italian communists are still outside the national government, then one might think that the increased danger along the eastern border will lead to the strengthening of the tendency which would mean definitely keeping Italy within the Western context, avoiding any neutralist and Third-Force temptations, and blocking the way for the design of home-ground communism.

Gilmozzi: A Test for the West

Question: What are the unknowns after Tito?

Gilmozzi: Tito has for many years been working on his succession and he has managed to create a popular political base which is so broad as to rule out any breakup or upheaval after his death. In the future, there should not be any new developments that might alter the European balance. But we must keep in mind the difficulties of a historical nature with which Yugoslavia will have to struggle, starting with Croatian secessionism which in the past has caused Tito much trouble. The difficulty could be increased if those temptations were to be supported from the outside.

Question: What will the Soviet Union do?

Gilmozzi: A Soviet intervention in Yugoslavia would signify the end of the policy of detente because this would be a direct challenge to the West. Not even Stalin ever dared to do that much. If the USSR should intervene in Moscow, then NATO will know that Moscow wants to start a test of strength that will settle issues with the Western world.

5058

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OIL DRILLING POSING FINANCIAL PROBLEMS

Rome IL SATTIMANALE in Italian 24 Jan 80 pp 30-33

[Article by Paolo Zecchini: "Italian-Style Petroleum"]

[Text] In the search for black gold, the Italian peninsula was prospected by everybody. But the output of 200 active wells is very poor. Hope however has not died and drilling is being stepped up as a result of the tremendous increase in the cost of Arab crude.

By the end of 1980, it will probably be equalled; by the end of 1981, it will certainly have been beaten. This is a record--but what kind of record? The record of petroleum extraction from Italian wells, going back to 1965. During that year (when the Ragusa and Gela deposits were in full operation), 2,209,873 tons of crude were extracted. National production then declined and drilling was done only to find methane and other gases; the petroleum was to a great extent left where it was. In 1973, we had dropped to 1,047,800 tons and then came the Yom Kippur War. In 1974, the year of the first price rises ordered by the OPEC countries, the figure was 1,039,915 tons. Then fear took over and both AGIP [National Italian Oil Company] and the private companies again began to consider the advisability of stepping up prospecting for Italian petroleum. A long recovery began. Gradually, AGIP discovered a rather large deposit in the area of Malossa in the province of Bergamo; in 1978 (according to the latest official statistics), the national petroleum output was 1,452,060 tons. Now we have begun exploiting the off-shore wells in the Adriatic and in the Sicilian Channel; this year we should reach the 2-million mark and in 1981 we should beat the record.

Now, 2.5 million tons signify a little more than 2 percent of the nation's petroleum requirements. A trifle. But why do AGIP and the private companies now stubbornly insist on drilling in such stingy soil? There are at least five reasons for that. First: They are drilling because it is necessary to find fuel gas, at least the kind of gas in which we are sufficiently rich. Secondly, they are drilling because, with the new

machines, it is possible to reach depths of 1,000 meters and the geography of hydrocarbons at such depths is yet to be plotted. Third, from the viewpoint of petroleum Italy's subsoil likewise is not so poor although it is rather lazy. And now we can see how foolish all this is, postponing the explanation of reasons numbers four and five, as to why drilling is being done now, or later.

But there is one premise: Between 1860 [as published] and today, at least 3,165 wells have been dug in Italy in search of hydrocarbons. Those that are still active include 841 for gas on land and 147 on the sea; for petroleum, we have 200 on land and 16 at sea. All of this voluminous drilling would lead us to assume that our prospectors (at one time they were called "well drillers") at last had made a big strike. Every few years, we in Italy have believed that we had gotten our hands on a deposit that would solve our problems; often, for abject reasons, both the companies and the press controlled by them sustained stupid illusions and undue euphoria. That leaves us with the fact that, although we have identified 156 deposits, so that it is not the petroleum that is lacking, nor is it true that our prospectors have always been visionaries. So, what now?

Hoping for Success in the Rospo Well

Now, the hopeful outlook by 1980, outlined by Antonio Stroppani (who was a naturalist and geologist and who wrote an article in "Petroli d'Italia"), is based on a particularly mischievous and disarranged subsoil. The petroleum-containing strata which really count usually are found on a level which geologists call the "Upper Triassic," belonging to the first period of the Mesozoic Age; but those in Italy are horizons which have been broken up and shaken by earthquakes. This is why the crude is found in many little pools separated from each other and, moreover, with qualities varying extremely from one pool to the next. You can drill in one place and find good oil, light, only slightly viscous oil, which will lead you to hope for better things to come; just 100 meters further down, you instead find a black mush which you cannot even get out and which would be difficult to refine. On the one hand, you are doing well at 500 meters and on the other hand you have to go down more than 1,000 meters and by the time you get down there you have spent 50 billions.

When Gulf in 1956 found petroleum at Ragusa, after the first five wells proved to be dry, it suddenly hit a kind of chocolate with sulfur. At the sixth well turned out to be excellent and abundant. That led to some considerable estimates and everything seemed to be fine. But the next wells gradually revealed that the chocolate had turned to sulfur. Today, the big hope is based on a discovery by prospectors from ELP, a consortium which is 61 percent in private hands and which operates in the Adriatic off the coast of Abruzzi. Just 4 years ago, ELP drilled the Rospo I well and the first estimates indicated that there should be

about 350,000 tons of petroleum coming out per year. Then it was seen that this was very heavy petroleum which was almost not suitable for processing. It took a special technique to extract it and a very special technique to refine it. In other words, the operation was too expensive. But yesterday we got the news that the European Investment Bank has made 3 billion lire for ELF research on the extraction and refining of heavy petroleum. It seems, they still believe in us. ELF now is once again working with enthusiasm and the results should be very good. In the meantime, AGIP has moved its Scarabeo IV platform to the edge of the ELF concession (36,000 hectares of water) and has struck oil: There have been four gushers of excellent crude but only four.

Montedison has been luckier; it placed its platforms off Marina di Ragusa. Looking at Montedison, we come to the fourth reason why we continue to drill obstinately in spite of the bizarre character of the Italian subsoil. It is certain that the Italian deposits will not solve the nation's petroleum supply problem but they may solve the problems of some big outfits, individually. One of these big outfits is Montedison which, to produce its textile fibers, needs 7 million tons of crude per year. Like a big barony, Montedison seeks to achieve self-sufficiency through its own wells and there is no telling that it might not achieve that in the end. Its engineers are convinced that, within several years, Italy's petroleum will make it possible to meet 10-15 percent of the overall requirements, which means about a dozen million tons per year or even more.

Off Marina di Ragusa, the American drilling platforms leased by Montedison are working on a sea bottom that is 72 meters down. The exploratory well drilling operation, christened Mila I, reached the deposit after 80 days of work at a depth of 1,640 meters. The petroleum turned out to be of top quality, very light, without any sulfur, similar to the one in Libya which is perhaps the best in the world. Now it seems that the deposit is bigger than it was thought originally. A drill hole here and a drill hole there, covering 70 prospecting permits in various parts of Italy, on land and offshore, adding up to a total surface 1.7 million hectares. That indeed is something. But other big textile-fiber production companies are also looking for petroleum, for example, Snia Viscosa.

What Is Deep Down in the Ground?

The AGIP of course is the queen among outfits conducting petroleum prospecting in the subsoil and offshore; this is an Italian flag company. The AGIP has for some years now been concentrating on "deep drilling," in other words, abyssal drilling. Now the question is: What is under the Po Valley? That is to say, under the methane and petroleum already discovered at Cortemaggiore and in many other localities? The most modern drilling machinery recently made it possible to ascertain that there is another, much deeper and perhaps much richer deposit in the Po Valley.

In 1974, at a depth of 3,500 meters under Malossa in the province of Bergamo, engineers found the biggest petroleum deposit ever discovered on Italian soil: A reserve of 40 million tons, plus 50 billion cubic meters of methane, which are not being wasted. There is absolutely nothing unusual about this because 40 million tons of petroleum add up to the nation's requirement for a period of 4 months. But Malossa has become the point of departure for the implementation of a vast program which, using the most up-to-date prospecting techniques and the most powerful drilling techniques, is aimed at drawing a new map of Italian hydrocarbons. Deep drilling is now being expanded to the west, toward Piedmont, and to the east, toward Veneto. But it also involves the southern regions. Excellent crude has in a matter of fact been pumped out of well number 2 in the oil field of Benevento while we can be sure that there are worthwhile mineral deposits in the province of Foggia. In many cases, we are now prospecting deep deposits which during the Fifties and Sixties were only scratched on the surface.

But is all of this frantic prospecting activity "really good?" This question was perhaps timely 10 years ago, when ENI (National Hydrocarbon Agency), AGIP and private oil companies were trying to outspend each other and were supposedly rediscovering fabulous deposits in the Apennines and in the Sila mountain range, while the big protagonist of that time was Arab and Iranian petroleum which was obtained at ridiculously low prices and in tremendous quantities. But at that time there was a clash between Enrico Mattei and the Seven Sisters, the (very just) struggle to assert the right to the existence of an Italian national oil company. Anything went, even lies. History, by the way, proved that the ENI was completely correct. From the economic viewpoint, the answer to the question, "Is it good?" looks like this: If petroleum prices at the well and at the sales continue to rise at the present rate, then Italian petroleum, with its very high extraction costs, will also soon become "good." So, it is certainly worthwhile to get ready and to find out with certainty where it is and where it is not. The same logic was applied in the United States which is full of petroleum and which until 1945 was the only big petroleum exporter; gradually, the wells in Texas and Pennsylvania, as well as the tremendous deposits in Alaska, will again become economically worthwhile and that also applies to the new ones. This explains the fifth reason why we in Italy continue to drill with method and patience, that is to say, both the AGIP and the private companies.

Other European countries, which are traditionally poor in petroleum, are doing the same thing. Skipping over Great Britain, Holland, and Norway which have had the good fortune of discovering tremendous deposits under the North Sea, it suffices to look at France (output 2 million tons per year, a little more than Italy's): The French government has stepped up prospecting both in the sedimentary basins on land and in the underwater continental shelf.

Waiting for the law

Prospecting activities must be supported by proper legislation which will reward or at least not punish those who look for petroleum. Deep drilling on land and at sea as a matter of fact involves tremendous financing problems. In January 1978, the then Minister of Industry Carlo Donat Cattin submitted to the cabinet a bill which the petroleum companies found to be good. After passage in Parliament, the office of the president of the chamber assigned it to the industry committee for examination; that was on 2 May. Loris Fortuna, chairman of the industry committee, gave assurances that the discussion would be completed by July. But then came the early dissolution of the legislature and the Donat Cattin law fell by the wayside.

But it was not taken up again in the new legislature. Here we might think of the current industry minister Bisaglia. Any delay will cause a delay in current prospecting because, at the end of one phase and the related financing, every company must suspend operations while waiting for more favorable conditions to develop programs and new initiatives.

1058

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WESTERN PRESS HAS NO RIGHT TO JUDGE IRAN

Rome L'UNITA in Italian 1 Feb 80 p 3

[Editorial by Saverio Vertone: "Bani Sadr, the Islamic Revolution and the Western Press. But Iran Is Truly Unpredictable"]

[Text] The "moderate" triumph of Bani Sadr probably opens up a stage of complex accounting with respect to the future of the Islamic revolution in Iran and in the East. In the West, and in Italy, it should, instead, close some accounts. I am speaking of those coarse remarks, of those hasty, careless judgments regarding Iran, the Iranians, the Mohammedans, the four wives, fanaticism, and Allah, behind which ancient epic poems did not scorn to appear, poems that were popularized by rhetoric, as in the case of Marathon, Cyrus, Darius, Alexander the Great, Lepanto, and above all a deep-rooted, romantic falsification, that completely Western miracle of a Greece that rises enchantingly from the water, as in the case of Aphrodite, as the barbarous and dark horizon of the East.

As in the case of the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, the anguished vicissitudes of Iran have stimulated the Atlantic world's protean and almost encyclopedic inclination toward racism. It is superfluous to say that behind the diadem for the illiterate and superstitious masses, behind Cyrus and Darius and Marathon, there is an urgent and also legitimate anxiety regarding the wrath of the home. But, on the other hand, it is not useless to add that this anxiety is unaware, or pretends to be unaware, of specific percentages concerning world oil consumption (the U.S. share amounts to 45 percent; that of the West, 70 percent) and looks angrily at what Bowchey calls the "income of the sheik," bravely leaving out of consideration the actual absence of sheiks in many producer countries, like Venezuela, Nigeria and, in fact, Iran.

The West has in its credit balance great, chaotic, and vortical revolutions that made their way by excavating their own bed through sheer force, with the blind certainty of big rivers; but it expects from the Iranian revolution the calm and drowsy course of estuaries.

A master of laity, of "movement," and of love, Alberoni did not see in Iran the magic moment of the "emerging state," and drew disastrous conclusions from it. Contaminated by Mohammed, overloaded with themes, disgracefully different from the sit-in's of Berkeley and of Harvard or from the disputes at Catholic University, what kind of movement is this Iranian movement that apparently does not analyze the problems of the married couple, does not examine its own conscience, and perhaps does not even know Thoreau, Ginsberg, Dylan Thomas, and Quattari?

More informed, reflective, and objective, Ronchey mentioned in his correspondence from Washington (*CORRIERE DELLA SERA*, 12 Feb 79), a kind neon sign which on the eve of Thanksgiving day adorned the streets of the most peaceful American cities. "Save a turkey, roast an Iranian" gently recommended the lighted signs of the Western capital, offering to the world an example of political balance and of gastronomic austerity. In spite of being so objective, reflective, and intelligent, having once reported the fact, Ronchey did not believe it necessary to comment and write about it. He aimed straight, preferring, through a thousand sharp observations and some honest news (for example, the tortures practiced by the Shah's regime) to let impartial opinions filter in--such as the "Iranian xenophobia," the "implacable mob in Tehran," and the "great bazaar of life and death" established in Iran by Khomeini.

Of course Alberoni and Ronchey are not coarse, approximative interpreters of Western thinking. Not at all. In Rotary and in Lyons Clubs, where colonies of proud commanders flourish, morbidly devoted to the laity and dedicated to free thinking (but also--let's be frank--in streetcars and in stores) in recent months much harsher and much more disdainful opinions have been heard, in which the old Christian intolerance of the infidels of Islam has assumed the biting tones of Voltairian contempt. Sensitive bookmakers, refined delicatessen proprietors, and thoughtful drivers of conveyances have not hidden fears of anger for the offenses committed against reason by people who are stubbornly unwilling to accept the light of intellect and who unjustly hold those who yearn for their oil wells.

History has known, and knows, infinite forms of xenophobia, impartially distributed among the four cardinal points of the world. But, as Gobineau, Spengler, and even Voltaire point out, in order to arrive at that particular obsession and codification of xenophobia, racism, there had to be the first stammerings of science, the irresistible sense of technological superiority, the scientific extrapolations of positivism; in short, a certain arrogance regarding reason, itself. The development of science then fully disapproved, and even ridiculed, the unreasonable calculations of lay reasoning in its emerging state. But the prejudices have remained in the culture of the masses. Western laicism still must close its account with respect to these suspicious residuals and, I would say, must above all come to terms with the truth.

As was perhaps inevitable, Iran has experienced terrible, tumultuous, troubled days. But what right does an area of the world in which, not more than 40 years ago, millions of Jews were scientifically exterminated because they were not Aryan (for not being what in reality does not exist), where up to 10 years ago blacks could not sit next to white people in streetcars, in restaurants, and in schools, an area from which came napalm bombs, destined for the forests and the people of Vietnam, where sequestered persons and convenient, above all not very risky, decimations of carabinieri are smuggled for revolutions, and a powerful press controls and orients, often uncontested, the thoughts, opinion, and needs for things? Yes, what right does this part of the world have to give lessons to a people who, alone and without sequestrations, or alliances with the mafia, has freed itself of a tyrant, proudly refuses American bananas (so attractive elsewhere) and, after a year of disorders, succeeds in avoiding the theocratic influence of one who greatly contributed to its liberation, by voting in a plebiscite for the most secular, well-balanced, and reasonable of the candidates? And all this contrary to the expectations of Western newspapers.

Setting aside the question of right, which obviously does not exist, how can the West allow itself indeed not only not to share the opinions and even the passions of Iran's intensely troubled life, but simply to turn up its nose at the Iranian revolution? Actually, if one considers matters carefully, at what can this blessed West turn up its nose, if not the very secular, liberal, logical, and Hellenic Shah?

8255

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JO BENKOW SEEN AS STRONG CANDIDATE TO SUCCEED RETIRING NORVIK

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 15 Dec 79 p 1

(Commentary by Eivind G. Karlson)

[Text] When the Conservative Party congress selects Erling Norvik's successor next May, it will also choose the person who will lead our largest bourgeois party into the decade of the 1980's. Who has the formula for that--and for keeping up with the Labor Party which still has not entirely lost faith in a pure majority in Parliament? Since Kari Willoch has announced that he definitely will not be the new chairman, most political observers see only one name being considered: Jo Benkow.

Many other candidates have been mentioned--and a few have already declared, after Erling's Norvik's surprising announcement earlier this week. Speculation will continue, before and after the next meeting of the conservative nominating committee on 28 January. In the meanwhile, members of the committee and others must be satisfied to try out names such as, for example, Benkow's vice chairman and colleague Astrid Gjertsen and their mutual parliamentary colleague Rolf Presthus, Lars Roar Langset, Hakon Randal, Mona Bekke, Jan P. Nyse, and "The Outsider," Kaci Kullmann Fife.

Which of them will remain "on the battlefield" when the committee has done its job and the election for chairman takes place? Not many. Jo Benkow is the most likely, but not only because he has been a member of the party executive committee since 1973, and first vice chairman since last year. The chairman of the parliamentary Justice Committee is one of the best equipped persons in the present leadership of the Conservative Party, intelligent, eloquent, attractive, tolerant, and with broad political experience on the municipal, county, and national levels and in industry.

In 1959 Benkow was elected to the city council in Baerum, where he also became chairman of the school board. As a member of Parliament since 1965 he was probably best known as his party's spokesman on social policies.

Several years ago he took the initiative in setting up an arrangement to provide housing support for the elderly, and he has always been a warm friend of those who need help from society to get along. And now--as chairman of the justice committee--he has been a solid opponent of the Labor Party government's criminal report, and he has firmly struck down the use of unlawful actions against legally passed resolutions.

Some would like to read a pure campaign speech. But this description is based on serious observations, which indicate that Benkow has considerable agility. On the other hand he has the quality of saying what he really means about things and about people. Politicians who are overly concerned about their careers are usually very careful about this. His key formula of a few years ago that Vardo should be depopulated has certainly not been forgotten. Also his statement that the Nordli government is the worst we have had in the memory of man. It happened correctly enough before the changes last fall, but it had a certain continuing validity.

The 35-year old former photographer has obviously too much intelligence to be the party workhorse. One would think that would be an absolute advantage for candidates for leading political office--which in itself is demanding enough--but that will probably be used against Benkow.

Where does he stand in the political picture? That should be of great interest both in and outside the modern, growing Conservative Party. Benkow himself has said that he places himself approximately in midstream. In practice that means that he works on precisely the same level as Kare Willoch and Erling Norvik. He said, "I have a distinct feeling of kinship with them both." This was before the election of chairman in 1970 when he supported Norvik and Willoch was elected. There can also be more comparisons of positions between the party's parliamentary leader and its number one vice chairman than between Benkow and Norvik.

Even if many believe that in Benkow will be a very strong candidate when the Conservative Party elects its new chairman, it must be expected that there will be a struggle. It is more likely than one perhaps expects in the harmonious Conservative Party. If we understand Benkow correctly, he will gladly fight for a chance to meet the challenges of the eighties--in production and working conditions, social policies, petroleum development and the economy. That is what it is all about. Benkow has self-confidence enough to get in the fight. And honesty enough to admit that this self-confidence exists.

ECONOMIST DISCUSSES AGENDA FOR 1980'S

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 28 Dec 79 p 18

[Commentary by Professor Preben Muntbe]

[Excerpt] What will occupy thoughts in the 1980's? What topics will be on the agenda? Probably many of them which are already there: the cost of energy and economic growth, data technology and demands for readjustment, rich and poor countries, inflation and redistribution of income, districts and pressure groups, and in general, foolish politicians and premises in the business world.

These well-known topics can be important, even dominant. Nevertheless, I have selected six others, one international and five domestic. And the domestic can also be universal, because industrial countries have much in common.

Instead of the Dollar

We are beginning the new decade with an international monetary system which is more unstable than ever before. The absence of a firm standard of value is more obvious and more disquieting than it has been for almost 50 years. The background is easy to relate. When World War II ended the U.S.A. had a production capacity and a technological level that was higher than ever, while the warring countries of Europe and Asia were greatly weakened. The dollar naturally acquired record strength. Worried politicians and economists spoke of a perpetual shortage of dollars.

National and private banks around the world wanted more than anything to build up their reserves of dollars. This desire endured right up to our time, even though there had in the meantime been basic changes in the situation of the U.S.A. By the end of the 1950's the income from abroad was insufficient to cover the cost of imports, military preparedness abroad, foreign aid and overseas investments. The country increased its indebtedness, but that was no problem, because the other countries of the world were constantly eager to obtain dollars, or in other words extend credit to the U.S.A.

Even when De Gaulle stuck sticks in the spokes and said, "The U.S.A. is buying our products with our own money," the automatic credit to the U.S.A. did not end. The dollar became and remained the bank currency of the world.

Two devaluations early in the seventies and periods of large decline later in the decade made the situation worse, and today both OPEC countries and others dread accumulating dollars. They want something that has a more stable value. But what? The world's gold holdings are too small to solve the problem. Only two alternative solutions remain. Either another national currency or an international accounting system. Japan, West Germany and other countries with strong currencies decline to have their money become the international bank currency. It causes too much concern when there is great speculative movement of capital. So there remains only one solution, created by all the great industrial countries acting together.

Within the International Monetary Fund they have begun working on an alternative to the dollar, but for the time being the idea of special drawing rights (SDR) is too limited to absorb both the OPEC surpluses and a larger portion of the enormous amount which circulates in the eurodollar market.

Confidence in the dollar is inversely proportional to the rate of inflation in the U.S.A. Therefore the stability of the world's currency rests on the economic policies of the U.S.A. We shall hear a great deal during the eighties about SDR cash and American inflation.

Shall the State Take It All

You may be sure that the state will also have increased income in the 1980's. That is the continuation of a trend. In 1950 30 percent of private income went in direct taxes and government insurance premiums. In 1975 that figure was doubled, and it has continued to increase since then. Taking into account the value added tax and other taxes, the tendency grows stronger rather than weaker.

Norway is not alone in this regard. In Denmark the chairman of "the economic wisemen" has recently proved that by the year 2110 the state will take 99 percent of the working person's income, if the present course is not changed. In Sweden the new head of the national bank has expressed concern over the same trend.

First, the problem can be met by changing the tax system. The broader the tax base, the lower the contributions can be held and the less the hardship with each individual tax. The outline presented by the government last autumn had as its purpose to obtain more income for the state in the 1980's. But it is probable that the other direction should be sought--cut down on payments to the government. The "free lunch" can be abandoned. Why should a visit to the doctor be free, when we pay for the telephone and transportation? Such questions will be faced in the coming years.

Can the State Sell Its Industries

From time to time in this country there have been bitter fights over private ownership vs. socialization. It is remarkable that these battles have been entirely ideological and have had almost no influence on the scope of state ownership in this country. Each time the state has moved to establish an enterprise or buy up stock in a private business the government and the opposition have let practical, time tested considerations weigh the heaviest. Therefore we have today a state-owned sector in Norwegian industry which has been limited and unproblematical. Is that period finished? Yes, if it gets special handling.

A basis for a market economy such as the Norwegian is that all firms in a branch will have the same working conditions. Then the manpower and capital will be attracted to the firm which can create the greatest value. Special handling causes wasted value. In practice this means that the demands for capital income, wages, and employment security will be the same in all firms.

Today private firms must obtain capital from the owners in the open market, and these owners demand a return for their money. State-owned firms get their capital from Parliament, and profits play a lesser role.

Recent years have shown that private firms go bankrupt and employees must seek other work. Nothing similar has happened with state-owned firms in our country, but in Finland a state-owned firm has recently gone bankrupt.

Technical and marketing changes can require new structures in industry. Companies merge, technical decisions must be made, ownership requirements must be complied with. Is it so with state-owned businesses? In Sweden the head of the state management association for industry has said that state-owned concerns should be able to be sold as easily as private concerns can be purchased, and he recommended also that state-owned businesses should raise money on the open market.

Can such thoughts grow in Norway in the eighties?

Constantly Protected

In the past 20 to 30 years Norwegian industry has become much more internationalized than it was before. Export and import competition on the home market has become more common. Norwegian firms have acquired daughter companies abroad, and foreign firms have purchased companies here. This development is still going on. The government is encouraging it by its policy on all concessions, which will pave the way for expanded industrial competition with foreign companies.

On the other side is the protected sector. Farming is a subject by itself, but we also have service industries which are protected from foreign competition on the home market. Banks and insurance companies are examples.

The question then is this: will continued internationalization in industry, trade, and other businesses create a tension toward the protected, and will that tension become so strong that the policies will break down? Will we see foreign banks and insurance companies with signs on the street in Oslo and other cities in the coming years? Will we see Norwegian financial institutions merged with large foreign firms, and perhaps see Norwegian firms buying up smaller foreign firms? Will we have Scandinavian commercial and savings banks in the 1980's?

The Corporate Society

When Norway came under the law regulating income it took a long step toward becoming a corporate state. Whether we had the government's or the bourgeois opposition's version of the law, it was clear that the labor unions were to be given much greater influence than they formerly had. In the first place, the nonunion workers' wages are to be largely determined by the union workers. In the second place Parliament gave the country's largest labor union a choice: accept this law, and we can get along. Refuse to accept it and there will surely be chaos.

We had nearly the same situation in the thirties when Parliament gave the farmers' organization power to regulate milk prices and market conditions for farmers who were not organized. It caused a stir then, but we now live peacefully with the arrangement.

Likewise, such consequential advances in the activity of organizations will release counter forces, and it is only the state which can straighten out opposing interests between organizations and between the organizations and the public. To find out how this will happen will be a task of the eighties.

The Art of Being Rich

Norway is today one of the richest countries in the world. According to statistics from the World Bank, only 15 per thousand of the world's inhabitants have a higher income. If this development continues, we will soon overtake Sweden and Switzerland, but it will be more difficult to overtake Kuwait.

What has this affluence brought us? What will we do with it, and where do we go from here? According to previous social philosophy, we placed great emphasis on material progress. If we could only defeat poverty many of our problems would disappear by themselves.

Today we know that was not correct. On the contrary, each day we are overwhelmed by narrowness and victimality, spiritual poverty and personal disharmony. This wealthy society must find a broader and deeper meaning. Therefore the dream of the good life still must stand high on our agenda for the next decade. Seekers of stadia must be encouraged, particularly the realists among them.

Have a good 1980's!

FISHING INDUSTRY SEES PROSPECTS FOR 1980'S AS UNCERTAIN

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 20 Dec 79 p 14

[Commentary by Knut Vattdal, fishing boat owner]

[Text] At the start of the 1980's the situation in the fishing industry is more unstable than it has been for many years. The decade of the 1970's produced both disappointments and pleasures. The variations were large, from entirely good years to entirely terrible years. The seventies ended with an especially bad year, causing many to be pessimistic about the eighties.

There are several reasons for today's difficulties. The two most important are shortages of resources and high costs--especially of oil, of which the fishing fleet is a major consumer. Lack of resources and increasing costs have created such pressures on profits that in general one can say that most of the fishing fleet is in debt. Parts of the fish processing industry are also working under difficulties. Except for simple products (herring oil and herring meal) the current difficulties can not be blamed on low export prices.

Is the pessimism about the 1980's warranted? In the fishing industry, the estimate of the future is strongly influenced by the existing situation. When incomes are high it is regarded as manna from heaven. When things are reversed--as now--it is believed that they will continue to get worse. It is therefore always difficult to make a serious prediction on the years just ahead.

I believe that the Norwegian fishing industry has important possibilities for the 1980's, but the problems will also be large. Three factors will be decisive for the industry's situation in the eighties: domestic costs, fish prices on the world markets, and growth of resources.

It is certain that the Norwegian fishing industry must continue to face increased domestic costs. The extraordinary increase in oil prices has worsened the situation drastically. In 1979 oil prices increased by 50

percent, and this increase will continue. At the beginning of the 1970's fuel costs were a small part of operating costs, and now it is clearly the largest part of the operating costs for the middle-sized and larger fishing vessels.

Many thought that fish prices on the world market would rescue the economy of the fishing industry. A simple conclusion was drawn that price increases would result from food shortages in large parts of the world. Fish products with their valuable protein would be especially desirable. Unfortunately, in the areas of the world where the food shortages are the worst--in the underdeveloped countries--the purchasing power is small. A few of these countries are really large consumers of Norwegian fish products. Nigeria has for decades been our greatest dried fish market, and has now begun to purchase our frozen mackerel. With small prospects of a rapid improvement in the living standard and purchasing power of these countries, one should not count on pressure from them to force up the prices of our fish products.

The other important factor when one is assessing the price situation in the fishing industry in the 1980's is that in a number of areas of the world the fishing resources have not been exploited. That applies to developed and underdeveloped countries. In both areas there is a lack of technology in how properly to exploit fishing resources. Underdeveloped countries also lack the capital. Today there is significant activity in a number of underdeveloped countries to exploit their fishing resources both for food for their own people and to earn foreign currency through export. Many feel called upon to help. The natives are not always idealistic. It will take time before the fishing industries of underdeveloped countries function as they should, but development is moving ahead. The fish products of underdeveloped countries will increasingly appear in our export markets. Much is also happening in the developed countries. The economic zones have made it possible to enforce strict regulations. Countries that have in the past been overfished such as Canada are now getting increased quotas of cod, for example. This is also noted in the U.S.A. market. And the U.S.A. itself is exploiting its large fish resources. It is therefore not realistic to believe that a general price rise in fish products will help the Norwegian fishing industry in the 1980's. The best that we can hope for is that fish prices will keep pace with the increases in our domestic costs.

In assessing the situation it is especially uncertain. Experience after three years with economic zones and cooperation with the Soviets and the EC countries make people pessimistic. We must believe that common sense will prevail and that the large problems which we now have concerning management of joint areas in the Barents and North Seas will be solved. It is just as much in the interests of the Russians and the EC countries as in ours. Everyone benefits. If serious efforts at regulation are carried out, not only on paper but in practice. If that happens it is expected that the low quotas which we now have in the Barents Sea (especially for cod and haddock) will be increased during the 1980's. As to the Atlantic-Scandinavian stocks of

herring, which Norway alone has the responsibility to regulate, a half-hearted regulatory policy has delayed a build-up of the stocks. This year the government heeded the oceanographers' long standing recommendation for a total prohibition. Stocks should now increase in a period of two to four years to the point that fishing for Atlantic-Scandinavian herring will again be permitted. And the potential here is really large.

I believe that the 1980's will be good years for fishing resources. It will take several years before the major effect is felt, but I am convinced that things will look better in 3 or 4 years than they do today.

But increased quotas alone are not enough to provide sufficient reward so that the industry will have adequate recruiting of qualified workers. It must soon be recognized that salaries comparable to those of industrial workers are not enough to recruit workers to a field with such special working conditions as fishing. If there is a shortage of fishermen, increased quotas will not help. We would then be in a situation where we would have to ask fishing nations which we are now evicting from Norwegian economic zones to help us take our quotas. The authorities must, especially in the first of the 1980's, work to hold wages up. Certain recent signs (such as the bill to support the fishing industry for 1980) give reason to believe that perhaps we are on the way from the talking and explaining stage to the acting stage.

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CSD: 4108

Next week will be decisive for cooperation between Volvo and Renault. New negotiations will be conducted and the result presented to Volvo's stockholders and employees. It is the third time recently that Volvo has put forth plans for cooperation. Previously they have dealt with Saab-Scania and the Norwegian government.

But this time it applies only to the passenger car division, and only to a very limited cooperation which will mean that Volvo can more simply and cheaply develop new models with four-wheel drive. The French state-owned company Renault is one of the pioneers in this area.

At the present time there is more and more interest in cooperation in the automobile industry. In recent years, Peugeot, Citroën and the European part of Chrysler (Talbot) have become one company. Saab will develop all of its new models together with Lancia which was formerly owned by Fiat. Leyland will produce cars in England for Japanese Honda, and Audi-VW and MAN are cooperating on trucks. Renault has taken over sales of American Motors in Europe, while AMC will sell Renault in the U.S.A. Production of a Renault model will also start in the U.S.A.

Ford Motor Company has purchased 25 percent of the stock of the Japanese firm Juyo Kogyo which produces Mazda. The two manufacturers will develop a common car which will replace the present Ford Escort. The new car will have the same motor and drive mechanism produced by Mazda in Japan. It will be produced both in the U.S.A. and Europe by Ford, but Mazda will produce its own model with the same components.

(7/8)

(80) 1108

PORTUGUESE FINANCE MINISTER ON EFFECTS OF ESCUDO REVALUATION

LD181409 Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 17 Feb 50 p. 1 LD

[Unattributed report]: "[Importers' Profits Will be Reduced to Minimum]"

[Text]: "The Ministry of Trade has everything ready to prevent profiteering by importers," Minister of Finance Cavaco e Silva stated in front of the cameras of Portuguese television's Channel 1 yesterday, answering interviewer Samfield Cabral, who asked him whether the reduction of the prices of imported goods would not be exploited by importers to secure excessive profits.

"Prices will fall; I have no doubt," Minister of Finance and Planning Cavaco e Silva stated yesterday in an interview granted to Channel 1.

Cavaco e Silva stated that the reduction of prices in the domestic market is one of the consequences of the measures recently adopted by the government, including the 6-percent revaluation of the escudo, while maintaining the "creeping" devaluation at the rate of 9.75 percent per month.

According to the minister, this revaluation means that imported products for consumption in Portugal will cost 6 percent less; a reduction of the same order in the prices of imported raw materials will result, moreover, in a fall in the prices of domestically manufactured goods.

Reduce Inflation To Increase Real Earnings

At another point in the interview, Cavaco e Silva said that "There are no prospects of increasing real earnings without succeeding in reducing inflation."

The struggle against inflation—which, he said, is a priority in the government's economic policy—"is not being waged by containing demand, and this is why," he stressed, "it will not aggravate unemployment."

The reduction of public consumption, he said, will be offset by the increase in private consumption and investment.

He also summarized the various reasons and measures which "clear signs" that private investment is increasing, in addition to which "measures to stimulate investment directly" are being prepared. Mendes e Silva also noted the reversal of the "cost-price gap" recorded over the last 3 years of public consumption (mainly state expenditure on goods and services) the increase in value exceeding 100% with private consumption stagnant.

With regard to a possible consequence of the revaluation of Portuguese currency, Mendes e Silva stated that the revaluation of the escudo, the minister anticipated that competitiveness will not be affected, because of increased productivity and the continuation of the "export" revaluation.

"The revaluation of the escudo will result in exports cheaper," he commented.

According to Mendes e Silva, the measure aims at containing public expenditure, and at the same time increasing the allocation of capital for public enterprises in comparison with 1964 and the tighter control over the hiring of personnel by the public sector, also fall within the field of containing inflation.

According to Mendes e Silva, the objective of the "export" revaluation of the escudo is justified by the need, on the one hand, not to disregard competitiveness abroad, and, on the other, to avoid speculative moves against the escudo.

The minister also denied possible negative consequences of the revaluation on companies from Portuguese origin; and, as a result of that measure, will receive a general loss in exports.

In this connection he emphasized that interest rates in Portugal and the advantages granted to migrants by the State of credit are factors favorable to attracting their savings.

Mendes e Silva also mentioned the importance of a measure which has also not been adopted—the possibility of civil servants being transferred from one ministry to another.

"It is incomprehensible why such a measure was not adopted previously," he stated.

SOCIALISTS CONTINUE TO WORK THEMSELVES OUT

Lisbon EXPRESS (in Portuguese) 10 Jan 68 p 1

(Article by Pedro d'Amorim, "Movimentos Sociais" issue, 1968, p 18)

[Text] Who won and who lost at the last meeting of the PS Socialist Party national committee? This is a question that can only be answered, with any certainty, in a year (after the elections and some eye of the Congress).

For the present, we surely have a new secretariat, from which the so-called "historicals" were excluded and which was reinforced with personalities associated with the movement (the "technocrats," "ex-SIS" (Socialist Intervention Group), and other independent figures). Based on this, there has been made a relative degree of homogeneity in its membership, which will allow for more effective action. But, from a more cautious standpoint, it is an executive group elected to lose the forthcoming legislative elections (not even the most optimistic forecasts indicate a significant increase in votes).

Insofar as the fundamental issues are concerned, divided in the organizational area (the use of the foundations, for example), or in the strategic area (policy on alliances, trade union policy, participation in elections and candidacy in the presidential elections), one has no impression but it has not come far enough.

Essentially, the groups on the rise in the party have come to assume responsibility for leading a crisis that is inevitable.

Movements Also Formed

In fact, there was very little clarification at the last meeting. Namely, the Socialists in attendance gaged forces, not increased the strength of each movement within the national committee. "Moderates" (CGT [General Union of Workers]-ists) operated on one side, as was to be expected; and the "historicals," on the other. The central group, "technocrats," "ex-SIS" and Independents acted as a connecting point, sometimes being backed by the former (during the voting on the formation of organization, and

Other conditions mentioned in the report.

It is suggested that the following conditions be considered in the future in connection with the study of the conditions of the country.

The results given in the report are in general in accordance with the results of the study of the conditions of the country. It is suggested that the following conditions be considered in the future in connection with the study of the conditions of the country.

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be that in 1980, if it is matter of no relevance by the present secretariat, but one that the presidential elections are to be held nearly 2 months after the legislative elections which will take place at the end of December, and the beginning of 1981, necessitates a consideration of the matter.

Union Policy Minister Fernando Triunfo

I have reviewed and considered information of what the union policy will be in the next part of the 1988-1991 legislative period.

In this regard, the proposal that was approved related only to the intention of holding a meeting of the Socialist trade unionists, with a view towards reinforcing the socialist movement in the UGT, in the context of the guidelines established in the 1980's document.

This initial comment was included at the suggestion of Jorge Sampaio, in order to oppose the alternative proposal of the "historicals," and avoid their more radical language. In fact, the alternative that is proposed is actually not unrelated to what the 1980's document calls for.

It should be noted that Sampaio was unable to implement this directive, despite the fact that it was included in the union policy that he has been pursuing. In fact, this means that the PS may be contesting positions within the UGT with other movements, namely, the Social Democrats, with the aim of dominating the trade union federation, possibly in an alliance with groups such as UDA and the FCT (United Workers Front F) - since, if those organizations could agree to form a coalition with the Socialists,

and the party's union policy will be tested very shortly, on the occasion of the VII Congress, scheduled for next November.

Two other hypotheses for action in this area would be to give the go-ahead to the Socialist trade unionists to choose between free membership in any union federation or leaving the UGT and promoting the creation of a new entity.

In this latter instance, their influence as a pressure group in the labor area would be maintained. If the reverse, they would lose an entire force dedicated to the UGT, as well as large sums channeled there; not to mention the doors which the Socialist International has opened to the organization opened.

In any event, this shift in union policy would, during the first phase, entail a significant loss of positions. In fact, lately, the Socialists'

entertainment in the labor movement has been increasingly reduced, and their victories have been usually won in alliance with the Social Democrats.

Federations Cause Argument

Two essential innovations have occurred with respect to the party's organization: a mini-executive group with the designation Political Committee will operate within the secretariat; and the district federations will start receiving at least a third of the funds which the party has at its disposal. It was also decided to set up and dynamize the Socialist trade union movement, with a view toward its activity within the UGL.

A proposal which prevented the accumulation of functions by the National secretariat and the chairmanship of the federations was defeated by a minimum margin (39 votes in favor, 47 against and 23 abstentions). If the proposal had been approved, in order to chair a foundation any member of the secretariat would have to have the confidence vote of two thirds of the members of that entity. It was obviously an attempt to challenge Maldonado Gonelha, who is head of the José Fontana (an important entity because of the funds that it has, and its role in the union area).

The proposal was submitted by individuals with such varied associations as João Lima, Teresa Ambrosio, Carlos Laje and João Cravinho. The latter assumed its defense. Mario Soares was staunchly opposed to the idea, which would limit his powers in this area (at present, the heads of the foundations are answerable only to the secretary-general). It should be noted that the discussion of this matter was of brief duration, because, after certain individuals contested the proposal (namely, Gonelha and Eduardo Pereira, two persons who would possibly have been affected), a demand calling for taking a vote immediately was approved.

Only one document was discussed on organization, inasmuch as the approval of the secretariat's proposal in general (by 86 votes in favor, 10 against and 8 abstentions) immediately excluded that of the "historicals." However, Antonio Reis and Cravinho included some suggestions of little importance in that document, either from the "historicals" or from other members of the National Committee.

It is a noteworthy fact that, with the departure of the "historicals" from the secretariat, the existence of the Political Committee ceases to have the significance that was ascribed to it some time ago. At present, it has become justified for basically functional reasons. However, it is highly improbable that Maldonado Gonelha will have a seat in it.

Year's Test for the Secretariat

Starting now, the secretariat will begin its year's test. In February, it will initiate contacts with political forces for the establishment of

FUTURE ROLE OF REFORMERS, UNIONS DISCUSSED

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 2 Feb 80 p. 2

[Article by Marcello Rebelo de Sousa: "Two Topics With a Future: Heeding the Reformers...and the Elections in the Insurance Workers Union"]

[Text] The Little Signs

At the height of the political dispute with the president of the republic, the three parliamentary groups comprising the Democratic Alliance (AD) were planning (and may possibly still be planning) to continue the request for ratification of Decree-law No 326/79, which created the "Damiao de Fois Institute of Social Research," attached to the Presidency of the Republic.

This decree-law was prepared by the Fifth Constitutional Government, and the "Damiao de Fois Institute" was intended to give the president of the republic technical support, by supplying him with information from studies required for his action.

It is thought that, in this "guerrilla activity" which is under way between a government and the president of the republic, the AD may be attempting to bring up the matter of the ratification of such a decree-law by way of proof that the majority could suffice at least not to allow the creation of an institute for technical-administrative support to the president attached to the Presidency of the Republic.

However, if certain reports circulating behind the scenes of the AD are to be believed, the reformers would not be very enthusiastic about the notion of this minor confrontation, this parliamentary act, between the majority and the president anyway, much less the possibility of being refused the ratification of that decree-law.

This is a little sign of an essential issue. On the other hand, and in another completely different sector of Portuguese political activity, observers are viewing with special attention the election campaign of the Union of Insurance Workers of the South, wherein tickets associated with the PCP [Portuguese Communist Party], PS [Socialist Party] and PSD [Social Democratic Party] are opposing each other separately.

The commission could become both more internal, the ministerial cabinet and the Social Democratic Center, with backing from the logical support of Christians, both founded in the German Republic of Germany, and by the same Christian party, the SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany).

On the matter of the role of a second presidential issue.

THE DISCUSSION AND THE DISSENT

The discussions centered by the parliament were the justification of the mission and the role of the "Comissão de Ação Democrática" was possibly disapproved, specifically because they did not feel that this is not the proper time to attack the unity of the majority, or even because the other members of your majority may not care to run the risk of losing a vote in São Paulo.

But, in any event, what is behind the misgivings of the reformers is really substantial:

Essentially, the reformers have been and are counting on the AD, but they are not resigned to the notion that the dissociation between AD and President Cavalcante comes is irreversible.

What prompted them to participate in the AD was the desire to contribute in this way to a change in the party spectrum which could end up precluding the formation of stable, unified governments in Portugal.

But, even when entering the AD, moreover, through a bilateral agreement that did not link them directly with the PSD (Social Democratic Center Party) and the PSD (People's Movement Party), they continued to indicate the need for a presidential leadership in the Portuguese government system.

In short, the reformers wanted to reconcile two fundamental strategic lines: the line of formation of a new majority, in this instance an extension of the right-center, with the line of presidential leadership of the government system.

To sum it up briefly, they wanted to form the bridge between AD and the President.

However, it so happens that the winds are not very favorable for that kind of mediation between Gomes Teixeira Street and the Belem Palace; and there are even some within the AD who maintain that Gen Ramalho Eanes is an unacceptable candidate for the Alliance's political strategy.

Now this is where the reformers will have to make a choice.

Open to the majority, as long as it does not definitively close the door on the candidacy of Gen Ramalho Eanes, how will they react when it becomes clear that this door is irrevocably closed?

To some analysts it is still doubtful how the reformers will decide in this contingency (yet to arise).

However, we think that the little sign that has now been given may increase as time elapses, and that it will become clear that Gen. Goulart indeed wants to be a candidate again, whether or not another military figure appears very soon who is willing to run against him in the primaries.

Hence, we must pay heed to the reformers and to the time when, sooner or later, they have to make a choice between loyalty to the parliamentary majority and counting on Goulart.

Was it not Giscard d'Estaing who, unexpected by many, dissociated himself from the majority in France on the eve of the 1969 referendum, after having a premonition of General de Gaulle's defeat, thereby taking his chances with post-Gaullism?

The PS' Union "Four de force"

The heated contest between Socialists and Social Democrats in the union of Insurance Workers of the South may, in turn, serve as a gauge of the PS' chances of playing an essential role in a UGI (General Union of Workers) hegemony. Moreover, the UGT's secretary general himself is personally engaged in this election campaign.

The essential question is as follows: After the required revision that the PS must make following the electoral improprieties, and despite the fact that he has retained a safe political position which many would not have anticipated, Maldonado Gonetka will nevertheless have to accept a certain amount of change in the PS' union policy, from the standpoint of autonomy with respect to the PSD in the government, and a reinforcement of Socialist positions in the UGI.

For this purpose, the PS will have to register sizable victories in the union area, until the next UGI congress; because only such victories will allow it to do some "forcing" that could lead to a change in the principle of parity between Socialists and Social Democrats within the General Union of Workers.

A considerable victory in one of the unions with major strategic influence, such as that of the Insurance Workers of the South, could be a prediction that the PS is in a position in the opposition to recover from the PSD now in the government the ground that was lost in the union area.

A Socialist defeat warrants renewed consideration of the union strategy as a whole.

To some observers, what has been said represents a kind of lesser evil that Maldonado Gonetka must accept, despite the fact that he is still a staunch defender of rapprochement between the Socialist and Social Democratic trade unionists.

It is simply that things are as they are, and it is impossible to conceal the fact of the confluence in the UGT of members who are now overtly dis-
tanced by the authorities.

Demerits (piling)

This week, when the increase in fuel prices finally materialized, something which EXPRESSO announced first-hand (an increase which, besides, was very badly prepared for politically), the two little signs that have been noted ended up posing essential questions, on which much of the horizon for the early 1980's will depend to a considerable extent; and the question of the PS' capacity for regenerating its strategy and its image in areas as important as the trade unions,...

Insist that the first question is concerned, although the reformers do not even constitute a political association, they should not be underestimated, particularly at a time when the AD might have to break off with lanes definitively.

There are 10 in Parliament, out of a majority of six, and they are present, also (indirectly, in many other major political posts, beginning with the presidency of the RTP (Portuguese Radio-Television System) itself).

As for the second question, time will tell whether the PS will rapidly succeed in collecting union dividends from its opposition status, and also how that ascent will be compatible with the essence of the Condiha strategy underlying UGT, which was based on a PS-PSD convergence.

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EC DIRECTOR ON ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS, MEMBERSHIP IN 1983

~~Source~~ DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 28 Jan 80 pp 13, 14

[Interview with Roland de Kergolay, general director of the European Economic Communities, by Jose Amaral; date and place not given]

[Text] The pace of the negotiations with Portugal has been similar to that in the case of Greece and Spain, asserted Kergolay, before explaining that there has been no meeting to date on the ministerial level simply because it has not been necessary. In an interview with DIARIO DE NOTICIAS, the general director of the Communities expresses the view that the expansion will not cause major changes in the present Common Market, and stresses the fact that the "southern countries" will have to accept the rules for operating in the community area as they exist today.

"Up until now, I have not noticed any appreciable delays in the negotiations with Portugal, I have heard some criticism from sectors which are protesting because there has been no meeting on the ministerial level, but I must say that no such meeting took place simply because it was not necessary." This was the answer given by Roland de Kergolay, general director of the European Communities, in an interview with DIARIO DE NOTICIAS, to the long-standing question of the delay in the negotiations with the Nine, which has now been raised again by certain sectors associated with the new parliamentary majority. Kergolay explained: "The timetable is not an inflexible objective, and may be changed for reasons apart from the negotiating process itself, for example, certain unpredictable repercussions stemming from the evolution of the international crisis;" emphasizing that the Membership Treaty cannot disregard any question, "regardless of how slight it may be." The general director of the Communities admits that Portugal may become a fully qualified member on the first day of 1983, whereupon it would begin the gradual adaptation of all sectors of the economy to the mechanisms of the Common Market, during a transitional period which the European Commission wants to limit to 10 years as a maximum, under any circumstances.

[Question] The debate held in Portugal on membership in the EEC has cited as a particularly significant question the need for deepseated changes in the

community to make possible the integration of three peripheral economies with levels of development and productive structures that are considerably imbalanced in relation to the average for the Nine. From this standpoint, membership entails major reorganization, not only for the candidate but also for the present Common Market. Do you accept this position?

[Answer] This is the groundrule: From the time of their entry, the countries which join the Community must adopt the entire "acquis communautaire" (community experience). * However, this basic rule allows a derogation, a so-called transitional period, which permits the making of exceptions in the immediate adoption of the "acquis," so as to facilitate membership without anxiety. This gradual approximation, through the transitional periods, is essential to preclude serious breakdowns in the candidate nations, which cannot become completely adjusted overnight to the Community mechanisms.

Having said this, it is equally obvious that the entry of the three new countries is posing new problems, and will do so for some time. But this is only the usual experience of the Community: Every day, new questions arise, and this is why the EEC is a living reality. The "acquis" changes from day to day. It is obvious that there will have to be adaptations and adjustments; but this is by no means equivalent to a considerable change in the structure of the Community.

[Question] I was referring especially to the need for progressive structural reforms in the integration mechanisms, based on the expansion to a peripheral area that is far removed from the "core" of the Nine. For example, I was referring to a change in the logic of the common agricultural policy, or the regional policy, issues which have, moreover, been brought up to the Community at present as an obvious result, for example, of the rejection of the budget by the European Parliament.

[Answer] Insofar as the PAC (common agricultural policy) is concerned, it is obvious: There is a problem that has been posed at present, consisting of a mixture of agricultural and budgetary problems which have nothing to do with the expansion....

[Question] But the expansion could exacerbate them considerably. So far, there is nothing to indicate the opposite hypothesis.

[Answer] True, no one can predict what might happen. But if we confine ourselves to certain concrete instances, the questions arise relatively easily. For example, one of the PAC's most serious problems at present is the financing of surpluses in the area of dairy products. The progress made in productivity was so great in this area that we have now reached a

* "Acquis communautaire": the combination of rules, legislation and mechanisms which govern the operation of the Community, and which will have to be adopted by the candidate country.

situation marked by chronic surpluses of milk, butter, powdered milk, etc. As you know, this has serious consequences for the budget. We are now going to try to cope with the problem by seeking mechanisms for arranging production which will make it possible to adjust the supply and demand within the Common Market. Furthermore, the problem has also cropped up, although on a lesser scale, in the case of sugar and certain grains.

I have just cited three specific areas wherein the expansion will not pose any new problems, since the three countries are regular importers of meat, dairy products and grain. It is likely that, in compensation, other difficulties will arise in areas such as vegetable and fruit production, for example. However, at the present time it is difficult to make an overall judgment of the consequences of the entry for Agriculture, since that "dossier" has not yet been opened in the cases of Portugal and Spain. As for Greece, I can only claim that the problems have found their solution in the Membership Treaty....

[Question] Therefore, in brief, the Community does not need to change structurally in order to take in the three new candidates. Is that a definitive conclusion?

[Answer] I do not think that there will be any deep-seated change. There will only be a change that is implicit in the entry of the three new countries (itself, with the questions that this involves, in the institutional area particularly. This is a question which we have already encountered in the first expansion, and which will perhaps be more complex now. But there are solutions, and the Community has already requested the preparation of two reports on the institutional issue: The first is the famous document of the "three wise men" which came out recently, and was prepared at the proposal of the Council of Ministers; the second, requested by the Commission, was worked on by another group of "wise men," and it may even make it possible for us to offer some suggestions.

[Question] Are there any concrete ideas which have resulted from those reports?

[Answer] There are no findings as yet. At present, the Commission is about to examine the second report and will make its decisions on the basis of the results contained therein. As for the document of the "three wise men," it will be incumbent on the Council to follow it up. So far, no decision has yet been made.

Increasing Political Identity

[Question] During the Intergroup meeting in Lisbon, several experts stressed once again the fact that the Community has failed in its attempts to intensify the integration in the political realm, and there has even been evidence of a considerable lag in that movement, because of the vicissitudes

point unresolved, regardless of how slight it may be. Everything has to be provided for; and, therefore, the exercise of the derivative right, which entails the review of some 40,000 pages of Community legislation to identify the requirements for adaptation on the part of Portuguese laws, has been prolonged. When this work has been accomplished, it is obvious that the time has come when, suddenly, everything begins to be resolved, and this or that chapter is closed. However, that conclusion is the sudden result of a slow previous effort. Therefore, the acceleration might well be a merely subjective impression.

Timetable Is Only a "Work Objective"

[Question] When compared with the Greek and Spanish processes, has Portugal's been slower?

[Answer] Up until now, I have not noticed any appreciable delays in the negotiations, and I do not think that there have been any. I have heard some criticism from sectors which are protesting because there has not yet been a meeting on the ministerial level. But this is the case simply because the meeting did not prove necessary. The first meeting of that kind will be held in February, and I can say right now that the agenda will be relatively limited, because there are not important essential matters to discuss. The ministers do not discuss particular aspects, and the work on the part of the deputies has progressed at a satisfactory pace. A considerable number of "dossiers" have already been opened and, by spring, I think that we shall be ready to take up all the chapters. At the present time, only those on agriculture, the right of establishment, and budgetary, financial and institutional matters remain.

At the same time, we shall have already identified new problems, or surmounted obstacles in connection with "dossiers" which were opened last year; therefore expending the constant effort that I have mentioned. I think that it will be possible to complete the work on identifying problems by the end of spring.

[Question] Do you consider it possible to maintain as a target the completion of the negotiations by the end of 1981?

[Answer] The target that we set for ourselves was to complete the negotiations so as to allow the Membership Treaty to go into effect on the first day of 1983. Taking into account an 18-month period for the parliamentary ratifications, this means that the treaty should be signed in the middle of next year. But that is only a work objective. This timetable should not be considered something unchangeable and inflexible, simply because difficulties could arise resulting from factors dissociated from the negotiations, for example, certain repercussions from the international crisis which are always difficult to predict. What is essential is to complete the negotiations on good terms, finding the best solutions for each

imposed by the crisis. To what extent could the expansion "replace" or reactivate the political integration?

[Answer] I think that the initial judgment made in your session is too harsh, when you claim that the desired intensification on the part of the Community on the political level has not occurred. In the first place, I would have to question to what extent, and by whom it is desired. In any event, what I can attest to is the development of a political cooperation among the member states that has, in reality, been reflected in increasingly frequent common attitudes toward the major international issues. We have witnessed the appearance of positions expressed by the group of states as a community. The case of the invasion of Afghanistan is a good example of a position that would not have been possible during the 1950's or 1960's.

[Question] Is the EEC, therefore, intensifying European political unity, despite the disintegrating effects caused by the development of the crisis?

[Answer] I think that it is assuming an increasing political identity. This seems evident to me.

Acceleration of the Negotiations: "A Subjective Phenomenon"

[Question] Let us proceed to the case of Portugal. The lag in the negotiating process has been discussed widely of late. Some sectors associate the acceleration noted during the past 6 months with a major change in the structure of the Portuguese negotiating team, and in the unblocking of the revision of the agreements of 1972 and 1976 discussed by the joint committee. Has there, in fact, been an appreciable change in the pace of the negotiations? Were there delays, or not, after all?

[Answer] In the first place, I deem it important to stress that the process of negotiating membership and the discussion of a new supplementary protocol for the agreement of 1972 are different things, despite the fact that they are closely linked. The purpose of the supplementary protocol, which was signed a month ago, is to consolidate the bases which will facilitate the membership with a minimum of problems. The Community gave Portugal certain guarantees which afford the country better opportunities for reorganizing its agricultural and industrial system. The case of the automotive industry is a rather accurate example in this regard.

As for the acceleration of the negotiations, I would just like to stress that this is a subjective phenomenon. This is so because all the negotiations on membership consist, for a long initial period (which has not yet ended for Portugal), of a survey of all the portions of the treaties which could pose problems. This effort at surveying the problems down to the last detail may be considered annoying, but it is indispensable. Each matter must be probed in detail. The Membership Treaty must not leave any

problem. This is far more important than the timetable. To leave questions for after the entry is the worst method, because it ends up leading to problems that are considerably more complex. But, for the present, the objective of completing the negotiations during 1981, probably as early as the first half of the year, still stands.

Transition Periods Should Not Exceed 10 Years

[Question] In Portugal, it has been maintained with some emphasis that the country stands to gain from prolonging the transition periods before the complete adaptation to the Community mechanisms as long as possible. In the case of Greece, the overall average was close to 5 years; but some experts consider that margin too narrow for the situation in which the Portuguese economy finds itself. What is your position on this point?

[Answer] Yes, in the case of Greece there were sectors which benefited from 5 years, while a larger group was included in 8 years; and, for certain areas, a maximum period of 7 years was established. For certain "zones" of industry, the transition period in the case of Portugal will be null, because they are already in a situation of free exchange with the Community. It is obvious that agriculture, for example, will require lengthy periods generally speaking; but, at the present time, I would only say that the transition cannot be unlimited. In the Commission's view, the derogations should not exceed a maximum of 10 years in any case.

[Question] Speaking of free exchange, can the Portuguese textile producers expect more leeway on the part of the EEC during the next few years with respect to the setting of limits on their exports?

[Answer] This is a very specific problem. There have been agreements concluded with Portugal, and I am not in a position to predict what changes will occur during the years preceding full membership. The principle of free circulation must be upheld starting at the time when the country is a member of the Community. Since that principle could cause problems, it is possible that the safeguard clause may be invoked by the Nine for a temporary period. Yet past experience has proven to us that, in the previous expansion, that expedient was seldom invoked, and never at the behest of the Community. In fact, the mechanisms called for in the membership treaties for the temporary periods have worked quite well. Will it be necessary to find new methods now? I don't know. That is another question for the negotiations.

1909

[SO: 310]

COMMUNIST YOUTH LEADER DESCRIBES GROUP'S GOALS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 28 Jan 80 p 7

[Text] "The labor movement's most important and most urgent task in Swedish society today is to deprive big finance of its power position. That is particularly true of the Wallenberg empire," Communist Youth chairman Lars Johansson said in a TT [PRESS WIRE SERVICE, INC.] interview.

"It is a disgrace that a little clique headed by Wallenberg runs almost all business activities and social development as well in a nation that calls itself democratic.

"Businesses should be taken over by society and by the wage earners so plans could be made for necessary industrial expansion and more extensive processing of raw materials than is now the case in order to guarantee future employment, maintain people's standard of living and put a stop to the enormous exportation of capital that is now going on."

According to Lars Johansson a prerequisite for such a business policy is a parliamentary majority for the Social Democrats and VPK [Leftist CP], with both parties in agreement on a radical policy that would include VPK cabinet ministers in a Social Democratic government.

Already Paid For

The workers would become owners of the Wallenberg group through expropriation, in other words Wallenberg could not count on being paid full value since in Johansson's opinion Wallenberg's power position is such "that he has already been paid many times over."

What did he think the more than 200,000 people now working in the Wallenberg company would say about such an operation?

"If both workers' parties work toward such a goal I think most of the employees would support it, in view of the fact that transferring the

Wallenberg empire to state ownership would guarantee jobs for many who now know that their jobs are threatened, those in depopulated areas and in many crisis-stricken branches.

"In the long run we feel that all big companies should be transferred to state ownership. It is also necessary for the state to gain control over the banks which are making unreasonably high profits due to inflation, among other things."

Communist Youth was formed 10 years ago. The association has 20,000 members, 60 percent of them workers and 40 percent attending high schools and other educational institutions.

More and more young people are experiencing a growing sense of alienation.

"One reason for this is that schools function poorly in the sense that they are examination schools which encourage competition instead of solidarity, justice and democracy. The commercial pressures to which young people are exposed contribute to a growing feeling of alienation and so does the unemployment many of them face when they get out of school.

Solidarity in School

"The Conservative minister of education now intends to launch a campaign against what is called violence and vandalism. Reactions we have heard from young people around the country show that students regard this as putting them on trial. Instead we must realize that the problems that exist in the schools are products of an environment created by adults.

"This is a question of solidarity. The fundamental ideals of the labor movement must come out in education. This means for example that exams should be eliminated and young people should be given a democratic influence over school life so they can meet the reactionary offensive that is being planned."

Lars Johansson feels the campaign against violence and vandalism should be met with a counter campaign by the labor movement for democracy and solidarity in the schools. This would provide solutions for the problems.

Communist Youth will hold its congress in Orebro in May. There will be a change of chairman at that time and Lars Johansson will return to his work as a social worker.

6578

CSO: 3109

GOVERNMENT TO BACK SAAB IN DEAL WITH FAIRCHILD TO BUILD PLANE

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 29 Jan 80 p. 10

[Text] Saab-Scania and the American firm Fairchild Industries have signed an agreement to cooperate in building a new passenger plane (the Transporter) that will hold at least 30 passengers. Delivery will start in 1984. The cooperative agreement is the first of its kind between American and European airplane industries.

The two companies will work as equal partners in development, production and marketing of the new plane.

The final assembly of the plane will take place in Sweden. The agreement must be seen against the background of a decision made a year ago by Saab-Scania to achieve an equal division between military and civilian work in the airplane division by the end of the 1980's.

From the point of view of Swedish employment this means that at least 400 men will be involved at the Saab-Scania development division.

In addition about 500 men could work on the plane in the machine shops if sales go as expected. The largest market is anticipated in the United States where Fairchild already has an established position. The plane is intended mainly for use on feeder routes covering short and medium distances.

The plane will be equipped with two turboprop engines with the capacity to fly 130 miles when fully loaded at a cruising speed of 500 kilometers an hour.

It can also be used as a business plane. The airplane will have a low noise level, according to Saab.

The Swedish government has already decided to help finance the project. The union organizations at Saab have approved the agreement.

Fairchild is very optimistic about the new plane and executive director John P. Dealy said: "We anticipate a large demand. A combination of Fairchild's product and sales experience in the area of passenger planes and Saab-Scania's resources in research, development and production is an ideal blend that will benefit both companies."

Fairchild's balance sheet for the first 9 months of 1979 showed invoices totaling about 2 billion kronor and profits of around 120 million Swedish kronor after taxes. There are approximately 11,500 employees.



This is what the new Saab-Scania airplane will look like.

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050: 1109

VOLVO TO BUILD SAAB-FAIRCHILD PLANE ENGINE WITH U.S. FIRM

Stockholm: DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 31 Jan 80 p. 36

[Article by Henrik Borgstrom]

[Text] Trollhattan, 30 Jan--Volvo Airplane Motors in Trollhattan is hopping to get 500 jobs--100 technicians and 400 plant personnel--from an agreement on joint production of civilian airplane engines with the American company Garrett in Arizona. Among other things they will be jointly developing a turboprop engine (a combination jet and propeller engine) for a passenger airplane for 25-30 passengers.

The agreement came just a few days after Saab presented a project for such a plane called the Transporter in conjunction with the American manufacturer, Fairchild. Fairchild and Garrett have already worked together in the past--there is every indication that the new Transporter will have an engine which Volvo Airplane Motors will help develop and manufacture.

"But everything depends on whether the Industrial Affairs Ministry will put up some risk money. We are beginning talks with a group from the ministry as early as next week," said the head of Airplane Motors, Gunnar L. Johansson when he presented the cooperation plan immediately on his return home from signing the agreement in the United States.

Two Projects

Thus the Industrial Affairs Ministry must now take a stand on two proposals for two civilian projects in the airplane industry--one from Saab on the plane, the other from Volvo on the engine.

A week ago a state airplane industry delegation under the leadership of Tony Hagstrom, chief of the National Telecommunications Administration, recommended that 675 million kronor be used on civilian projects within the airplane industry.

Conditional Loan

The state is expected to go along with a so-called conditional loan, one in which the money is repaid at the rate the civilian airplanes can be sold.

Volvo's cooperation with Garrett is expected to take about 500 million kronor in the next 5-year period. The money will go toward development of two new engines, preparations for production (including tools) and increased working capital.

The engines involved are:

The TFE 731-5, already manufactured by Garrett for 15 different business planes, 800 sold last year. Volvo will now help to develop the engine further. There is also a military version, the TFE 1042, which was submitted for the new Swedish light attack and training plane, the SK 2. (Commander in Chief Lennart Ljung will decide Friday whether he wants the plane or not.)

The engine has a traction force of 3600 to 4000 pounds and the normal speed is 800-900 km an hour.

The TPE 331-14 is the engine for which Volvo Airplane Motors has the highest hopes and the company has bought in for 15 percent. In other words it will make around 15 percent of the parts for all the engines Garrett manages to sell. It has a power of around 1500 horsepower, normal speed is around 500 km an hour. This turboprop engine is said to be especially well-suited for short-distance passenger airplanes.

Last year Volvo Airplane Motors signed an agreement with another American manufacturer, General Electric, and received state support for helping to develop an engine for a passenger plane designed for around 200 passengers.

Combat Plane

The spring will be a very exciting time for the company with vital decisions being made: the government's decision on a Swedish military airplane, the SK 2, and Saab's decision whether Garrett-Volvo Airplane Motors or some competitor will be chosen as the supplier of the civilian plane engines.

"This is one more example of our efforts to become a more civilian-oriented company. In 1972 90 percent of the Volvo Airplane Motors sales consisted of military orders, last year the figure was 70 percent and by 1990 we expect military sales to account for only 40 percent of the total," said Gunnar L. Johansson and his vice president, Bengt Eriksson.

The chairman of the Metalworkers Club, Kari-Göte Malm who has been to the United States and has inspected the Garrett plant, agreed with him.

"Even if we succeed with civilian engines we have to have a military production as a base in order to survive," he said.

Volvo Airplane Motors had expected to have a surplus of 200 technicians out of the 400 currently employed at the end of the first half of this year. About 100 of them will now be working on civilian Garrett engines. The company is expecting a military order to take care of another 100-- "otherwise there will have to be layoffs," said Volvo Airplane Motors president Gunnar L. Johansson.

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